21st Century Welfare Provision is more than the "social insurance state": A reply to Paul Pierson

This article reflects on the important lecture The Welfare State Over the Very Long Run, delivered by Paul Pierson, at the London School of Economics on 8 November 2010, on the occasion of the launch of Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State. Pierson's explanation for what he sees as the surprising stability of the welfare state over the past three to four decades of permanent austerity is largely rooted in fears of electoral ret-ribution and organized interest opposition against social reform (cf. Pierson 2011). While, in a nutshell, Pierson's lecture was a restatement of his famous new politics thesis with a nod to rival theoretical accounts, the present paper tries to go beyond Pierson's account of change-resistant welfare states by adding a number of empirical as-pects and theoretical dimensions to the debate on the long-term transformation of the welfare state. Empirically, on the one hand, the paper highlights several significant qualitative changes in social insurance provision, macroeconomic policy priorities, la-bor market policy and regulation, industrial relations, old age pension, social services and social policy administration, that are largely absent from Pierson's portrayal, also given his choice of data. The observation of profound social reform raises important theoretical issues for the comparative study of welfare state development. Here the pa-per points to underappreciated theoretical mechanisms, especially dynamics of policy learning in mature welfare state. In sum, the paper observes more profound change on the dependent variable requiring both a softening and updating of the theoretical biases to path-dependent institutional inertia. If policy makers, contrary to received wisdom, do engage in major reforms in spite of many institutional obstacles and negative political incentives, what distin-guishes these actors and the institutional conditions under which they operate, from the seemingly more general case of welfare inertia? In conclusion, the article argues that the readiness to use information feedback from past performance, new ideas and expertise and the inspiring reforms successes in many countries, should count as important con-duits or mechanisms explaining reforms. -- Dieser Artikel beschäftigt sich mit dem bedeutenden Vortrag The Welfare State Over the Very Long Run, den Paul Pierson anlässlich der Herausgabe des Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State am 8. November 2010 an der London School of Economics gehalten hat (vgl. Pierson 2011). Piersons Erklärung für die seiner Meinung nach bemerkenswerte Stabilität des Wohlfahrtsstaates in den von permanenter Austerität geprägten vergangenen drei bis vier Jahrzehnten basiert im Wesentlichen auf der Angst der politischen Eliten vor der Abstrafung an der Wahlurne und dem Widerstand organisierter Interessen gegen Sozialreformen. Vorliegender Aufsatz beleuchtet sowohl die empirischen als auch die theoretischen Grenzen dieser These eines wandlungsresistenten Wohlfahrtsstaates. In empirischer Hinsicht weist er auf eine nicht unerhebliche Anzahl von qualitativen Veränderungen hin, etwa auf der Ebene der Sozialversicherung, makroökonomischer Politikprioritäten, der Arbeitsmarktpolitik und -regulierung, der Beziehungen von Arbeitgebern und Arbeitnehmern, Renten, sozialen Dienstleistungen und der Sozialverwaltung. Die Beobachtung grundlegender Sozialreformen werfen wichtige theoretische Fragen für das vergleichende Studium wohlfahrtstaatlicher Entwicklung auf: Was unterscheidet politische Entscheidungsträger und die institutionellen Bedingungen, unter denen sie agieren, von dem anscheinend weitaus üblicheren Fall von Reformträgheit, wenn diese Akteure - entgegen der landläufigen Meinung - trotz einer Vielzahl institutioneller Hindernisse und negativer politischer Anreize umfassende Reformen anstoßen? Als Schlussfolgerung argumentiert dieser Aufsatz, dass die Lehren vergangener Performanz, neue Ideen und Expertisen sowie anregende Reformerfolge in vielen Ländern als wichtige Mechanismen gelten müssen, mit denen sich wohlfahrtstaatliche Veränderungen erklären lassen.

