A Theory of Pyramidal Ownership and Family Business Groups

We provide a rationale for pyramidal ownership (the control of a firm through a chain of ownership relations) that departs from the traditional argument that pyramids arise to separate cash flow from voting rights. With a pyramidal structure, a family uses a firm it already controls to set up a new firm. This structure allows the family to 1) access the entire stock of retained earnings of the original firm, and 2) to share the new firm's non-diverted payoff with minority shareholders of the original firm. Thus, pyramids are attractive if external funds are costlier than internal funds, and if the family is expected to divert a large fraction of the new firm's payoff; conditions that hold in an environment with poor investor protection. The model can differentiate between pyramids and dual-class shares even in situations in which the same deviation from one share-one vote can be achieved with either method. Unlike the traditional argument, our model is consistent with recent empirical evidence that some pyramidal firms are associated with small deviations between ownership and control. We also analyze the creation of business groups (a collection of multiple firms under the control of a single family) and find that, when they arise, they are likely to adopt a pyramidal ownership structure. Other predictions of the model are consistent with systematic and anecdotal evidence on pyramidal business groups.

The Risk-Adjusted Cost of Financial Distress

In this paper we argue that risk-adjustment matters for the valuation of financial distress costs, since financial distress is more likely to happen in bad times. Systematic distress risk implies that the risk-adjusted probability of financial distress is larger than the historical probability. Alternatively, the correct valuation of distress costs should use a discount rate that is lower than the risk free rate. We derive a formula for the valuation of distress costs, and propose two strategies to implement it. The first strategy uses corporate bond spreads to derive risk-adjusted probabilities of financial distress. The second strategy estimates the risk adjustment directly from historical data on distress probabilities, using several established asset pricing models. In both cases, we find that exposure to systematic risk increases the NPV of financial distress costs. In addition, the magnitude of the risk-adjustment can be very large, suggesting that a valuation of distress costs that ignores systematic risk significantly underestimates their true present value. Finally, we show that marginal distress costs computed using our new formula can be large enough to balance the marginal tax benefits of debt derived by Graham (2000), and we conclude that systematic distress risk can help explain why firms appear rather conservative in their use of debt.

Is Cash Negative Debt? A Hedging Perspective on Corporate Financial Policies

We model the interplay between cash and debt policies in the presence of financial constraints. While saving cash allows financially constrained firms to hedge against future income shortfalls, reducing debt - "saving borrowing capacity" - is a more effective way of securing future investment in high cash flow states. This trade-off implies that constrained firms will allocate excess cash flows into cash holdings if their hedging needs are high (i.e., if the correlation between operating cash flows and investment opportunities is low). However, constrained firms will use excess cash flows to reduce current debt if their hedging needs are low. The empirical examination of cash and debt policies of a large sample of constrained and unconstrained firms reveals evidence that is consistent with our theory. In particular, our evidence shows that financially constrained firms with high hedging needs have a strong propensity to save cash out of cash flows, while showing no propensity to reduce outstanding debt. In contrast, constrained firms with low hedging needs systematically channel free cash flows towards debt reduction, as opposed to cash savings. Our analysis points to an important hedging motive behind standard financial policies such as cash and debt management. It suggests that cash should not be viewed as negative debt.

Corporate Demand for Liquidity

This paper proposes a theory of corporate liquidity demand and provides new evidence on corporate cash policies. Firms have access to valuable investment opportunities, but potentially cannot fund them with the use of external finance. Firms that are financially unconstrained can undertake all positive NPV projects regardless of their cash position, so their cash positions are irrelevant. In contrast, firms facing financial constraints have an optimal cash position determined by the value of today's investments relative to the expected value of future investments. The model predicts that constrained firms will save a positive fraction of incremental cash flows, while unconstrained firms will not. We also consider the impact of Jensen (1986) style overinvestment on the model's equilibrium, and derive conditions under which overinvestment affects corporate cash policies. We test the model's implications on a large sample of publicly-traded manufacturing firms over the 1981-2000 period, and find that firms classified as financially constrained save a positive fraction of their cash flows, while firms classified as unconstrained do not. Moreover, constrained firms save a higher fraction of cash inflows during recessions. These results are robust to the use of alternative proxies for financial constraints, and to several changes in the empirical specification. We also find weak evidence consistent with our agency-based model of corporate liquidity.

