New Constitution, New Europe: What About (Fiscal) Federalism?

More than fifty years after the Schuman Declaration, Europe is still far from a real Political Union. In fact, Europe faces an important imbalance between the two sides of the integration process, appearing as an important actor in the international economic scenario, but as a minor actor in the international political arena. In this paper, we start by arguing that the “small steps” strategy that led Europe until the present situation is no longer sufficient to let the Union efficiently overcome its present deficits and challenges. So, we call for an important change in the institutional and economic organisation of the EU, towards a model of largely decentralised federalism. By examining the present challenges for EU and the characteristics of the proposal for an European Constitution designed by the Convention, as well as comparing the main federal systems existing in the world today, we argue that the mentioned proposal is not enough to give the EU a strong voice both in the political and the economic areas. In this context, we discuss the design of an adequate institutional framework for the political organisation of the EU, presenting an alternative proposal based on the characteristics of a truly federal system, also as its consequences in what concerns the design and implementation of European economic policies. Keywords: European Union, Political Union, Federalism, Fiscal Federalism, European Constitution

COMPETITIVENESS OF NATIONS IN THE GLOBALIZATION ERA: IS THE (IN)EXISTENCE OF A COLLECTIVE STRATEGY RELEVANT?

Economic globalization puts businesses and countries facing new opportunities and challenges and engenders a high degree of uncertainty/risk. Portugal, facing this new global environment, has been experiencing poor economic performance, growing in the last decade at a rate lower than the European Union’s average. How to seize opportunities and overcome challenges, while at the same time ensuring the desired convergence? This challenge is put in terms of the relations between the regulatory and economic policies of States and the competitiveness of nation-States. Using concrete examples, in particular the Portuguese case, we will attempt to answer the question: does the existence (or absence) of a collective strategy, understood as a concerted strategy between the State and companies, their associations and other institutions, produce significant impact on the competitiveness of Nations? To answer this question, the analysis will focus on the following topics: challenges posed by globalization in terms of competitiveness of countries; evolution of the Portuguese economy, between 1975 and 2007, compared to those of Finland, Ireland and South Korea, countries of recognized success in the context of globalization; lessons that can be drawn concerning the presence or absence of a collective strategy and its impact on the competitiveness of these countries.globalization; competitiveness; institutions; total factor productivity; collective strategy; Portugal

Financial Autonomy of the European Union after Enlargement

One of the most important and current problems in the European Union (EU) public finance concerns its system of own resources. Almost all economists involved in the subject agree that the present system needs a comprehensive reform, as it does efficiently allows to deal with the new reality of the enlarged European Union. However, there is quite a divergence on how to do the reform, the problem lying in its range and directions. In general some economists postulate to extend the EU tax base by the creation of one or more new EU taxes whereas others opt for simplifying the system by replacing traditional and VAT resources with the so called ”fourth resource”. These differences mainly result from dissimilar approaches of economists to the criterion of financial autonomy. The main aim of this paper is to evaluate the present system of EU own resources and the proposals of its reform owing to the criterion of financial autonomy.EU budget, own resources, financial autonomy

“To Deficit or Not to Deficit”: Should European Fiscal Rules Differ Among Countries?

The creation of the European Monetary Union has led to a substantial increase in the discussion of the importance of fiscal discipline and adequate fiscal rules in such a monetary union. The “European” solution has been challenged by many authors and politicians: among the main questions discussed in recent years, we find the use of the same rules for different situations in Member-Countries, particularly in terms of economic dimension and economic level of development. We develop a model of a monetary union between two countries that may differ in economic dimension and in the level of development. By solving transitional dynamics towards the steady state through numerical computation, the model allows us to examine the impact of fiscal shocks that may lead to excessive deficits. Our results suggest that the implications of such deficits depend on whether they occur in the small and less developed country or in the big and more developed one. In this context, we argue that an excessive deficit should be temporarily allowed in the case of the small and less developed country, in order to improve economic convergence and wages within the union.Monetary Union; SGP; Excessive Deficits; Technological-Knowledge Gap; Numerical Computation.

Fiscal Federalism in the European Union: How Far Are We?

