Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring the Balance

The vast majority of U.S. international agreements today are made by the President acting alone. Little noticed and rarely discussed, the agreements are concluded in a process almost completely hidden from outside view. This state of affairs is the result of a longterm transformation. Over the course of more than a century, Congress gradually yielded power to the President to make international agreements. Each individual delegation of authority relinquished only a small measure of power, while freeing members of Congress to focus on matters that were more likely to improve their reelection prospects. But the cumulative effect over time left Congress with little power over international lawmaking. As a result, the President is now able to make law over an immense array of issues—including issues with significant domestic ramifications—by concluding binding international agreements on his own. This imbalance of power violates democratic principles and may even lead to less effective international agreements. To correct this imbalance, this Article proposes a comprehensive reform statute that would normalize U.S. international lawmaking by reorganizing it around two separate tracks. International agreements that are now made by the President alone would proceed on an administrative track and would be subject to what might be called the “Administrative Procedure Act for International Law.” This new process would offer greater openness, public participation, and transparency, but not overburden lawmaking. A legislative track would include two existing methods for concluding international agreements: Senate-approved Article II treaties and congressional-executive agreements expressly approved by both houses of Congress. In addition, it would include an expanded “fast track” process that would permit streamlined congressional approval of agreements. Together, these proposals promise to create a more balanced, more democratic, and more effective system for international lawmaking in the United States

The Cost of Commitment

Over the last half-century, the number of treaties that address issues of human rights has grown from a handful to hundreds. The majority of nations now belongs to a panoply of international agreements - some regional, some universal - that address human rights issues ranging from labor standards to the treatment of prisoners to gender equality. The last decade in particular has witnessed a concerted push from the United Nations to bring nations into the human rights fold through ratification of the six core United Nations human rights treaties. Yet despite the proliferation of treaties and the growing attention to countries\u27 decisions to join them, little attention has been paid to what influences countries\u27 decisions to join these treaties. In this Article, I focus on only a small part of the broader puzzle of human rights treaty membership. Putting to one side, for the moment, the ways in which countries benefit from joining human rights treaties, I seek insight into how the cost of committing to human rights treaties influences countries\u27 decisions to join. I begin by proposing a new way of conceiving of the cost of consenting to be bound by a treaty. I argue that for treaties with minimal enforcement provisions - which includes most human rights treaties - understanding the cost of commitment requires taking into account not only the cost that would be entailed in bringing the country\u27s practices into compliance with the treaty but also the likelihood that those costs will be realized. I then investigate whether countries appear to be influenced by this cost of membership when they decide whether or not to join particular treaties. The Article uses empirical evidence drawn from a database that covers 166 nations over a time span of forty years to shed some light on the decisions of nations to join human rights treaties. Do countries with better human rights practices ratify more readily than those with worse human rights practices; Is the propensity of nations to ratify treaties affected by the enforcement mechanisms used in the treaties; Do democratic nations ratify more readily than nondemocratic nations; Is there a difference in the willingness of democratic and nondemocratic nations to commit to a treaty when their practices are out of step with the treaty\u27s requirements; These are a few of the questions that I ask in this Article. The empirical evidence, while far from conclusive, provides some preliminary answers that I hope will serve as a roadmap to future, more detailed investigation

The Law of Cyber-Attack

Cyber-attacks have become increasingly common in recent years. Capable of shutting down nuclear centrifuges, air defense systems, and electrical grids, cyber-attacks pose a serious threat to national security. As a result, some have suggested that cyber-attacks should be treated as acts of war. Yet the attacks look little like the armed attacks that the law of war has traditionally regulated. This Article examines how existing law may be applied-and adapted and amended-to meet the distinctive challenge posed by cyber-attacks. It begins by clarifying what cyber-attacks are and how they already are regulated by existing bodies of law, including the law of war, international treaties, and domestic criminal law. This review makes clear that existing law effectively addresses only a small fraction of potential cyber-attacks. The law of war, for example, provides a useful framework for only the very small number of cyber-attacks that amount to an armed attack or that take place in the context of an ongoing armed conflict. This Article concludes that a new, comprehensive legal framework at both the domestic and international levels is needed to more effectively address cyber- attacks. The United States could strengthen its domestic law by giving domestic criminal laws addressing cyber-attacks extra-territorial effect and by adopting limited, internationally permissible countermeasures to combat cyber-attacks that do not rise to the level of armed attacks or that do not take place during an ongoing armed conflict. Yet the challenge cannot be met by domestic reforms alone. International cooperation will be essential to a truly effective legal response. New international efforts to regulate cyber-attacks must begin with agreement on the problem-which means agreement on the definition of cyber-attack, cyber-crime, and cyber-warfare. This would form the foundation for greater international cooperation on information sharing, evidence collection, and criminal prosecution of those involved in cyber-attacks-in short, for a new international law of cyber-attack

The Law of Cyber-Attack

Cyber-attacks have become increasingly common in recent years. Capable of shutting down nuclear centrifuges, air defense systems, and electrical grids, cyber-attacks pose a serious threat to national security. As a result, some have suggested that cyber-attacks should be treated as acts of war. Yet the attacks look little like the armed attacks that the law of war has traditionally regulated. This Article examines how existing law may be applied-and adapted and amended-to meet the distinctive challenge posed by cyber-attacks. It begins by clarifying what cyber-attacks are and how they already are regulated by existing bodies of law, including the law of war, international treaties, and domestic criminal law. This review makes clear that existing law effectively addresses only a small fraction of potential cyber-attacks. The law of war, for example, provides a useful framework for only the very small number of cyber-attacks that amount to an armed attack or that take place in the context of an ongoing armed conflict. This Article concludes that a new, comprehensive legal framework at both the domestic and international levels is needed to more effectively address cyber- attacks. The United States could strengthen its domestic law by giving domestic criminal laws addressing cyber-attacks extra-territorial effect and by adopting limited, internationally permissible countermeasures to combat cyber-attacks that do not rise to the level of armed attacks or that do not take place during an ongoing armed conflict. Yet the challenge cannot be met by domestic reforms alone. International cooperation will be essential to a truly effective legal response. New international efforts to regulate cyber-attacks must begin with agreement on the problem-which means agreement on the definition of cyber-attack, cyber-crime, and cyber-warfare. This would form the foundation for greater international cooperation on information sharing, evidence collection, and criminal prosecution of those involved in cyber-attacks-in short, for a new international law of cyber-attack

Asking for Directions: The Case for Federal Courts to Use Certification Across Borders

For more than a decade, the bench, bar, and commentators have disagreed as to whether judges should look to decisions of international and foreign courts for guidance in resolving disputes that appear in U.S. courts. In 2003, Justice Scalia\u27s dissent in Lawrence v. Texas warned darkly that the majority\u27s citation to foreign and international sources was [d]angerous dicta that risked impos [ing] foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans. The next year, then-Attorney General Alberto Gonzales objected that [r]eliance on foreign law threatens to unmoor the court from the proper source of its authority. Members of Congress echoed those sentiments, some going so far as to threaten to impeach Justices who relied on such materials