Language discrimination by human newborns and by cotton-top tamarin monkeys

Humans, but no other animal, make meaningful use of spoken language. What is unclear, however, is whether this capacity depends on a unique constellation of perceptual and neurobiological mechanisms, or whether a subset of such mechanisms are shared with other organisms. To explore this problem, we conducted parallel experiments on human newborns and cotton-top tamarin monkeys to assess their ability to discriminate unfamiliar languages. Using a habituation-dishabituation procedure, we show that human newborns and tamarins can discriminate sentences from Dutch and Japanese, but not if the sentences are played backwards. Moreover, the cues for discrimination are not present in backward speech. This suggests that the human newborns' tuning to certain properties of speech relies on general processes of the primate auditory system

Social Interaction Effects on Reward and Cognitive Abilities in Monkeys

When given a choice between receiving $100 in 30 days and$110 in 31 days, most people wait for the larger, more delayed reward. However, when the choice is between $100 today and$110 tomorrow, many people shift their preferences to the smaller, immediate reward despite the same difference of $10 and one day. Reward properties—such as time to receipt—play a crucial role in our processing of rewards. However, reward processing does not only occur for individual decisions but also for social interactions; we must decide to either cooperate or compete with others for rewards. Humans stand out in the animal kingdom as exceptional cooperators, both in terms of the form that cooperation assumes as well as the nature of rewards attained. Regarding form, we are unique in the stability of our reciprocal interactions and in the scale of our cooperative coalitions, entailing multiple nation states in times of war. In terms of rewards, we are of course motivated, like all other animals, by the central survival payoffs such as food and water but also by abstract entities such as money, the promise of future support, and positions of power such as a king, president, or head of an academic department. To maintain these complicated interactions and evaluate the nature of reward, we must possess a number of prerequisite cognitive abilities. Here, we view this problem through the lens of evolutionary biology, asking which aspects of our cognitive machinery, and the social interactions it supports, are uniquely human and which are shared with other primates. Though we focus on lemurs, monkeys, and apes, we acknowledge that many of the processes we document are unlikely to be restricted to the primates, and in many cases, there is already comparable evidence from other mammals and birds. We begin by reviewing a suite of cognitive mechanisms that are involved in both human and nonhuman primate reward processing. Our review is particularly focused on the subset of situations with quantifiable rewards. We then describe the kinds of social interactions that are part and parcel of primate life, especially the highly social monkeys and apes. Lastly, we merge these two sections and consider how constraints on primate cognition may limit the complexity of primate social interactions

Patience! How to Assess and Strengthen Self-Control

Children often show signs of dysregulation, impulsivity, and risk-taking—behaviors that interfere with learning and growth. Commonly implicated in such interfering behaviors are problems of self-control. Several decades of research in the mind and brain sciences inform understanding of self-control, both as a trait and state. This research has significant implications for educators, providing strategies for assessing and strengthening self-control. This paper reviews the relevant theoretical concepts and practical applications. Part one discusses current thinking about the nature of self-control, focusing on the paired distinctions between (i) trait and state, as well as (ii) volitional and impulsive processes. Part two reviews a family of methods designed to assess different aspects of self-control. Part three focuses on ways to strength self-control, including simple strategies that help create habits and reduce conflict with competing temptations

Conceptual and Methodological Problems with Comparative Work on Artificial Language Learning

Several theoretical proposals for the evolution of language have sparked a renewed search for comparative data on human and non-human animal computational capacities. However, conceptual confusions still hinder the field, leading to experimental evidence that fails to test for comparable human competences. Here we focus on two conceptual and methodological challenges that affect the field generally: 1) properly characterizing the computational features of the faculty of language in the narrow sense; 2) defining and probing for human language-like computations via artificial language learning experiments in non-human animals. Our intent is to be critical in the service of clarity, in what we agree is an important approach to understanding how language evolved

Spontaneous Motor Entrainment to Music in Multiple Vocal Mimicking Species

SummaryThe human capacity for music consists of certain core phenomena, including the tendency to entrain, or align movement, to an external auditory pulse [1–3]. This ability, fundamental both for music production and for coordinated dance, has been repeatedly highlighted as uniquely human [4–11]. However, it has recently been hypothesized that entrainment evolved as a by-product of vocal mimicry, generating the strong prediction that only vocal mimicking animals may be able to entrain [12, 13]. Here we provide comparative data demonstrating the existence of two proficient vocal mimicking nonhuman animals (parrots) that entrain to music, spontaneously producing synchronized movements resembling human dance. We also provide an extensive comparative data set from a global video database systematically analyzed for evidence of entrainment in hundreds of species both capable and incapable of vocal mimicry. Despite the higher representation of vocal nonmimics in the database and comparable exposure of mimics and nonmimics to humans and music, only vocal mimics showed evidence of entrainment. We conclude that entrainment is not unique to humans and that the distribution of entrainment across species supports the hypothesis that entrainment evolved as a by-product of selection for vocal mimicry

Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgements

The psychological and neurobiological processes underlying moral judgement have been the focus of many recent empirical studies1–11. Of central interest is whether emotions play a causal role in moral judgement, and, in parallel, how emotion-related areas of the brain contribute to moral judgement. Here we show that six patients with focal bilateral damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC), a brain region necessary for the normal generation of emotions and, in particular, social emotions12–14, produce an abnor- mally ‘utilitarian’ pattern of judgements on moral dilemmas that pit compelling considerations of aggregate welfare against highly emotionally aversive behaviours (for example, having to sacrifice one person’s life to save a number of other lives)7,8. In contrast, the VMPC patients’ judgements were normal in other classes of moral dilemmas. These findings indicate that, for a selective set of moral dilemmas, the VMPC is critical for normal judgements of right and wrong. The findings support a necessary role for emotion in the generation of those judgements

The mystery of language evolution

Understanding the evolution of language requires evidence regarding origins and processes that led to change. In the last 40 years, there has been an explosion of research on this problem as well as a sense that considerable progress has been made. We argue instead that the richness of ideas is accompanied by a poverty of evidence, with essentially no explanation of how and why our linguistic computations and representations evolved. We show that, to date, (1) studies of nonhuman animals provide virtually no relevant parallels to human linguistic communication, and none to the underlying biological capacity; (2) the fossil and archaeological evidence does not inform our understanding of the computations and representations of our earliest ancestors, leaving details of origins and selective pressure unresolved; (3) our understanding of the genetics of language is so impoverished that there is little hope of connecting genes to linguistic processes any time soon; (4) all modeling attempts have made unfounded assumptions, and have provided no empirical tests, thus leaving any insights into language's origins unverifiable. Based on the current state of evidence, we submit that the most fundamental questions about the origins and evolution of our linguistic capacity remain as mysterious as ever, with considerable uncertainty about the discovery of either relevant or conclusive evidence that can adjudicate among the many open hypotheses. We conclude by presenting some suggestions about possible paths forward