Optimum Taxation and the Allocation of Time.

This paper deals with optimum commodity taxation in Becker's (1965) model of the allocation of time. While the existing public finance literature emphasizes the role of cross elasticities with leisure, I find that the optimal tax system crucially depends on factor shares and elasticities of substitution in household production. In the special case of Leontieff technology, the optimum tax rule depends solely on factor shares and, furthermore, this simple rule maintains the first best allocation. The Becker approach implies, for example, that the social optimum involves a preferential tax treatment of consumer services and possibly even exclusion from the tax base.

Taxation and International Migration of Superstars: Evidence from the European Football Market

This paper analyzes the effects of top earnings tax rates on the international migration of football players in Europe. We construct a panel dataset of top earnings tax rates, football player careers, and club performances in the first leagues of 14 Western European countries since 1985. We identify the effects of top earnings tax rates on migration using a number of tax and institutional changes: (a) the 1995 Bosman ruling which liberalized the European football market, (b) top tax rate reforms within countries, and (c) special tax schemes offering preferential tax rates to immigrant football players. We start by presenting reduced-form graphical evidence showing large and compelling migration responses to country-specific tax reforms and labor market regulation. We then develop a multinomial regression framework to exploit all sources of tax variation simultaneously. Our results show that (i) the overall location responses to the net-of-tax rate is positive and large, with an elasticity of the number of foreign players to the net-of-tax rate around one (and an elasticity of the number of domestic players around .15), (ii) location elasticities are even larger at the top of the ability distribution, but negative at the bottom due to ability sorting effects, and (iii) cross-tax effects of foreign players on domestic players (and vice versa) are negative and quite strong due to displacement effects. Those results can be rationalized in a simple model of migration and taxation with rigid labor demand.

On the Optimality of Joint Taxation with Household Production

The existing literature suggests that the concern for economic efficiency calls for individual taxation of married couples with a higher rate on the primary earner. This paper reconsiders the choice of tax unit in the Becker model of household production, which includes previous analyses as special cases. In the general framework, where all utility yielding commodities are produced through a combinatiion of market goods and household time, optimal taxation requires joint taxation of the family. This result assumes that there are no restrictions in the use of commodity taxes. In the presence of such restrictions individual taxation is typically optimal. However, this may call for a lower rate on primary earners, unlike the standard result.optimal taxation, household production, time allocation

The Marginal Cost of Public Funds in OECD Countries. Hours of Work Versus Labor Force Participation

A central finding of the modern labor market literature is that labor supply responses tend to be concentrated along the extensive margin (labor force participation) rather than the intensive margin (hours of work). Yet, the literature on the marginal cost of public funds (MCF) focuses solely on the intensive margin. In this paper we demonstrate that it is important to incorporate extensive labor supply responses into the analysis. Firstly, MCF becomes a function of average taxes, rather than just marginal taxes. Secondly, participation decisions and thus MCF depend on the magnitude of transfers for those out of work. Our calculations for 23 OECD countries reveal that the MCF becomes substantially higher once the participation e.ect is accounted for. This is especially the case for continental European countries where average taxes are high and benefit systems are generous.

How can Scandinavians tax so much?

American visitors to Scandinavian countries are often puzzled by what they observe: despite large income redistribution through distortionary taxes and transfers, these are very high-income countries. They rank among the highest in the world in terms of income per capita, as well as most other economic and social outcomes. The economic and social success of Scandinavia poses important questions for economics and for those arguing against large redistribution based on its supposedly detrimental effect on economic growth and welfare. How can Scandinavian countries raise large amounts of tax revenue for redistribution and social insurance while maintaining some of the strongest economic outcomes in the world? Combining micro and macro evidence, this paper identifies three policies that can help explain this apparent anomaly: the coverage of third-party information reporting (ensuring a low level of tax evasion), the broadness of tax bases (ensuring a low level of tax avoidance), and the strong subsidization of goods that are complementary to working (ensuring a high level of labor force participation). The paper also presents descriptive evidence on a variety of social and cultural indicators that may help in explaining the economic and social success of Scandinavia

Optimal Taxation of Married Couples with Household Production

The literature suggests that the concern for economic efficiency calls for individual-based taxation of married couples with a higher rate on the primary earner. This paper reconsiders the choice of tax unit in the Becker model of household production. Our aim is to study the robustness of previous results to the modelling of time allocation. In addition, we analyze the interaction between the optimal income tax for couples and the chosen commodity tax structure. In the absence of restrictions on the use of commodity taxes, efficient taxation requires joint taxation of the family. In the presence of restricted commodity taxation, the income tax should compensate for the erroneous commodity taxes. In this case, individual taxation is typically optimal, but not necessarily with a higher rate on primary earners as usually suggested.

Labour Tax Reform, The Good Jobs and the Bad Jobs.

We analyse recent proposals to shift the tax burden away from low-paid labour, assuming a dual labour market where the 'good' high-paying jobs are rationed. A shift in the tax burden from low-paid to high-paid workers has an ambiguous effect on the level of aggregate employment while the allocation of aggregate employment is likely to be further distorted. Even if the tax reform raises total employment, economic efficiency may be reduced because labour is reallocated from high-productive to low-productive jobs. Opportunities for on--the--job search have important implications for the policy effects. When these opportunities are small, the tax reform is more likely to raise employment and welfare.

A Revised Efficiency Principle for the Taxation of Couples

We reconsider the result that efficient taxation involves a lower marginal tax on secondary earners than on primary earners. Introducing labor force participation responses into the analysis, we show that a second-earner tax allowance is better than selective marginal tax rates.optimal taxation; married couples; labor supply behavior

The Role of Taxes as Automatic Destabilizers in New Keynesian Economics

This paper analyses the effects of taxation in New Keynesian economics. The results show that taxes contribute to price and wage stickiness and, moreover, that the resulting fluctuations in welfare are magnified by the presence of taxes. These results are at odds with the old Keynesian idea of automatic stabilizers.New Keynesian economics, taxation, automatic stabilizersJEL Classification: E32, E62

The Optimal Income Taxation of Couples

This paper analyzes the optimal income tax treatment of couples. Each couple is modelled as a single rational economic agent supplying labor along two dimensions: primary and secondary earnings. We consider fully general joint income tax systems. Separate taxation is never optimal if social welfare depends on total couple incomes. In a model where secondary earners make only a binary work decision (work or not work), we demonstrate that the marginal tax rate of the primary earner is lower when the spouse works. As a result, the tax distortion on the secondary earner decreases with the earnings of the primary earner and actually vanishes to zero asymptotically. Such negative jointness is optimal because redistribution from two-earner toward one-earner couples is more valuable when primary earner income is lower. We also consider a model where both spouses display intensive labor supply responses. In that context, we show that, starting from the optimal separable tax schedules, introducing some negative jointness is always desirable. Numerical simulations suggest that, in that model, it is also optimal for the marginal tax rate on one earner to decrease with the earnings of his/her spouse. We argue that many actual redistribution systems, featuring family-based transfers combined with individually-based taxes, generate schedules with negative jointness.