Selection criteria for container materials at the proposed Yucca Mountain high level nuclear waste repository

A geological repository has been proposed for the permanent disposal of the nation`s high level nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain in the Nevada desert. The containers for this waste must remain intact for the unprecedented service lifetime of 1000 years. A combination of engineering, regulatory, and licensing requirements complicate the container material selection. In parallel to gathering information regarding the Yucca Mountain service environment and material performance data, a set of selection criteria have been established which compare candidate materials to the performance requirements, and allow a quantitative comparison of candidates. These criteria assign relative weighting to varied topic areas such as mechanical properties, corrosion resistance, fabricability, and cost. Considering the long service life of the waste containers, it is not surprising that the corrosion behavior of the material is a dominant factor. 7 refs

Plan for metal barrier selection and testing for NNWSI

The Department of Energy`s Nevada Nuclear Waste Storage Investigations (NNWSI) Project is evaluating a site at Yucca Mountain in Nevada as a geological repository for the storage of high-level nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Management Projects (NWMP) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has the responsibility for design, testing, and performance analysis of the NNWSI waste packages. One portion of this work is the selection and testing of the material for container construction. The anticipated container design is for this material to be a corrosion resistant metal called the metal barrier. This document is the publication version of the Scientific Investigation Plan (SIP) for the Metal Barrier Selection and Testing Task. The SIP serves as a formal planning document for the investigation and is used to assign quality assurance levels to the activities of the task. This document is an informal version for information distribution and has the sections on ``Schedule and Milestones`` and ``Quality Assurance Level Assignment Sheets`` removed

Progress report on the results of testing advanced conceptual design metal barrier materials under relevant environmental conditions for a tuff repository

This report discusses the performance of candidate metallic materials envisioned for fabricating waste package containers for long-term disposal at a possible geological repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Candidate materials include austenitic iron-base to nickel-base alloy (AISI 304L, AISI 316L, and Alloy 825), high-purity copper (CDA 102), and copper-base alloys (CDA 613 and CDA 715). Possible degradation modes affecting these container materials are identified in the context of anticipated environmental conditions at the repository site. Low-temperature oxidation is the dominant degradation mode over most of the time period of concern (minimum of 300 yr to a maximum of 1000 yr after repository closure), but various forms of aqueous corrosion will occur when water infiltrates into the near-package environment. The results of three years of experimental work in different repository-relevant environments are presented. Much of the work was performed in water taken from Well J-13, located near the repository, and some of the experiments included gamma irradiation of the water or vapor environment. The influence of metallurgical effects on the corrosion and oxidation resistance of the material is reviewed; these effects result from container fabrication, welding, and long-term aging at moderately elevated temperatures in the repository. The report indicates the need for mechanisms to understand the physical/chemical reactions that determine the nature and rate of the different degradation modes, and the subsequent need for models based on these mechanisms for projecting the long-term performance of the container from comparatively short-term laboratory data. 91 refs., 17 figs., 16 tabs

Multiple tier fuel cycle studies for waste transmutation.

As part of the U.S. Department of Energy Advanced Accelerator Applications Program, a systems study was conducted to evaluate the transmutation performance of advanced fuel cycle strategies. Three primary fuel cycle strategies were evaluated: dual-tier systems with plutonium separation, dual-tier systems without plutonium separation, and single-tier systems without plutonium separation. For each case, the system mass flow and TRU consumption were evaluated in detail. Furthermore, the loss of materials in fuel processing was tracked including the generation of new waste streams. Based on these results, the system performance was evaluated with respect to several key transmutation parameters including TRU inventory reduction, radiotoxicity, and support ratio. The importance of clean fuel processing ({approx}0.1% losses) and inclusion of a final tier fast spectrum system are demonstrated. With these two features, all scenarios capably reduce the TRU and plutonium waste content, significantly reducing the radiotoxicity; however, a significant infrastructure (at least 1/10 the total nuclear capacity) is required for the dedicated transmutation system

