57 research outputs found
Improving the Security of United States Elections with Robust Optimization
For more than a century, election officials across the United States have
inspected voting machines before elections using a procedure called Logic and
Accuracy Testing (LAT). This procedure consists of election officials casting a
test deck of ballots into each voting machine and confirming the machine
produces the expected vote total for each candidate. We bring a scientific
perspective to LAT by introducing the first formal approach to designing test
decks with rigorous security guarantees. Specifically, our approach employs
robust optimization to find test decks that are guaranteed to detect any voting
machine misconfiguration that would cause votes to be swapped across
candidates. Out of all the test decks with this security guarantee, our robust
optimization problem yields the test deck with the minimum number of ballots,
thereby minimizing implementation costs for election officials. To facilitate
deployment at scale, we develop a practically efficient exact algorithm for
solving our robust optimization problems based on the cutting plane method. In
partnership with the Michigan Bureau of Elections, we retrospectively applied
our approach to all 6928 ballot styles from Michigan's November 2022 general
election; this retrospective study reveals that the test decks with rigorous
security guarantees obtained by our approach require, on average, only 1.2%
more ballots than current practice. Our approach has since been piloted in
real-world elections by the Michigan Bureau of Elections as a low-cost way to
improve election security and increase public trust in democratic institutions
OpenVPN is Open to VPN Fingerprinting
VPN adoption has seen steady growth over the past decade due to increased
public awareness of privacy and surveillance threats. In response, certain
governments are attempting to restrict VPN access by identifying connections
using "dual use" DPI technology. To investigate the potential for VPN blocking,
we develop mechanisms for accurately fingerprinting connections using OpenVPN,
the most popular protocol for commercial VPN services. We identify three
fingerprints based on protocol features such as byte pattern, packet size, and
server response. Playing the role of an attacker who controls the network, we
design a two-phase framework that performs passive fingerprinting and active
probing in sequence. We evaluate our framework in partnership with a
million-user ISP and find that we identify over 85% of OpenVPN flows with only
negligible false positives, suggesting that OpenVPN-based services can be
effectively blocked with little collateral damage. Although some commercial
VPNs implement countermeasures to avoid detection, our framework successfully
identified connections to 34 out of 41 "obfuscated" VPN configurations. We
discuss the implications of the VPN fingerprintability for different threat
models and propose short-term defenses. In the longer term, we urge commercial
VPN providers to be more transparent about their obfuscation approaches and to
adopt more principled detection countermeasures, such as those developed in
censorship circumvention research.Comment: In: USENIX Security Symposium 2022 (USENIX Security '22
Elliptic Curve Cryptography in Practice
In this paper, we perform a review of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), as it is used in practice today, in order to reveal unique mistakes and vulnerabilities that arise in implementations of ECC. We study four popular protocols that make use of this type of public-key cryptography: Bitcoin, secure shell (SSH), transport layer security (TLS), and the Austrian e-ID card. We are pleased to observe that about 1 in 10 systems support ECC across the TLS and SSH protocols. However, we find that despite the high stakes of money, access and resources protected by ECC, implementations suffer from vulnerabilities similar to those that plague previous cryptographic systems
Measuring small subgroup attacks against Diffie-Hellman
Several recent standards, including NIST SP 800- 56A and RFC 5114, advocate the use of “DSA” parameters for Diffie-Hellman key exchange. While it is possible to use such parameters securely, additional validation checks are necessary to prevent well-known and potentially devastating attacks. In this paper, we observe that many Diffie-Hellman implementations do not properly validate key exchange inputs. Combined with other protocol properties and implementation choices, this can radically decrease security. We measure the prevalence of these parameter choices in the wild for HTTPS, POP3S, SMTP with STARTTLS, SSH, IKEv1, and IKEv2, finding millions of hosts using DSA and other non-“safe” primes for Diffie-Hellman key exchange, many of them in combination with potentially vulnerable behaviors. We examine over 20 open-source cryptographic libraries and applications and observe that until January 2016, not a single one validated subgroup orders by default. We found feasible full or partial key recovery vulnerabilities in OpenSSL, the Exim mail server, the Unbound DNS client, and Amazon’s load balancer, as well as susceptibility to weaker attacks in many other applications
