National Reachback Systems for Nuclear Security: State-of-play report: ERNCIP Thematic Group Radiological and Nuclear Threats to Critical Infrastructure: Deliverable of task 3.1b

Operational systems for nuclear security in Finland, France, Denmark, UK, US and Canada were reviewed. The Finnish case is a holistic approach to Nuclear Security Detection Architecture, as defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency; reachback is only one component of the system, albeit an important crosscutting element of the detection architecture. The French and US studies concentrate on the reachback itself. The Danish nuclear security system is information-driven, relying on the cooperation of the competent authorities. The British and Canadian analyses describe nuclear security planning and operations in a Major Public Event (MPE), Olympics, where cooperation between the frontline officers and the reachback centre plays a key role to reduce radiological and nuclear risks. For the implementation of an efficient reachback system there is a strong need for standardizing the data acquisition, storing, and the final distribution of the analysis results. Major nuclear powers take this activity very seriously and they have 24/7 all year national service for information processing. The case studies of Finland and France show that efficient European reachback is manageable and technically possible on a country-wide basis. The case study on Denmark reveals that countries with limited reachback resources need an adequate and standardized technical information sharing mechanism to aid their national analysis services in a precise and timely manner.JRC.G.5-Security technology assessmen

National and Cross-border Expert Support for Nuclear Security

The role of technical, scientific and operational expert support is analysed through case studies and scenarios. The technology demonstrations show that cooperation between competent authorities is necessary for the successful handling of a nuclear security event both nationally and internationally. Once an event occurs in a state, it could involve other states as well. For this reason, high-level agreement is necessary between states to allow horizontal exchange of information between states during a nuclear security event. Expert support is a crucial cross-cutting element of a Nuclear Security Detection Architecture. An attempt is made to identify the basic elements and capabilities of a national expert support system.JRC.E.2-Technology Innovation in Securit

Information Sharing in a Nuclear Security Event - Consultation of Member States on the Report “Remote Expert Support of Field Teams; Reachback Services For Nuclear Security” ERNCIP Thematic Group Radiological and Nuclear Threats to Critical Infrastructure - Task 3B Deliverable 2

The ERNCIP thematic group for Radiological and Nuclear Threats to Critical Infrastructure (RN thematic group) produced in its working programme 2014 a report on radiological and nuclear information sharing between the EU Member States in case of a nuclear security event. As part of its working programme in 2015 the group collected views from the EU Member States regarding this report as a key step in the work towards future European format and protocol standardisation to be implemented for the technical reachback and other analysis purposes. The RN thematic group designed a simple questionnaire, which was sent to the relevant authorities in the Member States. The answers (10 out of 28) came from very different organizations working on domains of security, safety or military. The different background of the responding organizations shows that the responsibility on nuclear and radiological matters, including information sharing in a nuclear security event, varies strongly among different Member States. This knowledge alone is an important outcome of the questionnaire. Some replies showed that much work needs to be done for raising European awareness regarding prevention of, detection of and response to nuclear security events, including information sharing nationally and internationally. Some Member States have not yet identified the need of cooperation in sharing nuclear spectrometric data and analysis results. One of the basic requirements of the proposed new information-sharing system for nuclear security is that advanced national analysis resources can be provided for Member States that do not have such capabilities. Even though the future arrangements for information sharing would be based on a standard technological structure, all data exchange is voluntary and bilateral between the Member States.JRC.G.5-Security technology assessmen