Corporate Financial and Investment Policies when Future Financing is not Frictionless

Much of corporate finance is concerned with the impact of financing constraints on firms. However, the literature on financing constraints largely ignores the intertemporal implications of those constraints; in particular, how future financing constraints affect current investment decisions. We present a model in which future financing constraints lead firms to have a current preference for investments with shorter payback periods, investments with less risk, and investments that utilize more liquid/pledgeable assets. The model has a host of implications in different areas of corporate finance, including firms' capital budgeting rules, risk-taking behavior, capital structure choices, hedging strategies, and cash management policies. We show how a number of patterns reported in the empirical literature can be reconciled and interpreted in light of the intertemporal optimization problem firms solve when they face costly external financing. For example, contrary to Jensen and Meckling (1976), we show that firms may reduce rather than increase risk when leverage increases exogenously. Furthermore, firms in economies with less developed financial markets will not only take different quantities of investment, but will also take different kinds of investment (safer, short-term projects that are potentially less profitable). We also point out to several predictions that have not been empirically examined. For example, our model predicts that investment safety and liquidity are complementary: constrained firms are specially likely to distort the risk profile of their most liquid investments.

Should Business Groups be Dismantled?The Equilibrium Costs of Efficient Internal Capital Markets

We analyze the relationship between conglomerates’ internal capital markets and the efficiency of economy-wide capital allocation, and identify a novel cost of conglomeration that arises from an equilibrium framework. Because of financial market imperfections engendered by imperfect investor protection, conglomerates that engage in “winner-picking” (Stein, 1997) find it optimal to allocate scarce capital internally to mediocre projects, even when other firms in the economy have higher productivity projects that are in need of additional capital. This bias for internal capital allocation can decrease allocative efficiency even when conglomerates have efficient internal capital markets, because a substantial presence of conglomerates might make it harder for other firms in the economy to raise capital. We also argue that the negative externality associated with conglomeration is particularly costly for countries that are at intermediary levels of financial development. In such countries, a high degree of conglomeration, generated for example by the control of the corporate sector by family business groups, may decrease the efficiency of the capital market. Our theory generates novel empirical predictions that cannot be derived in models that ignore the equilibrium effects of conglomerates. These predictions are consistent with anecdotal evidence that the presence of business groups in developing countries inhibits the growth of new independent firms due to lack of finance

The Financial Accelerator in Household Spending: Evidence from International Housing Markets

This paper explores contractual features of housing finance and uses data from international housing markets to provide evidence supporting the “financial accelerator” (Bernanke et al. 1996, 1999). Among households whose housing demand is constrained by the availability of collateral, those who can borrow against a larger fraction of the housing value (achieve higher loan-to-value, or LTV ratio) have more procyclical debt capacity. This procyclicality in borrowing capacity is at the heart of the mechanism underlying the financial accelerator. Our empirical strategy uses international variation in maximum LTV ratios to show that housing prices as well as demand for new mortgages are more sensitive to income shocks in countries with higher LTV ratios, consistent with the dynamics of a collateral-based financial accelerator in household spending. We also find that the empirical relationship between maximum LTV ratios and income sensitivities is stronger in countries where housing prices are low relative to household income. Because collateral constraints are less likely to bind when housing is more expensive (an income constraint may bind instead), these latter results further suggest that a collateral-based accelerator is indeed behind the observed cross-country differences in income sensitivities

The Financial Accelerator: Evidence from the International Housing Markets

This paper shows novel evidence on the mechanism through which financial constraints amplify uctuations in asset prices and credit demand. It does so using contractual features of housing finance. Among agents whose housing demand is constrained by the availability of collateral, those who can borrow against a larger fraction of their housing value (achieve a higher loan-to-value, or LTV, ratio) have more procyclical debt capacity. This procyclicality underlies the nancial accelerator mechanism described by Stein (1995) and Bernanke et al. (1996). Our study uses international variation in maximum LTV ratios over three decades to test whether (a) housing prices and (b) demand for new mortgage borrowings are more sensitive to income shocks in countries where households can achieve higher LTV ratios. The results we obtain are consistent with the dynamics of a collateral-based financial accelerator in housing markets

The Marian Paths of Portugal and Local Development

This study aims to analyse the contribution of Marian Paths to the development of individual sites. The theoretical framework of the work is an empirical study which uses databases such as Science Direct, Emerald, Google Scholar, and Web of Science databases to identify suitable themes for empirical evidence (2015-2021) on pilgrimage paths and local development. Based on this, 19 interviews were undertaken to develop an understanding of developments, particularly in the area of Fátima, Portugal. The contents of the interviews were analysed using NVivo. This article concludes that there is no management model implemented on the Portuguese Marian paths, more specifically the paths of Fátima. However, efforts are being made to implement a development, upgrading, and promotion strategy for paths in the area. This study allows us to identify opportunities for local communities and for a sustainable management model for the paths of Fátima. The originality of the research lies in the fact that there are still no studies on the subject, mainly due to the lack of a management model for Marian paths