Economic performance or electoral necessity? Evaluating the system of voluntary income to political parties

Whilst the public funding of political parties is the norm in western democracies, its comprehensive introduction has been resisted in Britain. Political and electoral arrangements in Britain require parties to function and campaign on a regular basis, whilst their income follows cycles largely related to general elections. This article shows that the best predictor of party income is the necessity of a well-funded general election campaign rather than party performance. As a result, income can only be controlled by parties to a limited degree, which jeopardises their ability to determine their own financial position and fulfil their functions as political parties

Clientelistic networks and local corruption: Evidence from Western Crete DIMITRIOS CHRISTOPOULOS

In this article, the attitudes and interaction of local political and business elites in western Crete are examined by means of an attitudinal survey, triangulated with data from in-depth interviews, conducted between July and October 1991. The data examined indicate that the endemic prevalence of clientelistic networks creates the background for corruption, although evidence of corrupt practice is not strong. In this analysis it is presumed that the attitudes and perceptions of key actors are affected by a definition of corruption that is relevant to their particular civil society alone. Data analyzed here suggest that local élite attitudes towards corruption are not perceived to affect the standards of conduct at the local level. It can also be deduced that if corruption is linked to the problems of administrative efficiency and economic development of the region, these can be related to vertical clientelistic networks with the national centre

Weapons of the Powerful: Authoritarian Elite Competition and Politicized Anticorruption in China

What motivates authoritarian regimes to crack down on corruption? We argue that just as partisan competition in democracies tends to politicize corruption, authoritarian leaders may exploit anticorruption campaigns to target rival supporters during internal power struggles for consolidating their power base. We apply this theoretical framework to provincial leadership turnover in China and test it using an anticorruption data set. We find that intraelite power competition, captured by the informal power configuration of government incumbents and their predecessors, can increase investigations of corrupt senior officials by up to 20%. The intensity of anticorruption propaganda exhibits a similar pattern. The findings indicate that informal politics can propel strong anticorruption drives in countries without democratically-accountable institutions, although the drives tend to be selective, arbitrary, and factionally biased.postprin

Anger, anxiety and corruption perceptions: Evidence from France

British Academy grant SG-101785

Bishops who live like princes: Bishop Tebartz-van Elst and the challenge of defining corruption

This article contributes to the debate on defining corruption. Rather than attempting to provide a definitive definition, it uses the case of Franz-Peter Tebartz-van Elst, a German bishop from the diocese of Limburg who stepped down in 2014, to illustrate that the disciplines of law, political science, economics, and anthropology all make important contributions to understanding what corruption is and how it should be conceptualized. Seen through these different lenses, the article argues, the case of “Bishop Bling” can be understood in strikingly different ways. This has ramifications not just for the case itself but also for how analysts understand corruption more broadly. Adopting an overtly interdisciplinary approach does not represent a way to “solve” the definitional dilemma, but it can help analysts understand more about corruption’s multiplicity

Portraying the nature of corruption: Using an explorative case-study design

What is the nature of corruption in Western democracies? To answer this research question, the authors study 10 Dutch corruption cases in depth, looking at confidential criminal files. The cases allow them to sketch a general profile of a corruption case. The authors offer nine propositions to portray the nature of corruption. They conclude that corruption usually takes place within enduring relationships, that the process of becoming corrupt can be characterized as a slippery slope, and that important motives for corruption, aside from material gain, include friendship or love, status, and the desire to impress others. The explorative multiple case study methodology helps to expand our understanding of the way in which officials become corrupt. © 2008 The American Society for Public Administration

Integrating institutional and behavioural measures of bribery

Bribery involves individuals exchanging material benefits for a service of a public institution. To understand the process of bribery we need to integrate measures of individual behaviour and institutional attributes rather than rely exclusively on surveys of individual perceptions and experience or macro-level corruption indexes national institutions. This paper integrates institutional and behavioural measures to show that where you live and who you are have independent influence on whether a person pays a bribe. The analysis of 76 nationwide Global Corruption Barometer surveys from six continents provides a date set in which both institutional and individual differences vary greatly. Multi-level multivariate logit analysis is used to test hypotheses about the influence of institutional context and individual contact with public services, socio-economic inequalities and roles, and conflicting behavioural and ethical norms. It finds that path-determined histories of early bureaucratization or colonialism have a major impact after controlling for individual differences. At the individual level, people who frequently make use of public services and perceive government as corrupt are more likely to pay bribes, while socio-economic inequality has no significant influence. While institutional history cannot be changed, changing the design of public services offers is something that contemporary governors could do to reduce the vulnerability of their citizens to bribery

Honesty above all else? Expectations and perceptions of political conduct in three established democracies

The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the ESRC (grant number RES-000-22-3459) and British Academy (grant numbers SG-101785 and SG-52322). They would also like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions

Access to post-compulsory education and training: economic, sociological and political determinants and remaining research gaps

This paper presents a review and assessment of existing theoretical accounts to explain differentials in access to education and training in advanced economies. These theories tend to focus on the analysis of the influence of a set of economic, sociological and political variables on access to education. Existing theories are criticized on two grounds. Firstly, they seldom take into consideration the crucial role of political‐institutional factors, and in particular, welfare states’ actions through direct investment and regulation in shaping access levels. Secondly, they focus narrowly on the analysis of different stages of education and training, and this does not reflect the current policy emphasis on lifelong learning. The paper concludes with an outline of a future research agenda to address these gaps, and also calls for a more rigorous analysis of the weight of the different factors affecting access