119 research outputs found

    Experimental Evidence for Quantum Structure in Cognition

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    We proof a theorem that shows that a collection of experimental data of membership weights of items with respect to a pair of concepts and its conjunction cannot be modeled within a classical measure theoretic weight structure in case the experimental data contain the effect called overextension. Since the effect of overextension, analogue to the well-known guppy effect for concept combinations, is abundant in all experiments testing weights of items with respect to pairs of concepts and their conjunctions, our theorem constitutes a no-go theorem for classical measure structure for common data of membership weights of items with respect to concepts and their combinations. We put forward a simple geometric criterion that reveals the non classicality of the membership weight structure and use experimentally measured membership weights estimated by subjects in experiments to illustrate our geometrical criterion. The violation of the classical weight structure is similar to the violation of the well-known Bell inequalities studied in quantum mechanics, and hence suggests that the quantum formalism and hence the modeling by quantum membership weights can accomplish what classical membership weights cannot do.Comment: 12 pages, 3 figure

    The Guppy Effect as Interference

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    People use conjunctions and disjunctions of concepts in ways that violate the rules of classical logic, such as the law of compositionality. Specifically, they overextend conjunctions of concepts, a phenomenon referred to as the Guppy Effect. We build on previous efforts to develop a quantum model that explains the Guppy Effect in terms of interference. Using a well-studied data set with 16 exemplars that exhibit the Guppy Effect, we developed a 17-dimensional complex Hilbert space H that models the data and demonstrates the relationship between overextension and interference. We view the interference effect as, not a logical fallacy on the conjunction, but a signal that out of the two constituent concepts, a new concept has emerged.Comment: 10 page

    Quantum Experimental Data in Psychology and Economics

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    We prove a theorem which shows that a collection of experimental data of probabilistic weights related to decisions with respect to situations and their disjunction cannot be modeled within a classical probabilistic weight structure in case the experimental data contain the effect referred to as the 'disjunction effect' in psychology. We identify different experimental situations in psychology, more specifically in concept theory and in decision theory, and in economics (namely situations where Savage's Sure-Thing Principle is violated) where the disjunction effect appears and we point out the common nature of the effect. We analyze how our theorem constitutes a no-go theorem for classical probabilistic weight structures for common experimental data when the disjunction effect is affecting the values of these data. We put forward a simple geometric criterion that reveals the non classicality of the considered probabilistic weights and we illustrate our geometrical criterion by means of experimentally measured membership weights of items with respect to pairs of concepts and their disjunctions. The violation of the classical probabilistic weight structure is very analogous to the violation of the well-known Bell inequalities studied in quantum mechanics. The no-go theorem we prove in the present article with respect to the collection of experimental data we consider has a status analogous to the well known no-go theorems for hidden variable theories in quantum mechanics with respect to experimental data obtained in quantum laboratories. For this reason our analysis puts forward a strong argument in favor of the validity of using a quantum formalism for modeling the considered psychological experimental data as considered in this paper.Comment: 15 pages, 4 figure

    Classical Logical versus Quantum Conceptual Thought: Examples in Economics, Decision theory and Concept Theory

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    Inspired by a quantum mechanical formalism to model concepts and their disjunctions and conjunctions, we put forward in this paper a specific hypothesis. Namely that within human thought two superposed layers can be distinguished: (i) a layer given form by an underlying classical deterministic process, incorporating essentially logical thought and its indeterministic version modeled by classical probability theory; (ii) a layer given form under influence of the totality of the surrounding conceptual landscape, where the different concepts figure as individual entities rather than (logical) combinations of others, with measurable quantities such as 'typicality', 'membership', 'representativeness', 'similarity', 'applicability', 'preference' or 'utility' carrying the influences. We call the process in this second layer 'quantum conceptual thought', which is indeterministic in essence, and contains holistic aspects, but is equally well, although very differently, organized than logical thought. A substantial part of the 'quantum conceptual thought process' can be modeled by quantum mechanical probabilistic and mathematical structures. We consider examples of three specific domains of research where the effects of the presence of quantum conceptual thought and its deviations from classical logical thought have been noticed and studied, i.e. economics, decision theory, and concept theories and which provide experimental evidence for our hypothesis.Comment: 14 page

    A Quantum-Conceptual Explanation of Violations of Expected Utility in Economics

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    The expected utility hypothesis is one of the building blocks of classical economic theory and founded on Savage's Sure-Thing Principle. It has been put forward, e.g. by situations such as the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes, that real-life situations can violate Savage's Sure-Thing Principle and hence also expected utility. We analyze how this violation is connected to the presence of the 'disjunction effect' of decision theory and use our earlier study of this effect in concept theory to put forward an explanation of the violation of Savage's Sure-Thing Principle, namely the presence of 'quantum conceptual thought' next to 'classical logical thought' within a double layer structure of human thought during the decision process. Quantum conceptual thought can be modeled mathematically by the quantum mechanical formalism, which we illustrate by modeling the Hawaii problem situation, a well-known example of the disjunction effect, and we show how the dynamics in the Hawaii problem situation is generated by the whole conceptual landscape surrounding the decision situation.Comment: 9 pages, no figure

    Interpreting Quantum Particles as Conceptual Entities

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    We elaborate an interpretation of quantum physics founded on the hypothesis that quantum particles are conceptual entities playing the role of communication vehicles between material entities composed of ordinary matter which function as memory structures for these quantum particles. We show in which way this new interpretation gives rise to a natural explanation for the quantum effects of interference and entanglement by analyzing how interference and entanglement emerge for the case of human concepts. We put forward a scheme to derive a metric based on similarity as a predecessor for the structure of 'space, time, momentum, energy' and 'quantum particles interacting with ordinary matter' underlying standard quantum physics, within the new interpretation, and making use of aspects of traditional quantum axiomatics. More specifically, we analyze how the effect of non-locality arises as a consequence of the confrontation of such an emerging metric type of structure and the remaining presence of the basic conceptual structure on the fundamental level, with the potential of being revealed in specific situations.Comment: 19 pages, 1 figur
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