Development of an Organisational Certification Process for Specific Category Drone Operations

To govern and ensure the safety of increasing drone operations, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has defined three risk-based categories of unmanned aircraft system (UAS) operations. A large part of commercial UAS operations fall into the Specific category, which includes operations with medium risk that require an authority approval. One possible way to gain approval for these operations is the light UAS operator certificate (LUC) awarded by a national aviation authority. It offers organisations the privilege to assess and approve operations without applying for authorisation from an authority. However, only general information regarding the LUC is available in the European regulatory publications. Thus, there is currently a lack of detailed guidelines and practical information about the process and requirements for acquiring LUC status. This paper describes the development of a LUC application process model following a design science research approach. The model supports organisations to assess their LUC capabilities, develop their organisation, create the documentation to fulfil relevant requirements, and to apply for the certificate. Finally, the results of a case study where the process model was applied are presented

Safety analyses on the use of tram doors in GoA1 and GoA4 autonomy levels

Development towards higher grade of automation (GoA) levels has been a global trend in trains and metros, but so far not in trams due to their complex and highly dynamic operating environment. However, currently rail operators are also showing increasing interest on higher automation levels in tram systems to increase their efficiency and safety. Higher GoA levels in a tram system introduces changes in operating principles, new roles for personnel, and new types of safety risks in daily operations. In this report, we present two studies where risk analysis methods were applied in the conceptual level to identify new autonomy related safety risks in tram operations. The goal of this study was to identify and analyse the effects of increasing level of tram autonomy (from GoA1 to GoA4) on the use of automated tram door and its functionalities. The objectives were to identify the different operating situations of the automatic tram door system, analyse the related safety and availability risks, and define the necessary safety measures.The results of the PHA and STPA analyses show that parts of the door systems are already capable for GoA4 tram operations. There are safety systems ensuring that the doors do not open when the tram is in motion, and to detect obstacles between the doors. Solutions to ensure accessibility and safe entry and exit for all passengers must be developed for GoA4 operation considering especially passengers who move slowly, have reduced mobility, use wheelchair or are visually impaired. Managing of abnormal situations and emergencies needs to be carefully considered in GoA4 operation. For example, to ensure that the tram can be evacuated safely if needed, and that management of technical and human disturbances with the door systems could be managed remotely.The door system, however, is only one aspect of the tram operation and other parts are subject to significant changes. Thus, on the path towards automated tram operations, comprehensive safety analyses of all parts of the system and operations are still needed. Systemic methods, such as STPA, can be applied to support these analyses. The results of the analyses can be used to support development of the door systems by focusing the development actions into the areas where the major changes and improvement needs are expected

Safety risk sources of autonomous mobile machines

Autonomous mobile machines are applied increasingly often in outdoor applications, but only in places, where logistic problems and safety issues are resolvable. Solving safety issues require good hazard identification and risk estimation. The aim of this study is to show which new risks emerge in autonomous mobile machines compared to manual machines. There are new risks, which are valid only in autonomous mobile machines (e.g., related to sensors for situational awareness), and risks, which exist in both machine types, but human presence can make the difference in resolving the situation. Humans can take sophisticated protective measures during an unexpected hazardous situation. Another aim of this work is to give information to designers and assessors to consider risks of their own design. Autonomous mobile machines are complex, and their performance is not always easily predictable. A checklist of risks would help an assessor, but currently, it may be difficult to find a checklist for a specific autonomous mobile machine. The main result of this study is a checklist of new risk sources or hazards of autonomous mobile machines.<br/