Recalibrating Europe's semi-sovereign welfare states

Since the late 1970s, all the developed welfare states of the European Union (EU) have been recasting the basic policy mix on which their national systems of social protection were built after 1945. Intensified global competition, industrial restructuring, budgetary austerity, changing family relations and demographic ageing have thrown into question the once sovereign and stable welfare systems of the Golden Age. Moreover, domestic issues of work and welfare have more recently become ever more intertwined with processes of European political and economic integration. In this respect, it is fair to say that in the EU we have entered an era of semi-sovereign welfare states. Together, these forces have produced a momentum of system change that goes far beyond the popular notion of welfare state retrenchment. The new welfare edifice suggests a departure from a politics against markets social-protection perspective, towards more of a politics with markets, social-investment approach. This paper tries to capture the comprehensive character of the ongoing effort to recast the architecture of the post-war social contract in terms of the concept of welfare recalibration for both heuristic and prescriptive purposes. It also addresses the engagement of the EU in ongoing processes of recalibrating Europes semi-sovereign welfare states. In the policy debate the term European social model is often invoked. Yet such generalisations gloss over the immense differences in welfare state development, design and institutional make-up across the EUs 25 member states and, as a consequence, fail to capture the complexity of contingently convergent reform trajectories in the recent period. -- Seit den späten 70er Jahren stellen alle hochentwickelten Sozialstaaten der EU den Mix an Sozial-Politiken, wie er nach 1945 in den jeweiligen Staaten geschaffen wurde, auf den Prüfstand. Die intensivierte Globalisierung, der Umbau der industriellen Produktion, Budgetprobleme, sich verändernde Familienbeziehungen und eine alternde Bevölkerung führen zu immer mehr Zweifeln an dem lange Zeit bewährten und stabilen wohlfahrtsstaatlichen System des goldenen Zeitalters. Dazu kommt, dass in letzter Zeit bisher nationale Themen wie Arbeit und Wohlfahrtsstaat immer stärker in die Prozesse der europäischen Integration hineingezogen werden. In diesem Blickwinkel gesehen ist es angemessen zu sagen, dass in der EU die Ära der nur noch halbsouveränen Staaten begonnen hat. All dies zusammengenommen kann man sagen, dass sich eine Konstellation ergeben hat, in der sich ein Systemwechsel vollzieht, der weit über die populäre Wahrnehmung der Öffentlichkeit vom Abbau des Sozialstaats hinausgeht. Die Konstruktion der neuen Wohlfahrtspolitik bedeutet den Abschied von einer Politik des sozialen Beschützens gegen die Märkte hin zu einer Politik sozialer Investitionen mit den Märkten. In diesem Papier wird versucht, die umfassende Bedeutung der fortdauernden Bemühungen zur Umgestaltung der Architektur des Sozialkontrakts aus der Nachkriegszeit zu erfassen - und zwar sowohl für heuristische Zwecke wie auch als Handlungsanleitung. Die Analyse bezieht sich auch auf das Engagement der EU in den andauernden Prozessen, die halbsouveränen Wohlfahrtsstaaten Europas neu zu justieren. In politischen Diskussionen wird oft der Begriff vom Europäischen Sozialmodell beschworen.

Welfare and Employment: A European Dilemma?

The majority of the Member States of the European Union have undertaken remarkably comprehensive welfare and labor market reforms in the years since the 1990s. Many of these reforms, however, have not followed the conventional retrenchment and deregulation recipes, but rather took a liking to social pacts, activation, active ageing/avoidance of early retirement, part-time work, lifelong learning, parental leave, gender mainstreaming, flexicurity (balancing flexibility with security), reconciling work and family life. At first sight, these reforms seem to have resulted in relatively robust employment growth, especially for women and more recently older workers. European economic integration has fundamentally recast the boundaries of national systems of employment regulation and social protection, both by constraining the autonomy for domestic policy options but also by opening opportunities for EU-led social and employment coordination and agenda setting.labor market reforms, European integration, welfare states

Whatever Happened to the Bismarckian Welfare State? From Labor Shedding to Employment-Friendly Reforms

The paper challenges the widespread view that Bismarckian countries with a strong role of social insurance and labor market regulation are less successful than other employment regimes and hard to reforms. This has been true about a decade ago. But both the institutional set-up and the performance of BIsmarckian countries have changed fundamentally over the last years. The paper summarizes major reform dynamics in Bismarckian welfare states which had adopted a strategy of labor shedding in the 1970s and 1980s to combat open unemployment. As this was associated with an increasing burden of non-wage labor costs, this triggered a sequence of more employment-oriented and more fundamental reforms that eventually helped overcome a low employment situation. The paper pursues the trajectory of reforms, shows the structural change in labor market performance and points out the achievements of past reforms, but also emphasizes the need for further action in terms of education and training, activation and employment opportunities for all working age people in these countries so that flexibility and security can be reconciled.employment, Bismarckian welfare states, social insurance, social policy, labor market policies

