Entanglement between Demand and Supply in Markets with Bandwagon Goods

Whenever customers' choices (e.g. to buy or not a given good) depend on others choices (cases coined 'positive externalities' or 'bandwagon effect' in the economic literature), the demand may be multiply valued: for a same posted price, there is either a small number of buyers, or a large one -- in which case one says that the customers coordinate. This leads to a dilemma for the seller: should he sell at a high price, targeting a small number of buyers, or at low price targeting a large number of buyers? In this paper we show that the interaction between demand and supply is even more complex than expected, leading to what we call the curse of coordination: the pricing strategy for the seller which aimed at maximizing his profit corresponds to posting a price which, not only assumes that the customers will coordinate, but also lies very near the critical price value at which such high demand no more exists. This is obtained by the detailed mathematical analysis of a particular model formally related to the Random Field Ising Model and to a model introduced in social sciences by T C Schelling in the 70's.Comment: Updated version, accepted for publication, Journal of Statistical Physics, online Dec 201

Game Theoretical Interactions of Moving Agents

Game theory has been one of the most successful quantitative concepts to describe social interactions, their strategical aspects, and outcomes. Among the payoff matrix quantifying the result of a social interaction, the interaction conditions have been varied, such as the number of repeated interactions, the number of interaction partners, the possibility to punish defective behavior etc. While an extension to spatial interactions has been considered early on such as in the "game of life", recent studies have focussed on effects of the structure of social interaction networks. However, the possibility of individuals to move and, thereby, evade areas with a high level of defection, and to seek areas with a high level of cooperation, has not been fully explored so far. This contribution presents a model combining game theoretical interactions with success-driven motion in space, and studies the consequences that this may have for the degree of cooperation and the spatio-temporal dynamics in the population. It is demonstrated that the combination of game theoretical interactions with motion gives rise to many self-organized behavioral patterns on an aggregate level, which can explain a variety of empirically observed social behaviors

Omnibus Sequences, Coupon Collection, and Missing Word Counts

An {\it Omnibus Sequence} of length $n$ is one that has each possible "message" of length $k$ embedded in it as a subsequence. We study various properties of Omnibus Sequences in this paper, making connections, whenever possible, to the classical coupon collector problem.Comment: 26 page

Market Hegemony and Economic Theory

It is central to standard economic theory that people act on their interests. People are interested in a variety of things, so a range of values should influence market behavior. When engaged in commerce, however, people generally act for personal gain; the influence of other values usually just disappears in the marketplace. What is missing from the standard account is that people often act on proper subsets of their interests. Economics can, however, be extended to capture this insight.Yeshttps://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/manuscript-submission-guideline

Are we HER-ting for innovation in neoadjuvant breast cancer trial design?

Through the use of surrogate markers of efficacy, neoadjuvant studies may facilitate the implementation of new treatments into clinical practice. However, disease-free survival is the current standard outcome endpoint for registration of a novel treatment. The coupling of smaller neoadjuvant 'proof of principle' studies with larger adjuvant registration trials offers the promise of speeding up the time to market of new therapies. Clever new designs, such as the 'biological window' and 'learn on the way', can provide valuable insight regarding mechanisms of action and resistance of these novel drugs by identifying patients who are most likely to respond to a novel therapy early in the drug development process. Using the ongoing neoadjuvant trials with HER2 (human epidermal growth factor receptor 2)-directed therapy as a paradigm, this article discusses recent innovations in study design and the challenges of conducting translational research in the neoadjuvant setting

Crowd computing as a cooperation problem: an evolutionary approach

Cooperation is one of the socio-economic issues that has received more attention from the physics community. The problem has been mostly considered by studying games such as the Prisoner's Dilemma or the Public Goods Game. Here, we take a step forward by studying cooperation in the context of crowd computing. We introduce a model loosely based on Principal-agent theory in which people (workers) contribute to the solution of a distributed problem by computing answers and reporting to the problem proposer (master). To go beyond classical approaches involving the concept of Nash equilibrium, we work on an evolutionary framework in which both the master and the workers update their behavior through reinforcement learning. Using a Markov chain approach, we show theoretically that under certain----not very restrictive-conditions, the master can ensure the reliability of the answer resulting of the process. Then, we study the model by numerical simulations, finding that convergence, meaning that the system reaches a point in which it always produces reliable answers, may in general be much faster than the upper bounds given by the theoretical calculation. We also discuss the effects of the master's level of tolerance to defectors, about which the theory does not provide information. The discussion shows that the system works even with very large tolerances. We conclude with a discussion of our results and possible directions to carry this research further.This work is supported by the Cyprus Research Promotion Foundation grant TE/HPO/0609(BE)/05, the National Science Foundation (CCF-0937829, CCF-1114930), Comunidad de Madrid grant S2009TIC-1692 and MODELICO-CM, Spanish MOSAICO, PRODIEVO and RESINEE grants and MICINN grant TEC2011-29688-C02-01, and National Natural Science Foundation of China grant 61020106002.Publicad

Team reasoning and the rational choice of payoff-dominant outcomes in games

Standard game theory cannot explain the selection of payoff-dominant outcomes that are best for all players in common-interest games. Theories of team reasoning can explain why such mutualistic cooperation is rational. They propose that teams can be agents and that individuals in teams can adopt a distinctive mode of reasoning that enables them to do their part in achieving Pareto-dominant outcomes. We show that it can be rational to play payoff-dominant outcomes, given that an agent group identifies. We compare team reasoning to other theories that have been proposed to explain how people can achieve payoff-dominant outcomes, especially with respect to rationality. Some authors have hoped that it would be possible to develop an argument that it is rational to group identify. We identify some large—probably insuperable—problems with this project and sketch some more promising approaches, whereby the normativity of group identification rests on morality

Who are the enforcers? The motives and methods of muscle for hire in West Scotland and the West Midlands

Enforcement, ranging from threats to intimidation to assault to homicide, has long been an established practice within criminal networks. However, comparatively little academic research exists about the nature and role of enforcers within and beyond the context of contract killings. Drawing on qualitative interviews with criminal enforcers from two contrasting sites within the UK—the West Scotland and the West Midlands—the current study examines the articulated, identifiable pathways into criminal enforcement. Also it examines the nuanced nature of enforcement and the roles those men commonly adopt within the context of organised crime, as well as the relationship between these men’s activity, the wider context of organised crime, and presence of social and cultural capital within it. This article provides insights into how one becomes an enforcer; how contact is made between all parties involved; the degree of planning involved; and costing arrangements, with important implications for research and practice