625 research outputs found

    A case of hypoxic encephalopathy with delayed exacerbation

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    Most patients contract hypoxic encephalopathy after suffering a cardiac arrest. They usually endure severe neurological sequelae and the temporal profile of the disease progression remains unclear. This case study shows how the effects of hypoxic encephalopathy continue to progress for several years after the initial event. Up to eight years after the hypoxic insult, the patient’s intellect steadily deteriorated, and brain atrophy progressed. As the hypoxic insult on the brain is only transient, the neurological disability seems not to be exacerbated for years. However, our case indicates that this disorder may have a long progression

    Gas, Iron and Gravitational Mass in Galaxy Clusters: The General Lack of Cluster Evolution at z < 1.0

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    We have analyzed the ASCA data of 29 nearby clusters of galaxies systematically, and obtained temperatures, iron abundances, and X-ray luminosities of their intracluster medium (ICM). We also estimate ICM mass using the beta model, and then evaluate iron mass contained in the ICM and derive the total gravitating mass. This gives the largest and most homogeneous information about the ICM derived only by the ASCA data. We compare these values with those of distant clusters whose temperatures, abundances, and luminosities were also measured with ASCA, and find no clear evidence of evolution for the clusters at z<1.0. Only the most distant cluster at z=1.0, AXJ2019.3+1127, has anomalously high iron abundance, but its iron mass in the ICM may be among normal values for the other clusters, because the ICM mass may be smaller than the other clusters. This may suggest a hint of evolution of clusters at z ~ 1.0.Comment: 23 pages including 5 figures. Using PASJ2.sty, and PASJ95.sty. Accepted by PAS

    Free Entry and Social Inefficiency under Co-opetition

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    We investigate the social desirability of free entry in the co-opetition model in which firms compete in a homogeneous product market while sharing common property resources that affect consumers' willingness to pay for products. Our findings show that free entry leads to socially excessive or insufficient market entry in the case of non-commitment co-opetition, depending on the magnitude of "business stealing" and "common property" effects of entry. On the other hand, in the case of pre-commitment co-opetition, free entry leads to excess entry and a decline in common property resources. Interestingly, in this case, the excess entry results of Mankiw and Whinston (1986) and Suzumura and Kiyono (1987) hold even when there are no entry (set-up) costs. These results have important policy implications for entry regulation

    Free Entry and Social Inefficiency under Co-opetition

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    We investigate the social desirability of free entry in the co-opetition model in which firms compete in a homogeneous product market while sharing common property resources that affect market size or consumers' willingness to pay for products. We show that free entry leads to socially excessive or insufficient entry into the market in the case of non-commitment co-opetition, depending on the magnitude of "business stealing" and "common property" effects of entry. On the other hand, in the case of pre-commitment co-opetition, free entry leads to excess entry and a decline in the common property resources. Interestingly, in the latter case, the excess entry result of Mankiw and Whinston (1986) and Suzumura and Kiyono (1987) holds even when there are no entry (set-up) costs for entrants. These results have important policy implications for entry regulations

    Free Entry and Social Inefficiency under Co-opetition

    Get PDF
    We investigate the social desirability of free entry in the co-opetition model in which firms compete in a homogeneous product market while sharing common property resources that affect market size or consumers' willingness to pay for products. We show that free entry leads to socially excessive or insufficient entry into the market in the case of non-commitment co-opetition, depending on the magnitude of "business stealing" and "common property" effects of entry. On the other hand, in the case of pre-commitment co-opetition, free entry leads to excess entry and a decline in the common property resources. Interestingly, in the latter case, the excess entry result of Mankiw and Whinston (1986) and Suzumura and Kiyono (1987) holds even when there are no entry (set-up) costs for entrants. These results have important policy implications for entry regulations

    Why are cheetahs so powerful? S-shaped flexion spine effect on cheetah galloping

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    The 11th International Symposium on Adaptive Motion of Animals and Machines. Kobe University, Japan. 2023-06-06/09. Adaptive Motion of Animals and Machines Organizing Committee.Poster Session P
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