Partisan Monetary Policies: Presidential Influence through the Power of Appointment

We investigate the channels through which partisan influence from a Presidential administration could affect monetary policy-making.Influence could be a result of direct Presidential pressure exerted on members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), or it could be a result of partisan considerations in Presidential appointments to the Board of Governors. To investigate these two channels of influence, we devise and apply a method for estimating parameters of monetary policy reaction functions that can vary across individual members of the FOMC Our results suggest that the appointments process is the primary mechanism by which partisan differences in monetary policies arise

Monetary Policy Preferences of Individual FOMC Members: A Content Analysis of the Memoranda of Discussion

The Memoranda of Discussion provide detailed records of Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting deliberations. Procedures are developed for coding the textual data in the Memoranda and assessing the reliability of those codings. The codings are then used in the estimation of parameters of individual FOMC members\u27 reaction functions. Data from the 1970 to 1976 period are employed in the estimation. In the future, similar methods could be used to analyze newly released transcripts of FOMC meetings held after 1976

Money supply, money demand and miroeconomics models, ed. 2/ Havrilesky

xvi, 528 hal.: ill.; 20 c

A Partisanship Theory of Fiscal and Monetary Regimes.

This paper indicates that income redistribution, motivated by the distributive ideals of liberal political p arties, create unanticipated disincentives for productive effort. Thi s suggests that newly-elected liberal parties are likely to engage in monetary surprises in order to compensate for the adverse effects of these disincentives on real income. Estimated reaction from function s support these predictions. A measure of income redistribution, the change in the ratio of the social expenditures of government to GNP, has a positive significant effect on money growth. In addition, when the Presidency changes from conservative to liberal, there is a posit ive and significant increase on money growth. Copyright 1987 by Ohio State University Press.

Money supply, money demand and microeconomic models, 2nd.ed./ Havrilesky

xvi, 528 hal.: ill.; 20 cm

Monetary Policy Preferences Of Individual Fomc Members: A Content Analysis Of The Memoranda Of Discussion

The Memoranda of Discussion provide detailed records of Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting deliberations. Procedures are developed for coding the textual data in the Memoranda and assessing the reliability of those codings. The codings are then used in the estimation of parameters of individual FOMC members' reaction functions. Data from the 1970 to 1976 period are employed in the estimation. In the future, similar methods could be used to analyze newly released transcripts of FOMC meetings held after 1976. © 1997 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Partisan Monetary Policies: Presidential Influence through the Power of Appointment.

The authors investigate the channels through which partisan influence from a presidential administration could affect monetary policy-making. Influence could be a result of direct presidential pressure exerted on members of the Federal Open Market Committee or it could be a result of partisan considerations in presidential appointments to the Board of Governors. To investigate these two channels of influence, the authors devise and apply a meth od for estimating parameters of monetary policy reaction functions that can vary across individual members of the Federal Open Market Committee. Their results suggest that the appointments process is the primary mechanism by which partisan differences in monetary policies arise. Copyright 1993, the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.