Academic freedom: in justification of a universal ideal

This paper examines the justification for, and benefits of, academic freedom to academics, students, universities and the world at large. The paper surveys the development of the concept of academic freedom within Europe, more especially the impact of the reforms at the University of Berlin instigated by Wilhelm von Humboldt. Following from this, the paper examines the reasons why the various facets of academic freedom are important and why the principle should continue to be supported

Regulatory issues for deep borehole plutonium disposition

As a result of recent changes throughout the world, a substantial inventory of excess separated plutonium is expected to result from dismantlement of US nuclear weapons. The safe and secure management and eventual disposition of this plutonium, and of a similar inventory in Russia, is a high priority. A variety of options (both interim and permanent) are under consideration to manage this material. The permanent solutions can be categorized into two broad groups: direct disposal and utilization. The deep borehole disposition concept involves placing excess plutonium deep into old stable rock formations with little free water present. Issues of concern include the regulatory, statutory and policy status of such a facility, the availability of sites with desirable characteristics and the technologies required for drilling deep holes, characterizing them, emplacing excess plutonium and sealing the holes. This white paper discusses the regulatory issues. Regulatory issues concerning construction, operation and decommissioning of the surface facility do not appear to be controversial, with existing regulations providing adequate coverage. It is in the areas of siting, licensing and long term environmental protection that current regulations may be inappropriate. This is because many current regulations are by intent or by default specific to waste forms, facilities or missions significantly different from deep borehole disposition of excess weapons usable fissile material. It is expected that custom regulations can be evolved in the context of this mission

What do we mean by a cold repository?

The topic of thermal loading of a potential repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada has been the subject of intense discussion within the project technical community. While terms such as ``Hot Repository`` and ``Cold Repository`` are frequently used, they have not been clearly defined. In particular, the definition of a cold repository has remained the opinion of each individual. This has led to confusion and misunderstanding. In this paper, a number of observed definitions for a cold repository are discussed along with the technical implications, assumptions and inconsistencies. Finally, a common language is suggested

Repository and deep borehole disposition of plutonium

Control and disposition of excess weapons plutonium is a growing issue as both the US and Russia retire a large number of nuclear weapons. A variety of options are under consideration to ultimately dispose of this material. Permanent disposition includes tow broad categories: direct Pu disposal where the material is considered waste and disposed of, and Pu utilization, where the potential energy content of the material is exploited via fissioning. The primary alternative to a high-level radioactive waste repository for the ultimate disposal of plutonium is development of a custom geologic facility. A variety of geologic facility types have been considered, but the concept currently being assessed is the deep borehole

Plan for metal barrier selection and testing for NNWSI

The Department of Energy`s Nevada Nuclear Waste Storage Investigations (NNWSI) Project is evaluating a site at Yucca Mountain in Nevada as a geological repository for the storage of high-level nuclear waste. The Nuclear Waste Management Projects (NWMP) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has the responsibility for design, testing, and performance analysis of the NNWSI waste packages. One portion of this work is the selection and testing of the material for container construction. The anticipated container design is for this material to be a corrosion resistant metal called the metal barrier. This document is the publication version of the Scientific Investigation Plan (SIP) for the Metal Barrier Selection and Testing Task. The SIP serves as a formal planning document for the investigation and is used to assign quality assurance levels to the activities of the task. This document is an informal version for information distribution and has the sections on ``Schedule and Milestones`` and ``Quality Assurance Level Assignment Sheets`` removed

Disposition of plutonium in deep boreholes

Substantial inventories of excess plutonium are expected to result from dismantlement of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons. Disposition of this material should be a high priority in both countries. A variety of disposition options are under consideration. One option is to place the plutonium either directly or in an immobilized form at the bottom of a deep borehole that is then sealed. Deep-borehole disposition involves placing plutonium several kilometers deep into old, stable, rock formations that have negligible free water present. Containment assurance is based on the presence of ancient groundwater indicating lack of migration and communication with the biosphere. Recovery would be extremely difficult (costly) and impossible to accomplish clandestinely