Recalibrating Europe's semi-sovereign welfare states

"Since the late 1970s, all the developed welfare states of the European Union (EU) have been recasting the basic policy mix on which their national systems of social protection were built after 1945. Intensified global competition, industrial restructuring, budgetary austerity, changing family relations and demographic ageing have thrown into question the once sovereign and stable welfare systems of the Golden Age'. Moreover, domestic issues of work and welfare have more recently become ever more intertwined with processes of European political and economic integration. In this respect, it is fair to say that in the EU we have entered an era of semi-sovereign welfare states. Together, these forces have produced a momentum of system change that goes far beyond the popular notion of welfare state 'retrenchment'. The 'new' welfare edifice suggests a departure from a 'politics against markets' social-protection perspective, towards more of a 'politics with markets', social-investment approach. This paper tries to capture the comprehensive character of the ongoing effort to recast the architecture of the post-war social contract in terms of the concept of welfare recalibration for both heuristic and prescriptive purposes. It also addresses the engagement of the EU in ongoing processes of recalibrating Europe's semi-sovereign welfare states. In the policy debate the term 'European social model' is often invoked. Yet such generalisations gloss over the immense differences in welfare state development, design and institutional make-up across the EU's 25 member states and, as a consequence, fail to capture the complexity of 'contingently convergent' reform trajectories in the recent period." (author's abstract)"Seit den späten 70er Jahren stellen alle hochentwickelten Sozialstaaten der EU den Mix an Sozial-Politiken, wie er nach 1945 in den jeweiligen Staaten geschaffen wurde, auf den Prüfstand. Die intensivierte Globalisierung, der Umbau der industriellen Produktion, Budgetprobleme, sich verändernde Familienbeziehungen und eine alternde Bevölkerung führen zu immer mehr Zweifeln an dem lange Zeit bewährten und stabilen wohlfahrtsstaatlichen System des goldenen Zeitalters. Dazu kommt, dass in letzter Zeit bisher nationale Themen wie Arbeit und Wohlfahrtsstaat immer stärker in die Prozesse der europäischen Integration hineingezogen werden. In diesem Blickwinkel gesehen ist es angemessen zu sagen, dass in der EU die Ära der nur noch halbsouveränen Staaten begonnen hat. All dies zusammengenommen kann man sagen, dass sich eine Konstellation ergeben hat, in der sich ein Systemwechsel vollzieht, der weit über die populäre Wahrnehmung der Öffentlichkeit vom 'Abbau des Sozialstaats' hinausgeht. Die Konstruktion der neuen Wohlfahrtspolitik bedeutet den Abschied von einer Politik des sozialen Beschützens 'gegen die Märkte' hin zu einer Politik sozialer Investitionen 'mit den Märkten'. In diesem Papier wird versucht, die umfassende Bedeutung der fortdauernden Bemühungen zur Umgestaltung der Architektur des Sozialkontrakts aus der Nachkriegszeit zu erfassen - und zwar sowohl für heuristische Zwecke wie auch als Handlungsanleitung. Die Analyse bezieht sich auch auf das Engagement der EU in den andauernden Prozessen, die halbsouveränen Wohlfahrtsstaaten Europas neu zu 'justieren'. In politischen Diskussionen wird oft der Begriff vom 'Europäischen Sozialmodell' beschworen. Aber solche Generalisierungen gehen über die wirklich großen Unterschiede in den wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Entwicklungen, in der Gestaltung und im institutionellem Aufbau der 25 EU-Mitgliedstaaten hinweg und verfehlen so als Konsequenz, die Komplexität der 'kontingenten Konvergenz' der Reformwege in den vergangenen Jahren richtig zu erfassen." (Autorenreferat

Gebaande en ongebaande paden in sociaal Europa: over de institutionele samenhang van de nationale verzorgingsstaat en het proces van Europese integratie

