The Importance of Being Vigilant: Has ECB Communication Influenced Euro Area Inflation Expectations?

Using daily data on inflation-indexed bonds, we find evidence of a negative relationship between ECB communication regarding risks to price stability - measured on the basis of the frequency and strength of the keyword ‘vigilance’ - and changes in euro area break-even inflation. However, this result is only found for the second half of 2005. At that time, the start of a tightening of ECB monetary policy was increasingly likely. This suggests that communication should be closely in line with policy actions before it can be effective. Still, we also find that the economic significance of this type of communication has been small.central bank communication, ECB, inflation expectations

Is a word to the wise indeed enough? ECB statements and the predictability of interest rate decisions

We show that comments by euro area central bankers contain information on future ECB interest rate decisions, but that the comments mainly reflect recent developments in macroeconomic variables. Furthermore, models using only communication variables are outperformed by straightforward Taylor rule models. During the first years of the European Economic and Monetary Union, comments by ECB Executive Board members and high-level Bundesbank policy-makers were more informative than comments by national central bank presidents. We also find that differences of opinion were informative when they concerned the outlook for economic growth. Finally, our results suggest that the ECB used communication especially to signal interest rate increasescentral bank communication, ECB, interest rate decisions

Does ECB Communication Help in Predicting its Interest Rate Decisions?

We examine the usefulness of communication by the European Central Bank for predicting its interest rate decisions. We use ordered probit models based on the Taylor rule which we estimate using statements by ECB officials as well as macroeconomic variables. Statements by ECB officials on the main refinancing rate and future inflation are significantly related to ECB decisions. However, an out-of-sample evaluation shows that communication-based models do not outperform models based on macroeconomic data in predicting decisions. Both sets of models only accurately predict decisions to leave interest rates unchanged.ECB communication, interest rate decision, Taylor rule, ordered probit models

Statements of ECB Officials and their Effect on the Level and Volatility of the Euro-Dollar Exchange Rate

This paper studies the reaction of the mean and volatility of the euro-dollar exchange rate to statements of ECB officials during the first years of EMU. We focus on statements on monetary policy and the (potential) strength of the euro. We find that the Bundesbank has dominated the news coverage. We conclude that ECB statements have mainly influenced volatility. In some cases there are effects of statements on the level of the euro-dollar rate. Efforts to ‘talk up’ the euro have not been successful. There is also evidence of asymmetric reactions to news.ECB, euro, foreign exchange, news approach

Look Who’s Talking: ECB Communication during the First Years of EMU

This paper studies ECB and Bundesbank communication on monetary policy during the first years of the European Economic and Monetary Union. We study whether statements by different (groups of) central bankers have been contradictory and whether differences have diminished over time. We find that statements on the interest rate, inflation and economic growth have indeed been contradictory. Furthermore, national central banks continue to dominate communication on monetary policy. Finally, only the ECB Executive Board has observed radio silence before ECB Governing Council meetings. A positive conclusion is that, over time, interest rate statements have become less contradictory.central bank communication, European Central Bank, Bundesbank

The end of stability and growth pact?

This paper evaluates the Stability and Growth Pact. After examining the rules in place and the experience so far, the Pact is analysed from a political economy perspective, focusing on the choice for so-called soft law and drawing inferences from characteristics of successful fiscal rules at the state level in the United States. It is also examined whether big and small countries are likely to adhere to fiscal policy rules in place. Furthermore, the impact of the business cycle on fiscal policy outcomes is analysed. Finally, the proposals of the European Commission to strengthen the Pact are discussed. --stability and growth pact,EMU,budget discipline

The End of the Stability and Growth Pact?

This paper evaluates the Stability and Growth Pact. After examining the rules in place and the experience so far, the Pact is analysed from a political economy perspective, focusing on the choice for so-called soft law and drawing inferences from characteristics of successful fiscal rules at the state level in the United States. It is also examined whether big and small countries are likely to adhere to fiscal policy rules in place. Furthermore, the impact of the business cycle on fiscal policy outcomes is analysed. Finally, the proposals of the European Commission to strengthen the Pact are discussed.Stability and Growth Pact, EMU, budget discipline

The End of Stability and Growth Pact?

This paper evaluates the Stability and Growth Pact. After examining the rules in place and the experience so far, the Pact is analysed from a political economy perspective, focusing on the choice for so-called soft law and drawing inferences from characteristics of successful fiscal rules at the state level in the United States. It is also examined whether big and small countries are likely to adhere to fiscal policy rules in place. Furthermore, the impact of the business cycle on fiscal policy outcomes is analysed. Finally, the proposals of the European Commission to strengthen the Pact are discussed

Central Bank communication and monetary policy: a survey of theory and evidence

Over the last two decades, communication has become an increasingly important aspect of monetary policy. These real-world developments have spawned a huge new scholarly literature on central bank communication —mostly empirical, and almost all of it written in this decade. We survey this evergrowing literature. The evidence suggests that communication can be an important and powerful part of the central bank’s toolkit since it has the ability to move financial markets, to enhance the predictability of monetary policy decisions, and potentially to help achieve central banks’ macroeconomic objectives. However, the large variation in communication strategies across central banks suggests that a consensus has yet to emerge on what constitutes an optimal communication strategy. JEL Classification: E52, E58Central Bank, communication, monetary policy

Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence

Over the last two decades, communication has become an increasingly important aspect of monetary policy. These real-world developments have spawned a huge new scholarly literature on central bank communication—mostly empirical, and almost all of it written in this decade. We survey this ever-growing literature. The evidence suggests that communication can be an important and powerful part of the central bank’s toolkit since it has the ability to move financial markets, to enhance the predictability of monetary policy decisions, and potentially to help achieve central banks’ macroeconomic objectives. However, the large variation in communication strategies across central banks suggests that a consensus has yet to emerge on what constitutes an optimal communication strategy.