The Standard Meter by Any Name is Still a Meter Long

In §50 of Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein wrote the sentence, "There is one thing of which one can say neither that it is one metre long, nor that it is not one metre long, and that is the standard metre in Paris." Although some interpreters have claimed that Wittgenstein’s statement is mistaken, while others have proposed various explanations showing that this must be correct, none have questioned the fact that he intended to assert that it is impossible to describe the standard meter as being a meter long- Given that Wittgenstein introduces this sentence as analogous to the claim that "existence cannot be attributed to an element," and that the preceding passages discuss a language- game the simples of which can be described by their own names, there is good reason to think that Wittgenstein did not intend to assert this infamous sentence

Two Ways to Teach Pre-Medical Students the Ethical Value of Information Gathering

There are many things that medical and premedical students can and should get out of a course on medical ethics. Many topics relevant to the practice of medicine require genuine philosophical contemplation. For instance: What is voluntary informed consent? How should “death” be defined and what difference does this make in specific situations? And perhaps even, What is a person? Questions such as these are appropriate for medical ethics courses because of the bearing they have on ethical decisions made by physicians and others in the health care field. That is, encouraging reflection on these and other such questions is a means by which most of us who teach medical ethics hope to enable our students to become better—more ethically aware—health care workers

How are Emergencies Different

Three criteria are necessary for an event to be an emergency: (a) there must be an expectation of serious harm; (b) there must be an expectation that someone can do something to prevent or reduce that harm; and (c) there must be time pressure. Because emergencies are unique in having this set of criteria, standard moral principles, when applied to emergency situations, can require actions that are prohibited in other situations. This can give the impression that there are different moral principles at work in emergencies. This paper argues that this impression is illusory

The Death Penalty and Victims’ Rights: Legal Advance Directives

Insofar as we support the victims’ rights movement, we have reason to support the use of legal advance directives allowing individuals opposed to the death penalty an effective means of expressing their wish that their murderers not be executed. This is an extension of taking victims’ rights seriously in other circumstances, and helps to demonstrate that we truly respect the rights and autonomy of persons who have become victims. We have considered a number of worries about granting victims this sort of power, but given that most of those who are professionally concerned with the issue of the death penalty agree that there is no good reason to believe that the failure to impose the death penalty increases the risk of capital crime, we have been unable to discover anyone who has a legitimate interest in prohibiting such legal advance directives. If a murder victim could speak, his request that his murderer not be sentenced to death ought to be given serious consideration. By means of legal advance directives murder victims can speak

Family Resemblances and Criteria

In §66 of Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein looks for something common to various games and finds only an interconnecting network of resemblances. These are "family resemblances". Sympathetic as well as unsympathetic readers have interpreted him as claiming that games form a family in virtue of these resemblances. This assumes Wittgenstein inverted the relation between being a member of a family and bearing family resemblances to others of that family. (The Churchills bear family resemblances to one another because they belong to the same family, they don't belong to the same family because they resemble one another.) A close reading of Investigations gives no evidence that Wittgenstein made this mistake. Rather, family resemblances may play a role like the one criteria play for psychological terms. They give excellent but fallible evidence for membership in the extensions of some terms

Wittgenstein on Description

It is a commonplace in discussions of Wittgenstein's later writings to note that he insisted that philosophy involved descriptions, not explanations. Despite this little has been written about the descriptions he had in mind. A close reading of the texts shows that very often Wittgenstein was asking for descriptions of descriptions of everyday objects and phenomena. With this in mind, I consider what can be learned about pain from considering descriptions of descriptions of pain. I conclude by demonstrating how Wittgenstein's discussion of rule-following looks if we keep in mind that he is discussing and describing, descriptions

Viability

In seeking a compromise on abortion, many have suggested that the woman's rights supersede the fetus's until the fetus becomes viable, at which point the fetus's right to life becomes paramount. Others have objected that this is arbitrary. Nevertheless, we can make principled use of viability. Once viability is achieved it is possible to respect both values: a woman may choose to have the fetus removed from her body, and the fetus can be kept alive. Thus, if it is "the State's" duty, or interest, to protect the life of the fetus, there should be no "problem of abortion" after viability

Alternative Analyses

For quite some time now there has been a debate between those who insist that conceptual analysis is a matter of determining the conditions necessary and sufficient for falling under a concept, or belonging to a kind, and those who believe that if this is what conceptual analysis is, then conceptual analysis is futile. Perhaps the debate has become quieter in the last decade or so, but members of each side still seem to find it incredible that their position is not unanimously accepted by now. I would like to examine the possibility that there really is not as much disagreement here as has been supposed. To illustrate what I mean, in this paper I will consider three theories which have been proposed as alternatives to the Classical necessary and sufficient conditions account of analysis: Cluster Concepts, Paradigms, and Prototypes

Dialogue: The Characteristics of Information and Avoiding Surprises

The principle of avoiding surprises, on the other hand, provides some recourse. This is because most of the time there is general agreement about which possible outcomes would be surprising. Moreover, if the patient is surprised, that is some - albeit inconclusive - reason to believe that the physician should have provided the information. Also, a physician who fails to warn a patient must be willing to say that he was unprepared for that outcome, and so may be open to the criticism that he should have been. Granted, there will be instances in which it is not clear that the physician should have been prepared for an outcome, or should have found it unsurprising. But these correspond with the instances in which it simply is not clear whether the physician had the obligation to provide that information. There are gray areas. Although Steinberg's characteristics will be helpful for physicians sincerely looking for guidance, my concern is that they cannot provide a standard, and would not allow criticism of those rare physicians who stubbornly refuse to inform their patients

Hampton on the Expressive Power of Punishment

Hampton‘s expressive theory of retributive punishment is intended to provide a telos for retribution, a justifying aim that will both shed light on the retributive impulse and dispel the moral uneasiness critics feel about the intentional infliction of suffering on wrongdoers. The central idea is to show that the retributive impulse goes hand in hand with a commitment to egalitarian moral values. However, a close examination of the theory reveals the opposite. If punishment sends the message that the offender and the victim are equally valuable, it does so only by sending the message that a person‘s value is correlated with his ability to exert coercive force over other human beings