Sunk-cost fallacy and cognitive ability in individual decision-making

This paper reports on a laboratory experiment aiming at documenting the sunk-cost fallacy in individual decision-making and at identifying the role of the cognitive ability in its manifestation. For this purpose, the design rules out loss aversion and cognitive dissonance, identified by the literature as being the main psychological drivers of the bias. The sunk-cost fallacy is identified by comparing a low and a high sunk-cost treatment, respectively, against a control group that does not incur a sunk cost. There is evidence of a weak manifestation of the sunk-cost fallacy, which is statistically significant only for the high sunk-cost treatment. However, strong evidence of the fallacy was found among the high-cognitive-ability subjects. Finally, although cognitive ability is predictive of status-quo bias, it was not found to reduce the sunk-cost bias

The Agency of Politics and Science

Abstract We study a principal‐agent relationship between a politician and a researcher that captures stylized facts regarding the involvement of politics into scientific research. The politician has some ideal policy that he would like to implement, but needs to contract with a researcher to choose a policy that is supported by scientific advice. We study the implemented contracts under symmetric and under asymmetric information about the researcher's ability and concern for reputation, and discuss with which types of researchers the politician will contract. We identify several conflicts between the interests of voters and those of the politician. (JEL D72, D82, D83