Imperfect Forward Secrecy: How Diffie-Hellman Fails in Practice
International audienceWe investigate the security of Diffie-Hellman key exchange as used in popular Internet protocols and find it to be less secure than widely believed. First, we present Logjam, a novel flaw in TLS that lets a man-in-the-middle downgrade connections to " export-grade " Diffie-Hellman. To carry out this attack, we implement the number field sieve discrete log algorithm. After a week-long precomputation for a specified 512-bit group, we can compute arbitrary discrete logs in that group in about a minute. We find that 82% of vulnerable servers use a single 512-bit group, allowing us to compromise connections to 7% of Alexa Top Million HTTPS sites. In response, major browsers are being changed to reject short groups. We go on to consider Diffie-Hellman with 768-and 1024-bit groups. A small number of fixed or standardized groups are in use by millions of servers. Performing precomputations for just ten of these groups would allow a passive eavesdropper to decrypt traffic to up to 66% of IPsec VPN servers, 26% of SSH servers, 24% of popular HTTPS sites, or 16% of SMTP servers. In the 1024-bit case, we estimate that such computations are plausible given nation-state resources, and a close reading of published NSA leaks shows that the agency's attacks on VPNs are consistent with having achieved such a break. We conclude that moving to stronger key exchange methods should be a priority for the Internet community
Imperfect forward secrecy: How Diffie-Hellman fails in practice
International audienceWe investigate the security of Diffie-Hellman key exchange as used in popular Internet protocols and find it to be less secure than widely believed. First, we present Logjam, a novel flaw in TLS that lets a man-in-the-middle downgrade connections to "export-grade" Diffie-Hellman. To carry out this attack, we implement the number field sieve discrete logarithm algorithm. After a week-long precomputation for a specified 512-bit group, we can compute arbitrary discrete logarithms in that group in about a minute. We find that 82% of vulnerable servers use a single 512-bit group, and that 8.4% of Alexa Top Million HTTPS sites are vulnerable to the attack. a In response, major browsers have changed to reject short groups. We go on to consider Diffie-Hellman with 768-and 1024-bit groups. We estimate that even in the 1024-bit case, the computations are plausible given nation-state resources. A small number of fixed or standardized groups are used by millions of servers; performing precomputation for a single 1024-bit group would allow passive eavesdropping on 18% of popular HTTPS sites, and a second group would allow decryption of traffic to 66% of IPsec VPNs and 26% of SSH servers. A close reading of published NSA leaks shows that the agency's attacks on VPNs are consistent with having achieved such a break. We conclude that moving to stronger key exchange methods should be a priority for the Internet community
Challenges in cybersecurity: Lessons from biological defense systems
Defending against novel, repeated, or unpredictable attacks, while avoiding attacks on the 'self', are the central problems of both mammalian immune systems and computer systems. Both systems have been studied in great detail, but with little exchange of information across the different disciplines. Here, we present a conceptual framework for structured comparisons across the fields of biological immunity and cybersecurity, by framing the context of defense, considering different (combinations of) defensive strategies, and evaluating defensive performance. Throughout this paper, we pose open questions for further exploration. We hope to spark the interdisciplinary discovery of general principles of optimal defense, which can be understood and applied in biological immunity, cybersecurity, and other defensive realms
Harvesting verifiable challenges from oblivious online sources
Several important security protocols require parties to perform computations based on random challenges. Traditionally, proving that the challenges were randomly chosen has required interactive communication among the parties or the existence of a trusted server. We offer an alternative solution where challenges are harvested from oblivious servers on the Internet. This paper describes a framework for deriving “harvested challenges ” by mixing data from various pre-existing online sources. While individual sources may become predictable or fall under adversarial control, we provide a policy language that allows application developers to specify combinations of sources that meet their security needs. Participants can then convince each other that their challenges were formed freshly and in accordance with the policy. We present Combine, an open source implementation of our framework, and show how it can be applied to a variety of applications, including remote storage auditing and non-interactive client puzzles
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