Criminality and Englishness in the aftermath: The racecourse wars of the 1920s

This article explores the extent to which post-war concerns about Englishness and fears about ‘the enemy within’ shaped understandings of the ‘racecourse wars’ of the 1920s. These conflicts involved mainly metropolitan criminals in various affrays and fights on the streets of London, and on the racecourses of South-East England. The press coverage of the events has been described as akin to a ‘moral panic’ and certainly they provided serious headline fodder during the peaks of 1922 and 1925. Moreover, the key personnel of these ‘wars’, arguably dramatically overwritten by the press, have become signposts in the chronology of twentieth-century British organized crime. This article will draw upon newspaper reports, police autobiography, trial reports, Metropolitan Police records and correspondence with the army to explore concerns about the nature and prevalence of gang crime and forms of inter-personal violence

Reforming the Juvenile in Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century England

In a recent Green Paper on punishment, rehabilitation and sentencing the coalition government promised a ‘rehabilitation revolution’ in relation to its plans for dealing with offending by young people, ‘We must do better so that we can stop the young offenders of today becoming the prolific adult offenders of tomorrow’.1 An emphasis on prevention, on restorative justice, and on informal intervention points to successive governments concerns about the juvenile prison population. The proposed alternative to youth custody, the Young Offenders Academy, will instead focus on community and localism, harnessing integrated education, mental health and family services in order to focus on the education and development of the children.2 However, the ethos of a more child-centred approach to the penality of juvenile delinquents is not an innovation. Historically, the development of juvenile penal institutions has weaved a course between the needs of the children and the potential for reform on the one hand, and the political and public demands for retribution in the form of custodial sentences on the other

Strategic trading and manipulation with spot market power

When a spot market monopolist has a position in a corresponding futures market, he has an incentive to deviate from the spot market optimum to make this position more profitable. Rational futures market makers take this into account when setting prices. We show that the monopolist, by randomizing his futures market position, can strategically exploit his market power at the expense of other futures market participants. Furthermore, traders without market power can manipulate futures prices by hiding their orders behind the monopolist's strategic trades. The moral hazard problem stemming from spot market power thus provides a venue for strategic trading and manipulation that parallels the adverse selection problem stemming from inside information. Klassifikation: D82, G1

Monopoly power limits hedging

When a spot market monopolist participates in a derivatives market, she has an incentive to deviate from the spot market monopoly optimum to make her derivatives market position more profitable. When contracts can only be written contingent on the spot price, a risk-averse monopolist chooses to participate in the derivatives market to hedge her risk, and she reduces expected profits by doing so. However, eliminating all risk is impossible. These results are independent of the shape of the demand function, the distribution of demand shocks, the nature of preferences or the set of derivatives contracts

Changes in the Distribution of Income Volatility

Recent research has documented a significant rise in the volatility (e.g., expected squared change) of individual incomes in the U.S. since the 1970s. Existing measures of this trend abstract from individual heterogeneity, effectively estimating an increase in average volatility. We decompose this increase in average volatility and find that it is far from representative of the experience of most people: there has been no systematic rise in volatility for the vast majority of individuals. The rise in average volatility has been driven almost entirely by a sharp rise in the income volatility of those expected to have the most volatile incomes, identified ex-ante by large income changes in the past. We document that the self-employed and those who self-identify as risk-tolerant are much more likely to have such volatile incomes; these groups have experienced much larger increases in income volatility than the population at large. These results color the policy implications one might draw from the rise in average volatility. While the basic results are apparent from PSID summary statistics, providing a complete characterization of the dynamics of the volatility distribution is a methodological challenge. We resolve these difficulties with a Markovian hierarchical Dirichlet process that builds on work from the non-parametric Bayesian statistics literature