Let me decide: The importance of user autonomy in accepting online recommendations

The ubiquity of artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms has increased interest in the willingness of online users to accept the recommendations generated by recommendation system (RSs). The present study advances the discourse on how to facilitate the adoption and acceptance of such algorithms and systems by emphasizing the importance of user autonomy. As a first step, the hypothesis that user autonomy increases recommendation acceptance was tested in a controlled online experiment, in which we varied the number of recommendations presented to the user. A total of 240 participants used an online website, specifically developed for this study, to describe their vacation preferences and then chose their preferred vacation. Results show that users are more likely to accept recommendations when more recommendations are presented, highlighting the importance of user autonomy to the acceptance of RS and AI, while informing vendors about ways to tweak their algorithms to increase user compliance. Keywords: Recommendation, Autonomy, Decision making, Online experiment

The role of actively open-minded thinking in information acquisition, accuracy, and calibration

Errors in estimating and forecasting often result from the failure to collect and consider enough relevant information. We examine whether attributes associated with persistence in information acquisition can predict performance in an estimation task. We focus on actively open-minded thinking (AOT), need for cognition, grit, and the tendency to maximize or satisfice when making decisions. In three studies, participants made estimates and predictions of uncertain quantities, with varying levels of control over the amount of information they could collect before estimating. Only AOT predicted performance. This relationship was mediated by information acquisition: AOT predicted the tendency to collect information, and information acquisition predicted performance. To the extent that available information is predictive of future outcomes, actively open-minded thinkers are more likely than others to make accurate forecasts

Winning Isn't Everything: Guilt Proneness and Competitive vs. Non-Competitive Motivation

Guilt proneness is associated with both high motivation to succeed and enhanced concern for others. However, in competition, achieving success requires harming others’ interests, which demotivates guilt-prone individuals. Given the prevalence of competition in social and professional life, we examine the relation between guilt proneness, general motivation and competitive motivation. Two experiments and two lab studies (N=1735) measured guilt proneness, general motivation and competitive motivation, and their effects on competitive preferences and choices. Study settings included students’ choice of playing a game individually vs. competitively (Study 1), physicians’ likelihood to seek residency in medical fields characterized by high competitiveness (Study 2), amateur athletes’ preferences between inclusive and win-oriented team strategies (Study 3) and online workers’ evaluations of a hypothetical scenario (Study 4). Guilt proneness was related positively to general motivation, but negatively to competitive motivation. Guilt proneness, indirectly through lower competitive motivation, predicted a lower likelihood of pursuing competitive paths and preference for non-competitive strategies. Emphasizing prosocial aspects of competitiveness attenuated these effects

May the best man lose: Guilt inhibits competitive motivation

Both guilt and competition motivate goal achievement. Guilt increases task motivation, but also enhances prosocial goals. Competition motivates individual success, but its zero-sum nature makes personal and prosocial goals mutually exclusive. This work explores the relationship between guilt, competition and goal-achievement motivation. In five experiments, guilt was associated with higher motivation to achieve individual goals, but this motivation decreased in competitive settings. These relationships were observed for both experienced guilt and trait-level guilt proneness. Unlike guilt, shame, the emotion most closely related to it, did not affect competitive motivation. The studies identify a conflict between personal and prosocial goals, both activated by guilt, as the cause for reduced competitive motivation. When outperforming others did not harm their interests, or when competitive achievement could also benefit others, guilty competitors’ motivation returned to its typical high level. The results demonstrate the motivating power of emotions and competitive incentives on goal-directed behavior

Winning Isn't Everything: Guilt Proneness and Competitive vs. Non-Competitive Motivation

Guilt proneness is associated with both high motivation to succeed and enhanced concern for others. However, in competition, achieving success requires harming others’ interests, which demotivates guilt-prone individuals. Given the prevalence of competition in social and professional life, we examine the relation between guilt proneness, general motivation and competitive motivation. Two experiments and two lab studies (N=1735) measured guilt proneness, general motivation and competitive motivation, and their effects on competitive preferences and choices. Study settings included students’ choice of playing a game individually vs. competitively (Study 1), physicians’ likelihood to seek residency in medical fields characterized by high competitiveness (Study 2), amateur athletes’ preferences between inclusive and win-oriented team strategies (Study 3) and online workers’ evaluations of a hypothetical scenario (Study 4). Guilt proneness was related positively to general motivation, but negatively to competitive motivation. Guilt proneness, indirectly through lower competitive motivation, predicted a lower likelihood of pursuing competitive paths and preference for non-competitive strategies. Emphasizing prosocial aspects of competitiveness attenuated these effects. Conclusions: Guilt proneness is related to high general motivation but to a lower desire to win. Guilt prone individuals strive for excellence, but through non-competitive paths, whereas people with lower guilt proneness prefer competing

The role of actively open-minded thinking in information acquisition, accuracy, and calibration

Errors in estimating and forecasting often result from the failure to collect and consider enough relevant information. We examine whether attributes associated with persistence in information acquisition can predict performance in an estimation task. We focus on actively open-minded thinking (AOT), need for cognition, grit, and the tendency to maximize or satisfice when making decisions. In three studies, participants made estimates and predictions of uncertain quantities, with varying levels of control over the amount of information they could collect before estimating. Only AOT predicted performance. This relationship was mediated by information acquisition: AOT predicted the tendency to collect information, and information acquisition predicted performance. To the extent that available information is predictive of future outcomes, actively open-minded thinkers are more likely than others to make accurate forecasts

OMA: Overprecision and Manipulating the Audience

Presents the unpublished results from a series of disappointing studies

Is overconfidence a motivated bias? Experimental evidence (MOC)

Are overconfident beliefs driven by the motivation to view oneself positively? We test the relationship between motivation and overconfidence using two distinct, but often conflated measures: better-than-average (BTA) beliefs and overplacement. Our results suggest that motivation can indeed affect these faces of overconfidence, but only under limited conditions. Whereas BTA beliefs are inflated by motivation, introducing some specificity and clarity to the standards of assessment (Experiment 1) or to the trait’s definition (Experiments 2 and 3) reduces or eliminates this bias in judgment overall. We find stronger support for a cognitive explanation for overconfidence, which emphasizes the effect of task difficulty. The difficulty of possessing a desirable trait (Experiment 4) or succeeding on math and logic problems (Experiment 5) affected self-assessment more consistently than does motivation. Finally, we find the lack of an objective standard for vague traits allows people to create idiosyncratic definitions and view themselves as better than others in their own unique ways (Experiment 6). Overall, the results suggest motivation’s effect on BTA beliefs is driven more by idiosyncratic construals of assessment than by self-enhancing delusion. They also suggest that by focusing on vague measures (BTA rather than overplacement) and vague traits, prior research may have exaggerated the role of motivation in overconfidence