In deze rede wil ik aandacht besteden aan twee processen: de ontwikkeling van de verzorgingsstaat en de voortschrijdende Europese integratie. Het is mijn overtuiging dat deze beide grote naoorlogse projecten elkaar wederzijds, op dynamische wijze, hebben beïnvloed. Tijdens de naoorlogse wederopbouw werd de nationale verzorgingsstaat een elementaire politieke voorwaarde voor verdere economische integratie. Tegelijkertijd werd succesvolle Europese samenwerking een belangrijke economische voorwaarde voor de opbouw en uitbouw van de nationale verzorgingsstaat.Rede in verkorte vorm uitgesproken bij de aanvaarding van het ambt van bijzonder hoogleraar aan de Faculteit der Sociale Wetenschappen van de Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam vanwege de Wetenschappelijke Raad van het Regeringsbeleid met de leeropdracht Vergelijkende Analyse van de Europese Verzorgingsstaat, op 27 april 200

Learning from adversity: towards a European Union of social investment welfare states

This Policy Brief is based on a speech given at the 2023 edition of the EUI State of the Union, Florence, Palazzo Vecchio, 5 May.This policy brief reconstructs the process of welfare recalibration across EU welfare states in response to the Great Recession and the COVID-19 health shocks. It brings out four important lessons. The first is that generous and inclusive social protection buffered the Great Recession and the COVID-19 health shock well. Second, among European political economies, the more active welfare states were best able to bounce back with in terms of employment recovery. Third, the ECB vow ‘to do whatever it takes’ to save the euro was a key to breaking the spell of mass unemployment in the Southern eurozone. Finally, the NextGenerationEU policy response to the pandemic augured in an investment led recovery for the EU at large. The chapter concludes on a policy proposal to fast forward childhood social investment on EU fiscal support.Co-funded by the Erasmus+ Programme of the European Unio

Social investment agenda setting : a personal note

This article reconstructs how, under the umbrella of the Europea Union (EU), discreet opportunities for EU social policy agenda setting opened for academic expertise from the late 1990s to the 2020s. This began with the Dutch presidency of the EU in the first half of 1997, endorsing the notion of ‘social policy as a productive factor’, followed by the 2000 Lisbon strategy for Growth and Social Cohesion in the open economy. The social investment landmark publication was Why We Need a New Welfare State, written by Gøsta Esping-Andersen et al., for the Belgian presidency of 2001. Ultimately, cumulative academic insights and feedback from country-specific reform experiences found their synthesis in the Social Investment Package in 2013. EU political codification of social investment took effect with the adoption of the European Pillar of Social Rights in December 2017. The paper concludes on the future for social investment with some personal reflections as an engaged scholar.This article was published Open Access with the support from the EUI Library through the CRUI - Wiley Transformative Agreement (2020-2023)

The EU needs a social investment pact

In this Opinion Paper, we argue that long term-goals of social and economic policy in the EU must not fall victim to short-term policy orientations prompted by the banking crisis that hit the global economy in 2008 and the subsequent financial and fiscal problems affecting the Eurozone and the EU at large. We capture these long-term goals with the notion of a 'social investment imperative'. Social investment is not a new idea per se. We first revisit the social investment perspective as proposed towards the end of the 1990s and draw some lessons from past experience. We maintain that a social investment impetus, given Europe’s adverse demography, is today more acute than ever before. Subsequently, we examine how a renewed social investment perspective can be rescued from one-sided policy orientations prompted by the economic crisis (First paragraph

towards a holding environment for europe s diverse social citizenship regimes

The postwar expansion of the national welfare state produced – as a by-product – a sense of national community on the basis of social citizenship rights. European integration, also taking shape over the period of postwar reconstruction, lacked the accompanying moral force of deepening European community integrity. More perversely, the operational logic of intensified market and currency integration from the 1980s on was intent to ensure that member states held their 'wasteful' welfare state in check through economic liberalization, monetarism and balanced budgets. The aftermath of Euro crisis (and Brexit) has exposed that the 'permissive consensus' of relegating social policy to the nation state and market and monetary discipline to the EU is past its prime. However, I doubt that adding substance to EU social citizenship is a viable strategy in times of resurgent nationalism. I am also not so sanguine that 'adding stuff' to EU citizenship would strengthen any sense of European community. Rather, I suggest a more assertive and transformative institutional role for the EU in backing and bolstering the problem-solving capacities of semi-sovereign national welfare states. The EU should transform its modus operandi from a 'disciplining device' to a 'holding environment' for national welfare states to prosper, making the EU a proud and tangible union of national welfare states