Filter Media Recommendation Review

The original filter recommended by PNNL for the RASA is somewhat difficult to dissolve and has been discontinued by the manufacturer (3M) because the manufacturing process (substrate blown microfiber, or SBMF) has been superceded by a simpler process (scrim-free blown microfiber, or BMF). Several new potential filters have been evaluated by PNNL and by an independent commercial lab. A superior product has been identified which provides higher trapping efficiency, higher air flow, is easier to dissolve, and is thinner, accommodating more filters per RASA roll. This filter is recommended for all ground-based sampling, and with additional mechanical support, it could be useful for airborne sampling, as well

Representative Atmospheric Plume Development for Elevated Releases

An atmospheric explosion of a low-yield nuclear device will produce a large number of radioactive isotopes, some of which can be measured with airborne detection systems. However, properly equipped aircraft may not arrive in the region where an explosion occurred for a number of hours after the event. Atmospheric conditions will have caused the radioactive plume to move and diffuse before the aircraft arrives. The science behind predicting atmospheric plume movement has advanced enough that the location of the maximum concentrations in the plume can be determined reasonably accurately in real time, or near real time. Given the assumption that an aircraft can follow a plume, this study addresses the amount of atmospheric dilution expected to occur in a representative plume as a function of time past the release event. The approach models atmospheric transport of hypothetical releases from a single location for every day in a year using the publically available HYSPLIT code. The effective dilution factors for the point of maximum concentration in an elevated plume based on a release of a non-decaying, non-depositing tracer can vary by orders of magnitude depending on the day of the release, even for the same number of hours after the release event. However, the median of the dilution factors based on releases for 365 consecutive days at one site follows a power law relationship in time, as shown in Figure S-1. The relationship is good enough to provide a general rule of thumb for estimating typical future dilution factors in a plume starting at the same point. However, the coefficients of the power law function may vary for different release point locations. Radioactive decay causes the effective dilution factors to decrease more quickly with the time past the release event than the dilution factors based on a non-decaying tracer. An analytical expression for the dilution factors of isotopes with different half-lives can be developed given the power law expression for the non-decaying tracer. If the power-law equation for the median dilution factor, Df, based on a non-decaying tracer has the general form Df=a〖×t〗^(-b) for time t after the release event, then the equation has the form Df=e^(-λt)×a×t^(-b) for a radioactive isotope, where λ is the decay constant for the isotope

A General Investigation of Optimized Atmospheric Sample Duration

ABSTRACT The International Monitoring System (IMS) consists of up to 80 aerosol and xenon monitoring systems spaced around the world that have collection systems sensitive enough to detect nuclear releases from underground nuclear tests at great distances (CTBT 1996; CTBTO 2011). Although a few of the IMS radionuclide stations are closer together than 1,000 km (such as the stations in Kuwait and Iran), many of them are 2,000 km or more apart. In the absence of a scientific basis for optimizing the duration of atmospheric sampling, historically scientists used a integration times from 24 hours to 14 days for radionuclides (Thomas et al. 1977). This was entirely adequate in the past because the sources of signals were far away and large, meaning that they were smeared over many days by the time they had travelled 10,000 km. The Fukushima event pointed out the unacceptable delay time (72 hours) between the start of sample acquisition and final data being shipped. A scientific basis for selecting a sample duration time is needed. This report considers plume migration of a nondecaying tracer using archived atmospheric data for 2011 in the HYSPLIT (Draxler and Hess 1998; HYSPLIT 2011) transport model. We present two related results: the temporal duration of the majority of the plume as a function of distance and the behavior of the maximum plume concentration as a function of sample collection duration and distance. The modeled plume behavior can then be combined with external information about sampler design to optimize sample durations in a sampling network

A General Investigation of Optimized Atmospheric Sample Duration

ABSTRACT The International Monitoring System (IMS) consists of up to 80 aerosol and xenon monitoring systems spaced around the world that have collection systems sensitive enough to detect nuclear releases from underground nuclear tests at great distances (CTBT 1996; CTBTO 2011). Although a few of the IMS radionuclide stations are closer together than 1,000 km (such as the stations in Kuwait and Iran), many of them are 2,000 km or more apart. In the absence of a scientific basis for optimizing the duration of atmospheric sampling, historically scientists used a integration times from 24 hours to 14 days for radionuclides (Thomas et al. 1977). This was entirely adequate in the past because the sources of signals were far away and large, meaning that they were smeared over many days by the time they had travelled 10,000 km. The Fukushima event pointed out the unacceptable delay time (72 hours) between the start of sample acquisition and final data being shipped. A scientific basis for selecting a sample duration time is needed. This report considers plume migration of a nondecaying tracer using archived atmospheric data for 2011 in the HYSPLIT (Draxler and Hess 1998; HYSPLIT 2011) transport model. We present two related results: the temporal duration of the majority of the plume as a function of distance and the behavior of the maximum plume concentration as a function of sample collection duration and distance. The modeled plume behavior can then be combined with external information about sampler design to optimize sample durations in a sampling network

Data Authentication Demonstration for Radionuclide Stations

Data authentication is required for certification of sensor stations in the International Monitoring System (IMS). Authentication capability has been previously demonstrated for continuous waveform stations (seismic and infrasound). This paper addresses data surety for the radionuclide stations in the IMS, in particular the Radionuclide Aerosol Sampler/Analyzer (RASA) system developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). Radionuclide stations communicate data by electronic mail using formats defined in IMS 1.0, Formats and Protocols for Messages. An open message authentication standard exists, called S/MIME (Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions), which has been proposed for use with all IMS radionuclide station message communications. This standard specifies adding a digital signature and public key certificate as a MIME attachment to the e-mail message. It is advantageous because it allows authentication to be added to all IMS 1.0 messages in a standard format and is commercially supported in e-mail software. For command and control, the RASA system uses a networked Graphical User Interface (GUI) based upon Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) communications, which requires special authentication procedures. The authors have modified the RASA system to meet CTBTO authentication guidelines, using a FORTEZZA card for authentication functions. They demonstrated signing radionuclide data messages at the RASA, then sending, receiving, and verifying the messages at a data center. They demonstrated authenticating command messages and responses from the data center GUI to the RASA. Also, the particular authentication system command to change the private/public key pair and retrieve the new public key was demonstrated. This work shows that data surety meeting IMS guidelines may be immediately applied to IMS radionuclide systems