What I've Learned About Teaching...So Far

Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession,

The Effects of Reducing Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Barriers to Trade on the Washington State Apple Industry

Health Economics and Policy,

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RIVER RATS AND IDAHO'S FOUR RIVERS WHITEWATER RAFTING LOTTERY

Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

Welfare Trade-offs between Transferable and Non-Transferable Lotteries

The Four Rivers lottery run by the National Forest Service distributes the opportunity to raft four sections of rivers in Idaho through a non-transferable lottery. The restriction of trade and focus on equity in distribution creates a deadweight loss in total surplus compared with a market or auction system. If the NFS allowed the transferring of permits, then there exists a potential for rafters to gain surplus in trade. However, non-rafters have an incentive to enter the transferable lottery to make a profit from trade. Using the NFS lottery as a guide, this paper examines welfare under the two lottery system to understand how changes in transferability affect the welfare of users and non-users, and the revenues of the government. Since variables, such as number of permits, permit fees, and application fees, also impact welfare, we derive comparative statics for these variables to demonstrate how these government controls affect rafter welfare, non-rafter welfare, and government revenue differently under transferable and non-transferable lotteries. Our results show the welfare trade-offs rafters have between transferable and non-transferable lotteries.Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

ALL TUNA IS NOT CREATED EQUAL: THE EXISTENCE OF QUANTITY SURCHARGES DUE TO PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION.

Quantity surcharges exist when unit prices are higher for larger packages. We hypothesize that various sizes of goods are differentiated products, and this explains some surcharges. Estimating a random-coefficients logit demand model, we examine own and cross elasticities to determine the level of differentiation between products with different size packages.Marketing,

Interst Group Incentives for Post-lottery Trade Restrictions

The rights to use publicly-managed natural resources are sometimes distributed by lottery,and typically these rights are non-transferable. Prohibition of post-lottery permit transfers discourages applicants from entering the lottery solely for protable permit sale, so only those who personally value the use of the resource apply. However, because permits are distributed randomly and trade is restricted, permits may not be used by those who value them most. We examine a possible rationale for restrictions on permit transfers based on the distribution of welfare across interest groups, and characterize the economic conditions under which post-lottery prohibitions on trade are likely to arise. We develop our model using the specic case of the Four Rivers Lottery used to allocate rafting permits on four river sections in Idaho and Oregon.lottery, trade prohibition, interest groups

Effects of Generic Advertisement on Demand: The Case of the Washington State Apple Commission

The Washington Apple Commission (WAC) generically promoted apples for the Washington state industry from 1937 until 2003. This paper provides an analysis of the effects on demand attributable to these activities. Demand movement associated with promotion tends to be positive, though the results are mixed. Overall, WAC promotion increased growers’ total revenue by approximately $53.4 million for 2002. The estimated average return to advertising topped$8.7 per dollar of advertising. Continuing selected promotional activities could increase revenue for growers if these activities could be carried out by voluntary, coordinated efforts.Demand and Price Analysis,

Milk Marketing Order Winners and Losers

Determining the impacts on consumers of government policies affecting the demand for food products requires a theoretically consistent micro-level demand model. We estimate a system of demands for weekly city-level dairy product purchases by nonlinear three stage least squares to account for joint determination between quantities and prices. We analyze the distributional effects of federal milk marketing orders, and find results that vary substantially across demographic groups. Families with young children suffer, while wealthier childless couples benefit. We also find that households with lower incomes bear a greater regulatory burden due to marketing orders than those with higher income levels.Milk, marketing orders, dairy industry regulation

Milk Marketing Order Winners and Losers

Do milk marketing orders affect various demographic groups differently? To answer this question, we use supermarket scanner data to estimate an incomplete demand system for dairy products. Based on these estimates, we simulate substitution effects among dairy products and the welfare impacts of price changes resulting from changes in milk marketing orders for various consumer groups. While we find little difference in own- and cross-price substitution elasticities of demand, the welfare effects of price changes vary substantially across demographic groups, with some losing and others winning from this government program. Families with young children suffer from marketing orders, while wealthier childless couples benefit. Additionally, we find that households with lower incomes pay a larger percentage of their income due to marketing orders than those with higher income levels.Consumer/Household Economics,

Information and Opportunistic Behavior in Federal Crop Insurance Programs

Opportunistic behavior in crop insurance can arise due to asymmetric information between producers and the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation. Producers who insure fields using transitional yields based on county average yields or who select options such as buy-up coverage or revenue insurance may increase their return from crop insurance. Using field-level crop insurance contract data for several crops in five growing regions, we find evidence that producers can profit from using buy-up coverage, revenue insurance, and transitional yields and that the level of producer opportunism is crop but not necessarily land-quality specific and is greater due to premium subsidization.opportunistic behavior, crop insurance, buy-up, revenue, transitional yields