Survey Article: Justice in Production

Liberal egalitarianism has been criticized for paying insufficient attention to what justice requires for the institutions that structure economic production. In the light of such criticism, this paper investigates arguments that liberal egalitarians might give for the kinds of institutional reforms that critics have proposed. These reforms include (1) guarantees for meaningful work, (2) worker participation in the governance of economic enterprises, and (3) democratic participation in the control of the means of production at the level of society. The paper argues that liberal egalitarianism has much to say not only about questions regarding distribution, but also about questions regarding production

The social purpose of corporations

What are corporations for? This paper provides an analytical review of relevant research on this question, and some thoughts on the moral evaluation of corporations. It distinguishes between the concepts of social purpose and corporate purpose. Social purpose concerns the specific contribution that a corporation makes to realis-ing societal goals. Corporate purpose concerns the goals the corporation should actively pursue. Related questions of whether corporations ought to serve a social purpose, whether they ought actively to pursue their corporate purpose, and how to articulate, pursue, and measure corporate purpose are explored. Determining social purpose quickly raises difficult political questions. The arguments for a minimalist or a maximalist approach to social purpose are set out and debated. The authors conducted interviews with 24 business leaders which highlighted frustration at the vague concept of social purpose and exactly how social and corporate purpose relate to each other. There was broad agreement that corporations should serve some social purpose, but not precisely what this might be. The authors outline three reasons why societies become entitled to make claims on corporations, based on the principle of reciprocity. Corporations rely on society's legal system for adjudication and protection. They rely on access to scarce resources that might otherwise be deployed elsewhere, and they are a constant source of social and economic disruption as they undertake their business. Efficiency and market competition are often cited as forces that might steer firms to social purpose, but the paper argues that pervasive market failures suggest that social purpose cannot be left entirely to the corporation. A web of other factors might also obstruct that goal. Likewise, corporate purpose cannot be determined by the corporation alone due to a lack of 'epistemic competence' or the ability to balance and judge competing stakeholder interests, and the fact that corporations interact within political and social structures. The paper considers the societal responsiveness and shared value approaches to articulating corporate purpose, and the shortcomings of these methodologies. One of the most complex challenges is the meaningful measurement of corporate and social purpose. Most current measures of corporate purpose are accounting measures. Social purpose also uses holistic action-guiding measures for environmental, social, and governance impacts. However, none is yet satisfactory, and measurement remains 'the most important condition for giving bite to corporate purpose'

Does Global Business Have a Responsibility to Promote Just Institutions?

ABSTRACT:Drawing upon John Rawls's framework inThe Law of Peoples,this paper argues that MNEs have a responsibility to promote well-ordered social and political institutions in host countries that lack them. This responsibility is grounded in a negative duty not to cause harm. In addition to addressing the objection that promoting well-ordered institutions represents unjustified interference by MNEs, the paper provides guidance for managers of MNEs operating in host countries that lack just institutions. The paper argues for understanding corporate responsibility in relation to the specific institutional environment in which MNEs operate.</jats:p

IS INCOMPARABILITY A PROBLEM FOR ANYONE?

The incomparability of alternatives is thought to pose a problem for justified choice, particularly for proponents of comparativism – the view that comparative facts about alternatives determine what one rationally ought to choose. As a solution, it has been argued that alternatives judged incomparable by one of the three standard comparative relations, “better than,” “worse than,” and “equally good,” are comparable by some fourth relation, such as “roughly equal” or “on a par.” This solution, however, comes at what many would regard as too high a cost – namely, rejection of the transitivity of the relation “at least as good as.” In this paper, I argue that proponents of comparativism need not incur this cost. I defend the possibility of justified choice between incomparable alternatives on grounds that comparativists can accept. The possibility of incomparability has been met with resistance, in part because of the intuitive appeal of comparativism. By defending the possibility of justified choice between incomparable alternatives on grounds that comparativists can accept, this paper supports further inquiry into the subject of incomparability.