Do higher corporate taxes reduce wages? : Micro evidence from Germany

Because of endogeneity problems very few studies have been able to identify the incidence of corporate taxes on wages. We circumvent these problems by using an 11-year panel of data on 11,441 German municipalities' tax rates, 8 percent of which change each year, linked to administrative matched employer-employee data. Consistent with our theoretical model, we find a negative effect of corporate taxation on wages: a 1 euro increase in tax liabilities yields a 77 cent decrease in the wage bill. The direct wage effect, arising in a collective bargaining context, dominates, while the conventional indirect wage effect through reduced investment is empirically small due to regional labor mobility. High and medium-skilled workers, who arguably extract higher rents in collective agreements, bear a larger share of the corporate tax burden

Computing welfare losses from data under imperfect competition with heterogeneous goods

We study the percentage of welfare losses (PWL) yielded by imperfect competition under product differentiation. When demand is linear, if prices, outputs, costs and the number of firms can be observed, PWL is arbitrary in both Cournot and Bertrand equilibria. If in addition, the elasticity of demand (resp. cross elasticity of demand) is known, we can calculate PWL in Cournot (resp. Bertrand) equilibrium. When demand is isoelastic and there are many firms, PWL can be computed from prices, outputs, costs and the number of .rms. In all these cases we find that price-marginal cost margins and demand elasticities may influence PWL in a counterintuitive way. We also provide conditions under which PWL increases or decreases with concentration

PRIVATE SAVINGS IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES: ARE THERE TERMS OF TRADE SHOCKS?

The paper examines the impact of terms of trade shocks on private savings in the transition economies after accounting for the effect of other determinants. Economic agents in the transition economies are subject to tight credit constraints which are more pronounced during bad state of nature. Thus, adverse shocks to commodity prices in the world market can force them to reduce savings by a larger amount than they would otherwise have. Empirical analysis using a dynamic panel model and data from twenty one transition economies confirm that most of the determinants of savings identified in the literature also apply to the transition economies. Favorable movements in both the permanent and transitory components of the terms of trade have a significant positive impact on private savings with transitory movements having a larger impact than the permanent component. This reflects the lack of access to foreign borrowing that many of the transition economies have faced during the last decade. Although the impact of terms of trade shocks are found to be asymmetric, the magnitude of the impact appears to be small. The results are robust for alternative estimators, determinants, and country groupings.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39958/3/wp572.pd

Political Contestability and Public Contracting

Do public agents undertake socially inefficient activities to protect themselves? In politically contestable markets, part of the lack of flexibility in the design and implementation of the public procurement process reflects public agents' risk adaptations to limit the political hazards from opportunistic third parties---political opponents, competitors, and interest groups. Reduced flexibility limits the likelihood of opportunistic challenges, while externalizing the associated adaptation costs to the public at large. We study this matter and provide a comprehensive theoretical framework with empirically testable predictions

Separation versus affiliation with partial vertical ownership in network industries

The separation of integrated monopolies and new market entrants have changed vertical interactions between suppliers and dealers. Firms have substituted full integration with vertical restraints leading to collusive behaviour harmful to competition. We examine how a partial vertical ownership (an affiliation) of one of the competing downstream retailers by the upstream monopoly could help internalise the production decision after a complete divestiture. Our results in a Cournot framework confirm the positive role of partial integration on firms' profits and consumer surplus in increasing social welfare. These results are consistent with empirical studies of economies after vertical separation in network industries