Review of Videotape Presented at the 6th Annual Conference on Ethnic and Minority Studies: Alan Hertzberg, The Autobiography of Miss Jane Dubois

To say that The Autobiography of Miss Jane Dubois is an exciting new departure in the venerable art of autobiography does not do full justice to the work under review here. Nor is it sufficient to say that in giving us this study of human life, producer Alan Hertzberg proves that works of integrity and high purpose can be crafted by the video artist, holding out the promise that if it would, American television could lift itself from the slough of mediocrity in which it has ever wallowed. What makes this twelve- chapter study an unforgettable experience is Jane Dubois herself, the young black woman from New York City whose life we ”watch“ unfold over the course of three hours

Economic Impacts of Aquatic Vegetation to Angling in Two South Carolina Reservoirs

Angler creel surveys and economic impact models were used to evaluate potential expansion of aquatic vegetation in Lakes Murray and Moultrie, South Carolina. (PDF contains 4 pages.

Density Functional Theory of Inhomogeneous Liquids: II. A Fundamental Measure Approach

Previously, it has been shown that the direct correlation function for a Lennard-Jones fluid could be modeled by a sum of that for hard-spheres, a mean-field tail and a simple linear correction in the core region constructed so as to reproduce the (known) bulk equation of state of the fluid(Lutsko, JCP 127, 054701 (2007)). Here, this model is combined with ideas from Fundamental Measure Theory to construct a density functional theory for the free energy. The theory is shown to accurately describe a range of inhomogeneous conditions including the liquid-vapor interface, the fluid in contact with a hard wall and a fluid confined in a slit pore. The theory gives quantitatively accurate predictions for the surface tension, including its dependence on the potential cutoff. It also obeys two important exact conditions: that relating the direct correlation function to the functional derivative of the free energy with respect to density, and the wall theorem.Comment: to appear in J. Chem. Phy

Intent and Recklessness in Torts: The Practical Craft of Restating Law

However one frames the concepts of intent and recklessness in a Restatement, they must be kept generic, stable, and endogenous. By generic we mean that the concepts should not be tied to any single tort, or family of torts. For example, one frequently encounters philosophical treatments of tort that automatically link intent with the causing of tangible harms, such as personal injury and property damage. Apparently, intent and harm are coupled in this manner in order to contrast intentional infliction of harm with negligently harmful conduct. But to inextricably link intent with tangible harm in a Restatement of Torts would constitute error-intent has a wider range of applications in the tort system. Thus, an actor may intentionally cause another to suffer harm other than tangible harm -- for example, economic loss, injury to reputation, or pure emotional upset -- under circumstances that make the actor\u27s conduct tortious. Indeed, an actor may commit an intentional tort without intending any harm whatsoever. The definition of intent must, therefore, be kept generic so that it can help to define a wide range of different torts. The same rule applies to recklessness. One may recklessly cause not only tangible harm to persons or property, but also economic loss, injury to reputation, and pure emotional upset unaccompanied by personal injury or property damage. Both intent and recklessness must also be kept stable in the sense that they must have the same meaning whenever employed in defining tortious acts. The Restatement drafter must be able, in other words, to offer a definition that remains constant whenever used in this Restatement. The concept of intent is too fundamental to be allowed to shift meanings across different factual contexts. Finally, intent and recklessness must be kept endogenous to tort without adjusting for how those elements are conceptualized in nonlegal contexts or in legal contexts other than tort. Thus, the fact that in Shakespeare\u27s tragedies intent may carry a special meaning that helps the playwright achieve dramatic impact, or the fact that intent has a special meaning in criminal statutes, should be irrelevant to the drafter of a Restatement of Torts. A Restatement of Torts speaks to, and only to, the tort system of which it is a constituent part. Other systems --Shakespearian tragedies, systems of criminal justice, and the like-- should be left to conceptualize intent and recklessness on their own, perhaps quite differently

Fixing Failure to Warn

Design-defect and failure-to-warn cases share the same structural elements. Just as the defendant cannot defend a case premised on defective design without knowing the specifics of how the plaintiff would redesign the product to make it safer, so with regard to defective warnings the plaintiff cannot challenge the reasonableness of the defendant\u27s marketing or whether better warnings would have saved the plaintiff from injury without knowing the specifics of the proposed warnings. No court would accept as adequate a statement by the plaintiff that she has a general idea for a reasonable alternative design (RAD), and no court should accept a similar generalization for a reasonable alternative warning (RAW). For understandable reasons, failure to warn is a doctrine that has tended to lack rigor. It is altogether too easy to conclude that a product seller should have said something more in order to alert a user or consumer about a risk. However, even when one can establish that there was a failure to warn, tort law requires that the omission be causally related to the plaintiff\u27s injury. That many courts have adopted a presumption that if a warning had been given it would have been heeded does not resolve the causation problem identified in this Article. In fairness, the defendant cannot rebut the heeding presumption unless the plaintiff identifies the warning that should have been given. One of the authors suspects that some form of enterprise liability may best describe the courts\u27 reactions to the difficulties described herein. But given the certainty that courts will continue to apply a failure-to-warn analysis, we argue that the plaintiff should be required to prove a RAW to establish a prima facie case. It is our hope that this Article will serve as the beginning of a fruitful dialogue

Fixing Failure to Warn

Design-defect and failure-to-warn cases share the same structural elements. Just as the defendant cannot defend a case premised on defective design without knowing the specifics of how the plaintiff would redesign the product to make it safer, so with regard to defective warnings the plaintiff cannot challenge the reasonableness of the defendant\u27s marketing or whether better warnings would have saved the plaintiff from injury without knowing the specifics of the proposed warnings. No court would accept as adequate a statement by the plaintiff that she has a general idea for a reasonable alternative design (RAD), and no court should accept a similar generalization for a reasonable alternative warning (RAW). For understandable reasons, failure to warn is a doctrine that has tended to lack rigor. It is altogether too easy to conclude that a product seller should have said something more in order to alert a user or consumer about a risk. However, even when one can establish that there was a failure to warn, tort law requires that the omission be causally related to the plaintiff\u27s injury. That many courts have adopted a presumption that if a warning had been given it would have been heeded does not resolve the causation problem identified in this Article. In fairness, the defendant cannot rebut the heeding presumption unless the plaintiff identifies the warning that should have been given. One of the authors suspects that some form of enterprise liability may best describe the courts\u27 reactions to the difficulties described herein. But given the certainty that courts will continue to apply a failure-to-warn analysis, we argue that the plaintiff should be required to prove a RAW to establish a prima facie case. It is our hope that this Article will serve as the beginning of a fruitful dialogue