Determining the need for issue linkages in multilateral trade negotiations

In multilateral trade negotiations, trade-offs usually are made within the issue-areas that are on the agenda. In the absence of cross-issue trade-offs (linkages), agreement may not be possible. To maximize both the potential gains from trade and the scope for agreement, negotiators need to be willing and able to consider the feasibility of issue linkages. This raises the practical problem of determining when such trade-offs are likely to be necessary. Although quantitative methods of policy analysis have been developed, they have not been widely used by policymakers, in part owing to the fact that negotiations focus largely on nontariff measures. This article proposes a qualitative approach to the problem and applies it to the Tokyo and Uruguay Round negotiations on safeguards to protect domestic industries from problems related to increases in import

Subsidies and spillovers in a value chain world : new rules required?

Assessing the effects of subsidies is complicated, given the need to consider linkages within and across supply chain networks. A precondition for determining whether existing WTO disciplines on subsidies are adequate is better information and more empirical research on the extent to which negative international spillovers are created by prevailing policies. Many of the policies that affect supply chain operations are not considered subsidies under the WTO. There are no rules on subsidies for services or investment incentives. Conversely, some WTO rules may not be appropriate or effective given the increasing prevalence of value chains. There is an urgent need for policy analysis to determine how existing WTO disciplines impact on value chain s and whether and how large the negative spillovers are of national policies. A necessary condition for any such determination is much better data on the measures that are employed by governments around the world, both at the central and sub-central levels

Antitrust-based remedies and dumping in international trade

The authors explore the possibility of government's seeking to agree to apply competition policy based considerations and disciplines in addressing unfair-trade allegations before turning to"standard"antidumping remedies. The premise of proponents of antidumping actions is that the existence of market power in exporter's home markets, or potential market dominance in the importing (host) market, is an important source of perceived"unfairness."But antidumping authorities do not investigate the existence of such situations. The authors propose that allegations of dumping first be investigated by competition authorities to determine the contestability of the relevant markets. Their proposal does not involve harmonization of competition laws. All that would change from the status quo is that a necessary condition for an antidumping action is that competition authorities find that the exporting firm's home market is not contestable, and conclude that no remedial action is possible through the application of competition law. Ideally, agreement along these lines would be sought in the multilateral (GATT) context, but bilateral or regional trade agreements could also be concluded. For example, European Union cooperationor association agreements might be extended along the lines proposed.TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Access to Markets,Markets and Market Access

Developing Countries and the Uruguay Round: Achieving Multilateral Discipline on Safeguards

This article focuses on the safeguards problem, that is, on the use of 'emergency' protection which does not comply with GATT rules.Research Seminar in International Economics, Department of Economics, University of Michiganhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/100758/1/ECON222.pd

International cooperation and the reform of public procurement policies

The decision not to launch negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO) on three of the Singapore Issues in the so-called July 2004 package provides an opportunity to revisit the knowledge base on which proposals for further international collective action may be drawn. This paper examines the available evidence on public procurement practices in developing countries that could be relevant to further multilateral rule making on state purchasing. Although there is considerable agreement on ends (efficient, non-corrupt, and transparent public purchasing systems), little information is available on means and, in particular, on the effective and replicable strategies that developing countries can adopt to improve their public procurement systems. A concerted effort to substantially add to the knowledge base on public procurement reforms in developing countries, through targeted research and international exchange of information on implemented procurement policies and outcomes, is critical to identifying areas where further binding multilateral disciplines may be beneficial.Government Procurement,Corruption&Anitcorruption Law,Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures,Pharmaceuticals&Pharmacoeconomics,Business in Development

The G20 and the global trading system : leveraging the Asia-pacific experience

There is a growing disconnect between the need to bolster the multilateral trading system and the willingness of the world’s major economies to cooperate to do so. Concerted action on trade reform can help to support the process of global rebalancing and improve growth performance. Rather than repeat past calls to complete the WTO Doha round talks and refrain from protectionist actions, the G20 should build on the experience of the East Asia and Pacific region and commit to a specific trade cost reduction target and support greater plurilateral cooperation on regulatory matters under the umbrella of the WTO

Determining the Need for Issue Linkages in Multilateral Trade Negotiations

In multilateral trade negotiations, trade-offs usually are made within the issue-areas that are on the agenda. In the absence of cross-issue trade-offs (linkages), agreement may not be possible. To maximize both the potential gains from trade and the scope for agreement, negotiators need to be willing and able to consider the feasibility of issue linkages. This raises the practical problem of determining when such trade-offs are likely to be necessary. Although quantitative methods of policy analysis have been developed, they have not been widely used by policymakers, in part owing to the fact that negotiations focus largely on nontariff measures. This article proposes a qualitative approach to the problem and applies it to the Tokyo and Uruguay Round negotiations on safeguards to protect domestic industries from problems related to increases in imports.Research Seminar in International Economics, Department of Economics, University of Michiganhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/100757/1/ECON221.pd

Developing Country Participation in the Uruguay Round

The premise of this paper is twofold: (1) the more advanced developing countries will have to participate actively in the negotiations to achieve substantial results; and (2) their participation is necessary if the multilateral approach for addressing trade policy issues is to remain (become more) attractive to the large industrialized players such as the European Community, Japan, and the United States.Research Seminar in International Economics, Department of Economics, University of Michiganhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/100759/1/ECON223.pd

Government procurement : Market access, transparency, and multilateral trade rules

The authors examine the effects on national welfare and market access of two public procurement practices-discrimination against foreign suppliers of goods and services and nontransparency of the procedures used to allocate government contracts to firms. Both types of policies have become prominent in international trade negotiations, including the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO) trade talks. Traditionally, the focus of international trade agreements has been on market access. However, many developing countries have opposed the launch of negotiations to extend the principle of nondiscrimination to procurement. As a result, the current focus in the Doha Round is on an effort to launch discussions on agreeing to principles of transparency in procurement. While transparency will not constrain the ability of governments to discriminate in favor of domestic firms, it could nonetheless improve market access by reducing corruption. The authors assess and compare the impact of eliminating discrimination and fostering greater domestic competition in procurement markets and enhancing transparency in state contracting. Their analysis concludes that greater domestic competition on procurement markets and greater transparency will improve economic welfare. But there is no clear-cut effect on market access of ending discrimination or improving transparency. This mismatch between market access and welfare effects may account for the slower progress in negotiating procurement disciplines in trade agreements than for traditional border measures such as tariffs, given that market access is the driving force behind trade agreements.Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Markets and Market Access,Decentralization,Labor Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Markets and Market Access,Access to Markets,TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT

Agriculture and the Uruguay Round

The goal of this paper is to discuss: (1) the scope that exists for an agreement on agriculture to be reached in the Uruguay Round; and (2) the merits of alternative negotiation procedures and possible agreements. The premise of the paper is that it may be most fruitful if negotiations focus on achieving agreement on specific rules regarding intervention in agriculture rather than specific reductions in the levels of agricultural support.Research Seminar in International Economics, Department of Economics, University of Michiganhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/100756/1/ECON220.pd