8,302 research outputs found
A Hierarchical Game with Strategy Evolution for Mobile Sponsored Content and Service Markets
In sponsored content and service markets, the content and service providers
are able to subsidize their target mobile users through directly paying the
mobile network operator, to lower the price of the data/service access charged
by the network operator to the mobile users. The sponsoring mechanism leads to
a surge in mobile data and service demand, which in return compensates for the
sponsoring cost and benefits the content/service providers. In this paper, we
study the interactions among the three parties in the market, namely, the
mobile users, the content/service providers and the network operator, as a
two-level game with multiple Stackelberg (i.e., leader) players. Our study is
featured by the consideration of global network effects owning to consumers'
grouping. Since the mobile users may have bounded rationality, we model the
service-selection process among them as an evolutionary-population follower
sub-game. Meanwhile, we model the pricing-then-sponsoring process between the
content/service providers and the network operator as a non-cooperative
equilibrium searching problem. By investigating the structure of the proposed
game, we reveal a few important properties regarding the equilibrium existence,
and propose a distributed, projection-based algorithm for iterative equilibrium
searching. Simulation results validate the convergence of the proposed
algorithm, and demonstrate how sponsoring helps improve both the providers'
profits and the users' experience
Resource Allocation in Wireless Networks with RF Energy Harvesting and Transfer
Radio frequency (RF) energy harvesting and transfer techniques have recently
become alternative methods to power the next generation of wireless networks.
As this emerging technology enables proactive replenishment of wireless
devices, it is advantageous in supporting applications with quality-of-service
(QoS) requirement. This article focuses on the resource allocation issues in
wireless networks with RF energy harvesting capability, referred to as RF
energy harvesting networks (RF-EHNs). First, we present an overview of the
RF-EHNs, followed by a review of a variety of issues regarding resource
allocation. Then, we present a case study of designing in the receiver
operation policy, which is of paramount importance in the RF-EHNs. We focus on
QoS support and service differentiation, which have not been addressed by
previous literatures. Furthermore, we outline some open research directions.Comment: To appear in IEEE Networ
Cloud/fog computing resource management and pricing for blockchain networks
The mining process in blockchain requires solving a proof-of-work puzzle,
which is resource expensive to implement in mobile devices due to the high
computing power and energy needed. In this paper, we, for the first time,
consider edge computing as an enabler for mobile blockchain. In particular, we
study edge computing resource management and pricing to support mobile
blockchain applications in which the mining process of miners can be offloaded
to an edge computing service provider. We formulate a two-stage Stackelberg
game to jointly maximize the profit of the edge computing service provider and
the individual utilities of the miners. In the first stage, the service
provider sets the price of edge computing nodes. In the second stage, the
miners decide on the service demand to purchase based on the observed prices.
We apply the backward induction to analyze the sub-game perfect equilibrium in
each stage for both uniform and discriminatory pricing schemes. For the uniform
pricing where the same price is applied to all miners, the existence and
uniqueness of Stackelberg equilibrium are validated by identifying the best
response strategies of the miners. For the discriminatory pricing where the
different prices are applied to different miners, the Stackelberg equilibrium
is proved to exist and be unique by capitalizing on the Variational Inequality
theory. Further, the real experimental results are employed to justify our
proposed model.Comment: 16 pages, double-column version, accepted by IEEE Internet of Things
Journa
When Mobile Blockchain Meets Edge Computing
Blockchain, as the backbone technology of the current popular Bitcoin digital
currency, has become a promising decentralized data management framework.
Although blockchain has been widely adopted in many applications, e.g.,
finance, healthcare, and logistics, its application in mobile services is still
limited. This is due to the fact that blockchain users need to solve preset
proof-of-work puzzles to add new data, i.e., a block, to the blockchain.
Solving the proof-of-work, however, consumes substantial resources in terms of
CPU time and energy, which is not suitable for resource-limited mobile devices.
To facilitate blockchain applications in future mobile Internet of Things
systems, multiple access mobile edge computing appears to be an auspicious
solution to solve the proof-of-work puzzles for mobile users. We first
introduce a novel concept of edge computing for mobile blockchain. Then, we
introduce an economic approach for edge computing resource management.
Moreover, a prototype of mobile edge computing enabled blockchain systems is
presented with experimental results to justify the proposed concept.Comment: Accepted by IEEE Communications Magazin
Optimal Pricing-Based Edge Computing Resource Management in Mobile Blockchain
As the core issue of blockchain, the mining requires solving a proof-of-work
puzzle, which is resource expensive to implement in mobile devices due to high
computing power needed. Thus, the development of blockchain in mobile
applications is restricted. In this paper, we consider the edge computing as
the network enabler for mobile blockchain. In particular, we study optimal
pricing-based edge computing resource management to support mobile blockchain
applications where the mining process can be offloaded to an Edge computing
Service Provider (ESP). We adopt a two-stage Stackelberg game to jointly
maximize the profit of the ESP and the individual utilities of different
miners. In Stage I, the ESP sets the price of edge computing services. In Stage
II, the miners decide on the service demand to purchase based on the observed
prices. We apply the backward induction to analyze the sub-game perfect
equilibrium in each stage for uniform and discriminatory pricing schemes.
Further, the existence and uniqueness of Stackelberg game are validated for
both pricing schemes. At last, the performance evaluation shows that the ESP
intends to set the maximum possible value as the optimal price for profit
maximization under uniform pricing. In addition, the discriminatory pricing
helps the ESP encourage higher total service demand from miners and achieve
greater profit correspondingly.Comment: 7 pages, submitted to one conference. arXiv admin note: substantial
text overlap with arXiv:1710.0156
Privacy Management and Optimal Pricing in People-Centric Sensing
With the emerging sensing technologies such as mobile crowdsensing and
Internet of Things (IoT), people-centric data can be efficiently collected and
used for analytics and optimization purposes. This data is typically required
to develop and render people-centric services. In this paper, we address the
privacy implication, optimal pricing, and bundling of people-centric services.
We first define the inverse correlation between the service quality and privacy
level from data analytics perspectives. We then present the profit maximization
models of selling standalone, complementary, and substitute services.
Specifically, the closed-form solutions of the optimal privacy level and
subscription fee are derived to maximize the gross profit of service providers.
For interrelated people-centric services, we show that cooperation by service
bundling of complementary services is profitable compared to the separate sales
but detrimental for substitutes. We also show that the market value of a
service bundle is correlated with the degree of contingency between the
interrelated services. Finally, we incorporate the profit sharing models from
game theory for dividing the bundling profit among the cooperative service
providers.Comment: 16 page
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