19 research outputs found
Ontology as Transcendental Philosophy
How does the critical Kant view ontology? There is no shared scholarly answer to this question. Norbert Hinske sees in the Critique of Pure Reason a “farewell to ontology,” albeit one that took Kant long to bid (Hinske 2009). Karl Ameriks has found evidence in Kant’s metaphysics lectures from the critical period that he “was unwilling to break away fully from traditional ontology” (Ameriks 1992: 272). Gualtiero Lorini argues that a decisive break with the tradition of ontology is essential to Kant’s critical reform of metaphysics, as is reflected in his shift from “ontology” to “transcendental philosophy,” two notions that Lorini takes to be related by mere “analogy” (Lorini 2015).
I agree with Lorini that a thorough reform of ontology is a pivotal part of Kant’s critical plan for metaphysics and that ontology somehow “survives within the critical philosophy” (Lorini 2015: 76). To make this case, however, I deem it important to identify “ontology” and “transcendental philosophy” in the sense of extensional equivalence. While we can detect this identification in Kant’s writings, only from his metaphysics lectures can we get a full sense of its historical and philosophical significance. In this chapter I focus on how it represents a definitive turn from as well as notable continuity with traditional treatments of ontology, particularly the Wolffian one
A Guide to Ground in Kant's Lectures on Metaphysics
While scholars have extensively discussed Kant’s treatment of the Principle of Sufficient Ground in the Antinomies chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason, and, more recently, his relation to German rationalist debates about it, relatively little
has been said about the exact notion of ground that figures in the PSG.
My aim in this chapter is to explain Kant’s discussion of ground in the
lectures and to relate it, where appropriate, to his published discussions of
ground
Die Methode der Erkenntnis bei Descartes und Leibniz /
Reg.1. Halfte: Historische Einleitung. Descartes' Methode der klaren und deutlichen Erkenntnis2. Halfte: Leibniz' Methode der formalen Begrundung. Erkenntnislehre und Monadologi
Transzendentale Dialektik : ein Kommentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft /
1. Ideenlehre und Paralogismen2. Vierfache Vernunftantinomie; Natur und Freiheit; Intelligibler und empirischer Charakter3. Das Ideal der reinen Vernunft; Die spekulativen Beweisarten vom Dasein Gottes; Dialektischer Schein und Leitideen der Forschung4. Die Methodenlehre; Mit einem Nachwort und Register fĂĽr alle vier Teil