Unstable Identities: The European Court of Human Rights and the Margin of Appreciation

All legal systems work under a master narrative – the self-conception of most actors of the system itself. A master narrative is a short and simple story and it is the underlying premise upon which any legal system is based. It is a simple story because it paints the system in quick broad brushstrokes and at (most) times is oblivious to the paradoxes within it. Furthermore, a master narrative is important for legitimization purposes because the actors’ legitimacy will depend on their (perceived) conformity with the system’s master narrative. Therefore, legitimacy is self-referential; the yardsticks for a legitimate action are contained within the system’s master narrative, not outside of it. When talking about different international courts it is important to remember that they are embedded within a master narrative that is contextual and contingent and, at different points, more or less contested. This paper explores the question of what happens when the master-narrative is in a period of transition (from a state cantered to a post-national world order) and when the actors’ legitimacy, their interpretative endeavours the very fundamentals are in a state of flux. I use the margin of appreciation discussion as a focal point of describing the conflicting narratives under which the European Court of Human Rights works, narratives in which the different actors (judges, attorneys, NGO activists, government agents) and their consequences in terms of the interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights

Migrating concepts: Immigrant integration and the regulation of religious dress in France and Canada

Religion in general, and Islam in particular, has become one of the main focal points of policy-making and constitutional politics in many Western liberal states. This article proposes to examine the legal and political dynamics behind new regulations targeting individual religious practices of Muslims. Although one could presuppose that church-state relations or the understanding of secularism is the main factor accounting for either accommodation or prohibition of Muslim religious practices, I make the case that the policy frame used to conceptualize the integration of immigrants in each national context is a more significant influence on how a liberal state approaches the legal regulation of individual practices such as veiling. However, this influence must be assessed carefully since it may have different effects on the different institutional actors in charge of regulating religion, such as the Courts and the legislature. To assess these hypotheses I compare two countries, France and Canada, which are solid examples of two contrasting national policy frames for the integration of immigrants