Technology, Wages and Skill Shortages: Evidence from UK Micro Data

Why have skill shortages continue to persist despite increases in training and the skill levels of the workforce? We argue that technical progress has raised the demand for skilled labour to mach the observed increase in supply. We provide econometric evidence in support of this hypothesis, showing that skill shortages are higher for establishments that use advanced technology in the production process. We also provide econometric evidence that hiring difficulties are inversely related to the relative wage, as theory would suggest. Our results have clear implications for policy. If technological progress continues to be skill biased, policies that address skills deficiencies will only be successful if they produce a continual, rather than a temporary, increase in levels of skills among the workforc

How does big data affect GDP? Theory and evidence for the UK

We present an economic approach to measuring the impact of Big Data on GDP and GDP growth. We define data, information, ideas and knowledge. We present a conceptual framework to understand and measure the production of “Big Data”, which we classify as transformed data and data-based knowledge. We use this framework to understand how current official datasets and concepts used by Statistics Offices might already measure Big Data in GDP, or might miss it. We also set out how unofficial data sources might be used to measure the contribution of data to GDP and present estimates on its contributions to growth. Using new estimates of employment and investment in Big Data as set out in Chebli, Goodridge et al. (2015) and Goodridge and Haskel (2015a) and treating transformed data and data-based knowledge as capital assets, we estimate that for the UK: (a) in 2012, “Big Data” assets add £1.6bn to market sector GVA; (b) in 2005-2012, account for 0.02% of growth in market sector value-added; (c) much Big Data activity is already captured in the official data on software – 76% of investment in Big Data is already included in official software investment, and 76% of the contribution of Big Data to GDP growth is also already in the software contribution; and (d) in the coming decade, data-based assets may contribute around 0.07% to 0.23% pa of annual growth on average

The Trade and Labour Approaches to Wage Inequality

We compare the trade and labour approaches to wage inequality. We first look at the theoretical differences, stressing the different roles ascribed to sector and factor bias, labour supply and the theory of technical change in trade models with endogenous prices. We then briefly review some of the evidence on the sector bias of prices and technology.Wage inequality, Technical change, Stolper-Samuelson effects

Understanding 'The Essential Fact about Capitalism': markets, competition and creative destruction

This paper examines two ways in which competition works in modern capitalist economies to improve productivity. The first is through incentives: encouraging improvements in technology, organisation and effort on the part of existing establishments and firms. The second is through selection: replacing less-productive with more productive establishments and firms, whether smoothly via the transfer of market shares from less to more productive firms, or roughly through the exit of some firms and the entry of others. We report evidence from the UK suggesting that selection is responsible for a large proportion of aggregate productivity growth in manufacturing, and that much of this is due in turn to selection between plants belonging to multi-plant firms. We also investigate whether the nature of the selection process varies across the business cycle and report evidence suggesting that it is less effective in booms and recessions. Finally, although in principle productivity catch-up by low-income countries ought to be easier than innovation at the frontier, in the absence of a well functioning competitive infrastructure (a predicament that characterises many poor countries), selection may be associated with much more turbulence and a lower rate of productivity growth than in relatively prosperous societies. We report results of a survey of firms in transition economies suggesting that, particularly in the former Soviet states (excluding the Baltic states), poor output and productivity performance has not been due to an unwillingness on the part of firms to change and adapt. On the contrary, there has been a great deal of restructuring, much new entry and large reallocations of output between firms; but such activity has been much more weakly associated with improved performance than we would expect in established market economies

Constructing a price deflator for R&D: calculating the price of knowledge investments as a residual

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Job Creation, Job Destruction and the Contribution of Small Businesses: Evidence for UK Manufacturing

We use the ARD micro level data set for UK manufacturing to document job creation and job destruction (JC&D). Due to data limitations, previous UK studies were unable to use entry and exit in calculations of JC&D and/or were are at the firm rather than establishment/plant level and/or used data that understate the number of small businesses in the economy. Our data can overcome these problems being based on plant and establishment-level data from the UK Census of Production. We compute JC&D levels and rates and the contribution of small businesses for UK manufacturing between 1980 and 1991 and compare our findings with previous UK studies and other countries. We find: a) establishment (plant) job creation and destruction rates of 10.0% and 13.5% (11.2% and 14.7%) respectively, higher than other studies; b) large establishments (plants) are responsible for about 60% (55%) of job destruction; and c) small establishments (plants) are responsible for between 50% and 68% (57% and 70%) of job creation, depending on calculation method.Small firms, Job creation and destruction