More Lessons From Japan: End Industrywide Collective Bargaining?

The number of books and articles discussing Japanese management techniques with an eye to transplanting them to the United States is staggering. Americans understandably are impressed by Japanese efficiency and like to think the adoption of some of their techniques will aid our own industries. Often these proposals seem fanciful and fail to recognize the many differences between the two countries, their economic systems and cultures

Reducing Unions\u27 Monopoly Power: Costs and Benefits

There is a fundamental conflict between labor law and antitrust law. The antitrust laws reflect the powerful idea that competition should usually dictate the way our economy is organized, to the benefit of the economy as a whole, including workers. But the labor exemption to the antitrust laws suggests a different policy: workers should have the right to eliminate competition for wages, hours, and working conditions

More Lessons From Japan: End Industrywide Collective Bargaining?

The number of books and articles discussing Japanese management techniques with an eye to transplanting them to the United States is staggering. Americans understandably are impressed by Japanese efficiency and like to think the adoption of some of their techniques will aid our own industries. Often these proposals seem fanciful and fail to recognize the many differences between the two countries, their economic systems and cultures

Reducing Unions\u27 Monopoly Power: Costs and Benefits

There is a fundamental conflict between labor law and antitrust law. The antitrust laws reflect the powerful idea that competition should usually dictate the way our economy is organized, to the benefit of the economy as a whole, including workers. But the labor exemption to the antitrust laws suggests a different policy: workers should have the right to eliminate competition for wages, hours, and working conditions

Anticonsumer Effects of Union Mergers: An Antiitrust Solution

Should unions and corporations be treated identically under the antitrust laws? This article explores this provocative question by examining whether union mergers should be subject to the antitrust laws. Currently unions and corporations are treated very differently. Large corporate mergers are blocked if their effect may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly . They are permitted if they are likely to be benign, procompetitive, or proconsumer. Collective bargaining, by contrast, enjoys a broad exemption from the antitrust laws. If they follow appropriate procedures, unions - even unions that, when taken together, cover all workers within a given industry - are permitted to merge or to coordinate their activity. There is no review of these mergers or of this coordinated activity to determine whether monopoly power, cartel-type behavior, or other anticompetitive or anticonsumer activity will result. This Article asks whether mergers or joint conduct between labor unions should be examined under a standard similar to that used to scrutinize corporate activity. This piece outlines an alternative proposal that would allow workers within individual companies to form a union or otherwise coordinate their bargaining, but then subjects all proposed mergers or other alliances of these units to the provisions of the antitrust laws. We take Congress\u27 concerns in the area as a given and demonstrate that Congress could substantially have reached its primary goals in a better way. An approached that treated union activity identically to corporate activity might very well reduce the anticompetitive potential of unions without ignificantly sacrificing their protective and efficiency-enhancing aspects. This Article focuses upon some of the implications and practical consequences that could arise from this alternative policy

Anticonsumer Effects of Union Mergers: An Antiitrust Solution

Should unions and corporations be treated identically under the antitrust laws? This article explores this provocative question by examining whether union mergers should be subject to the antitrust laws. Currently unions and corporations are treated very differently. Large corporate mergers are blocked if their effect may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly . They are permitted if they are likely to be benign, procompetitive, or proconsumer. Collective bargaining, by contrast, enjoys a broad exemption from the antitrust laws. If they follow appropriate procedures, unions - even unions that, when taken together, cover all workers within a given industry - are permitted to merge or to coordinate their activity. There is no review of these mergers or of this coordinated activity to determine whether monopoly power, cartel-type behavior, or other anticompetitive or anticonsumer activity will result. This Article asks whether mergers or joint conduct between labor unions should be examined under a standard similar to that used to scrutinize corporate activity. This piece outlines an alternative proposal that would allow workers within individual companies to form a union or otherwise coordinate their bargaining, but then subjects all proposed mergers or other alliances of these units to the provisions of the antitrust laws. We take Congress\u27 concerns in the area as a given and demonstrate that Congress could substantially have reached its primary goals in a better way. An approached that treated union activity identically to corporate activity might very well reduce the anticompetitive potential of unions without ignificantly sacrificing their protective and efficiency-enhancing aspects. This Article focuses upon some of the implications and practical consequences that could arise from this alternative policy

β-Barrel scaffolds for the grafting of extracellular loops from G-protein-coupled receptors

Owing to the difficulties in production and purification of G-protein-coupled receptors (GPCRs), relatively little structural information is available about this class of receptors. Here we aim at developing small chimeric proteins, displaying the extracellular ligand-binding motifs of a human GPCR, the Y receptor. This allows the study of ligand-receptor interactions in simplified systems. We present comprehensive information on the use of transmembrane (OmpA) and soluble (Blc) β-barrel scaffolds. Whereas Blc appeared to be not fully compatible with our approach, owing to problems with refolding of the hybrid constructs, loop-grafted versions of OmpA delivered encouraging results. Previously, we described a chimeric construct based on OmpA displaying all three extracellular Y1 receptor loops in different topologies and showing moderate affinity to one of the natural ligands. Now, we present detailed data on the interaction of these constructs with several Y receptor ligands along with data on new constructs. Our findings suggest a common binding mode for all ligands, which is mediated through the C-terminal residues of the peptide ligand, supporting the functional validity of these hybrid receptors. The observed binding affinities, however, are well below those observed for the natural receptors, clearly indicating limitations in mimicking the natural system

β-Barrel scaffolds for the grafting of extracellular loops from G-protein-coupled receptors

Owing to the difficulties in production and purification of G-protein-coupled receptors (GPCRs), relatively little structural information is available about this class of receptors. Here we aim at developing small chimeric proteins, displaying the extracellular ligand-binding motifs of a human GPCR, the Y receptor. This allows the study of ligand-receptor interactions in simplified systems. We present comprehensive information on the use of transmembrane (OmpA) and soluble (Blc) β-barrel scaffolds. Whereas Blc appeared to be not fully compatible with our approach, owing to problems with refolding of the hybrid constructs, loop-grafted versions of OmpA delivered encouraging results. Previously, we described a chimeric construct based on OmpA displaying all three extracellular Y1 receptor loops in different topologies and showing moderate affinity to one of the natural ligands. Now, we present detailed data on the interaction of these constructs with several Y receptor ligands along with data on new constructs. Our findings suggest a common binding mode for all ligands, which is mediated through the C-terminal residues of the peptide ligand, supporting the functional validity of these hybrid receptors. The observed binding affinities, however, are well below those observed for the natural receptors, clearly indicating limitations in mimicking the natural system