Arrow's theorem, Weglorz' models and the axiom of choice

Applying Weglorz' models of set theory without the axiom of choice, we investigate Arrow-type social welfare functions for infinite societies with restricted coalition algebras. We show that there is a reasonable, nondictatorial social welfare function satisfying "finite discrimination", if and only if in Weglorz' model there is a free ultrafilter on a set representing the individuals.Arrow impossibility theorem, anonymity, ecological welfare functions, axiomatic set theory, ultrafilters, Weglorz's models, permutation models

Aggregate economic shocks, child schooling and child health

Do aggregate economic shocks, such as those caused by macroeconomic crises or droughts, reduce child human capital? The answer to this question has important implications for public policy. If shocks reduce investments in children, they may transmit poverty from onegeneration to the next. This paper uses a simple framework to analyze the effects of aggregate economic shocks on child schooling and health. It shows that the expected effects are ambiguous, because of a tension between income and substitution effects. The paper then reviews the recent empirical literature on the subject. In richer countries, like the United States, child health and education outcomes are counter-cyclical: they improve during recessions. In poorer countries, mostly in Africa and low-income Asia, the outcomes are pro-cyclical: infant mortality rises, and school enrollment and nutrition fall during recessions. In the middle-income countries of Latin America, the picture is more nuanced: health outcomes are generally pro-cyclical, and education outcomes counter-cyclical. Each of these findings is consistent with the simple conceptual framework. The paper discusses possible implications for expenditure allocation.Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Population Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Health Systems Development&Reform,Labor Policies

Own and sibling effects of conditional cash transfer programs : theory and evidence from Cambodia

Conditional cash transfers have been adopted by a large number of countries in the past decade. Although the impacts of these programs have been studied extensively, understanding of the economic mechanisms through which cash and conditions affect household decisions remains incomplete. This paper uses evidence from a program in Cambodia, where eligibility varied substantially among siblings in the same household, to illustrate these effects. A model of schooling decisions highlights three different effects of a child-specific conditional cash transfer: an income effect, a substitution effect, and a displacement effect. The model predicts that such a conditional cash transfer will increase enrollment for eligible children - due to all three effects - but have an ambiguous effect on ineligible siblings. The ambiguity arises from the interaction of a positive income effect with a negative displacement effect. These predictions are shown to be consistent with evidence from Cambodia, where the child-specific program makes modest transfers, conditional on school enrollment for children of middle-school age. Scholarship recipients were more than 20 percentage points more likely to be enrolled in school and 10 percentage points less likely to work for pay. However, the school enrollment and work of ineligible siblings was largely unaffected by the program.Access to Finance,Primary Education,Education For All,Tertiary Education,Youth and Governance

Inductively coupled plasma- and glow discharge plasma-sector field mass spectrometry

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