Lessons Learned? The Kosovo Specialist Chambers’ Lack of Local Legitimacy and Its Implications

The experiences of many transitional justice mechanisms have led to a general consensus on the central importance of local legitimacy and local ownership; this indeed is repeatedly avowed by both the UN and the EU in their prescriptions on effective transitional justice mechanisms. Yet, I argue that the Kosovo Specialist Chambers was established in the absence of both. The court was not created in response to domestic pressure from within Kosovo; rather, it was the result of external pressure which by definition compromised local ownership and legitimacy. Drawing on the findings from first-hand qualitative research, I demonstrate that the court’s local legitimacy has not improved since its establishment. This lack of legitimacy, I argue, has potentially negative implications as, without popular legitimacy, the court’s proceedings and judgements are unlikely to command sufficient public support to either catalyse the societal changes promised by the court’s external sponsors, or withstand opposition to the court from within the Kosovo Albanian population resulting from any perceived slight against the ‘heroic’ KLA

The Assumptions Underlying the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and their Implications

Since 1999 international actors have presented Kosovo’s problems as stemming exclusively from endogenous factors which locals cannot solve; international oversight is thus a necessary and benign source of order. The KSC is the latest initiative premised on this assumption; this article identifies the key implications of this. The fact that the KSC’s creation was driven by external actors has had a negative impact on its legitimacy amongst the general public within Kosovo that will impact on their response to its proceedings. The idea that international oversight is more efficient is questionable given that since 1999 international judicial mechanisms have endured corruption, witness intimidation, and political interference. Those who supported the establishment of the KSC advanced a narrative which implies they were not culpable for the events of 1998-2000; in fact, both UNMIK and KFOR – by virtue of their respective mandates – manifestly failed in their duty to provide security

“An Expensive Commodity”? The Impact of Hope on US Foreign Policy During the “Unipolar Moment”

“Imperial overstretch” and the role played by related ideational issues derived from particular liberal tenets and the US’ belief in its “manifest destiny” to lead the world, have been regularly cited as explanations for why the US’ ambitious project to transform the world in the post-Cold War era failed. In this article I argue that these analyses have overlooked a crucial causal factor which also impelled the US to undertake its ultimately doomed project: hope. I demonstrate that analyses of hope’s influence have found that while hope can exert a positive influence, it can also – if irrational – induce self-destructive behaviour. During the period of unipolarity, the US repeatedly advanced teleological visions of a bright future for humanity routinely infused with the language of hope. I demonstrate that hope was, however, more than just a discursive device; it was itself a catalyst for the US’ actions. I argue that a confluence of factors at the end of the Cold War aligned to impel the rapid emergence of a particular variant of hope – defined as ‘wilful hope’ – which inspired the US to act as it did. I demonstrate how this disposition was evident in the rhetoric employed by both Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush but also – more importantly – in the strategies they each implemented. Ultimately, this disposition played a crucial – though not exclusive – role in undermining international support for US leadership and precipitating the end of ‘the unipolar moment’

From Human Security to the Responsibility to Protect: The Co-option of Dissent?

In this article I argue that the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has sanitized much of the revolutionary potential of human security. While R2P has not subsumed human security — the latter arguably involves a broader array of issues and themes which continue to be discussed — it has come to dominate the debate on the protection of human rights and, specifically, preventing and responding to mass atrocities. Whereas human security, in its early inception, constituted a challenge to the state-centric nature of the international system, R2P maintains the systemic status quo and treats states — and the state-based nature of the United Nations (UN) — as unalterable constants. While R2P is propelled largely by non-states actors, the strategic calculus focuses on altering the behaviour of states — a strategy I consider naïve and/or hubristic — rather than reforming the state-based system in a way which coheres with the original human security approach of empowering individuals at the expense of states

The viability of the responsibility to prevent

The efficacy of the Responsibility to Prevent suffers from two key problems; causal indeterminacy, and a dependence on the political will of states, particularly the permanent five members of the Security Council. The vast array of factors which can be cited as potentially contributing to the outbreak of conflict and atrocity crimes mitigates against the determination of definite “conflict triggers”. This does not mean prevention is impossible but does limit the efficacy of “early warning systems”. The dynamics of the “four crimes” within R2P’s purview further limits the efficacy of prevention as the decision to engage in mass atrocities is taken in response to a perceived existential crisis. This significantly limits the scope for leveraging the “internal” aspect of R2P as the decision to commit these acts is invariably born from a belief that no other option is available to the potential aggressors. Thus the specifics of atrocity crime prevention places great emphasis on the operationalisation of the external dimension of R2P, namely the role of the international community. So long as the response of the “international community” is predicated on the political will of states, however, the efficacy of prevention in these areas will be limited, as the “international” response is prey to narrowly defined national interests

The Impact of the Security Council on the Efficacy of the International Criminal Court and the Responsibility to Protect

This article argues that the manner in which the Security Council inhibits the consistent application of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and International Criminal Court (ICC) referrals reinforces their power in the international order without creating long term peace and stability. The Security Council’s discretionary powers allow it to subjectively determine which situations to address and which lawbreakers to prosecute; this consolidates, and indeed expands, the power of the Security Council in relation to other agents of international law. As a result, international cooperation to protect and promote human rights and punish human rights violators is currently impeded. This article argues that those concerned with the consistent enforcement of international human rights law, and the punishment of human rights violators, must accept the need for reforms to the current international order that would allow a better integration of R2P and the ICC into international law and practice. Our reforms – advanced in the form of general principles taken from legal theory – propose altering the Security Council’s powers and developing new judicial structures to enable the more consistent application of international lawPostprintPeer reviewe