In this paper, we compare the present process of definition and implementation of fiscal policies in the European Union with the main conclusions of the “fiscal federalism” theory. This is done in order to draw possible lessons for future evolution, particularly taking into account the possibility of creating a European “Federation of Nation-States”, which we supported in a previous work. We argue that these main conclusions are easily compatible with the emergence of a largely decentralised “Federation”, but are still far distant from the present situation. In this context, we argue for several important lines of change in the short-run, namely an effective change in the process of coordinating fiscal policies and a credible reform of the Stability and Growth Pact, and in the medium-long-run, namely an important increase in the size of the European budget.Fiscal federalism, fiscal policy, European budget, fiscal discipline

The “New” Stability and Growth Pact: More Flexible, Less Stupid?

Since the beginning of the European single currency project, the adoption of fiscal binding rules, restraining the use of the single policy instrument left for national authorities, has been challenged by many authors and politicians. The discussion has been rekindled in recent years, following a period of economic recession or stagnation in several Member-Countries and some criticisms linking the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) to the general economic situation. Some of the questions raised by those who criticised the initial framework for fiscal discipline may have been taken into account in the recent revision of the SGP (March 2005), which followed the suspension of the Pact for Germany and France and eventually made the SGP more flexible and “less stupid”. In this paper, we evaluate the changes contained in the “new” SGP, by taking account of the properties for ideal fiscal rules put forward by Kopits and Symansky (1998) and comparing with some recently published studies on the same topic. The main result of our analysis points towards a clear increase in flexibility together with the probable emergence of new enforcement problems. In this context, an insufficient output in terms of fiscal discipline could arise, leading to the need for new improvements within the European framework for the definition and implementation of national fiscal policies.EMU, SGP, Fiscal Rules, Fiscal Discipline

Divergent competitiveness in the eurozone and the optimum currency area theory

As the euro is on its second decade, the European sovereign debt crisis and the ever more evident disparities in competitiveness among member states are prompting many to question whether monetary union is bringing more benefits than costs. The optimum currency area (OCA) theory provides a framework with several criteria for such analysis. Most literature focuses either or on OCA individual criteria or on an aggregate analysis of these criteria, using meta-properties. Differently, we start by a descriptive analysis of the first twelve euro countries under six criteria between 1999 and 2009. We detect signs of labour geographic mobility. However, nominal wages growth largely outpaced productivity growth in some periphery countries, resulting in losses of competitiveness. Financial markets seem to be deeply integrated. Total intra-EMU trade increased, though core countries seem to have benefited more, as their relative competitiveness improved. We detect no increased homogeneity of exports structures of EMU countries. Inflation rates alternated between periods of convergence and of divergence, though prices levels consistently converged between EMU countries. Finally, budgetary indiscipline was frequent preventing several countries from having fiscal room to face asymmetrical shocks.We conclude by estimating the impact of five OCA criteria on countries’ relative competitiveness, using real effective exchange rates as a proxy. Differences in the growth of unit labour costs, the dissimilarity of trade and the differences in output growth were found to be significant. With a higher confidence level, bilateral trade is significant and points towards the specialization paradigm. Thus, we identify some causes of the divergent competitiveness between some EMU countries that contributed to weaker economic growth in parts of the euro area.Optimum currency area, Euro Area; Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), Competitiveness

Da Moeda Única à União Política?

No presente artigo, tenta mostrar-se que a moeda única deve ser vista necessariamente sob um duplo prisma, enquanto reflexo máximo da integração económica na Europa e enquanto catalizador decisivo da necessidade de uma maior velocidade no processo de integração política. Assim, por um lado, atende-se à moeda única enquanto ponto de chegada culminante do processo de integração económica na Europa, fazendo-se uma breve análise do caminho percorrido e das lições que encerra, bem como uma apreciação da real importância económica da moeda única europeia e das suas implicações sobre a organização económica e política da União. Por outro lado, atende-se à moeda única enquanto ponto de partida para um novo fôlego da construção política europeia, evidenciando o modo como algumas das questões levantadas pelo advento do euro, em conjunto com outros problemas emergentes ou actuais na União, parecem impelir a uma transformação essencial da sua organização política, a ocorrer a médio prazo e tendendo ao aparecimento de um sistema de tipo federal, ainda que, forçosamente, com características originais.Europa, União Económica e Monetária, Política Económica, União Política, Intergovernamentalismo, Federalismo, Federalismo Fiscal

Image segmentation and reconstruction of 3D surfaces from carotid ultrasound images

Tese de doutoramento. Engenharia Electrotécnica e de Computadores. Faculdade de Engenharia. Universidade do Porto. 200