19 research outputs found

    Public reason and teaching science in a multicultural world: a comment on cobern and loving: "An essay for educators..." in the Light of John Rawls' Political Philosophy

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    This is a comment on the article “An Essay for Educators: Epistemological Realism Really is Common Sense” written by Cobern and Loving in Science & Education. The skillful analysis of the two authors concerning the problematic role of scientism in school science is fully appreciated, as is their diagnosis that it is scientism not universal scientific realism which is the cause of epistemological imperialism. But how should science teachers deal with scientism in the concrete every day situation of the science classroom and in contact with classes and students? John Rawls’ concept of public reason offers three “cardinal strategies” to achieve this aim: proviso, declaration and conjecture. The theoretical framework is provided, the three strategies are described and their relevance is fleshed out in a concrete example

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    The procedural epistemic value of deliberation

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    Collective deliberation is fuelled by disagreements and its epistemic value depends, inter alia, on how the participants respond to each other in disagreements. I use this accountability thesis to argue that deliberation may be valued not just instrumentally but also for its procedural features. The instrumental epistemic value of deliberation depends on whether it leads to more or less accurate beliefs among the participants. The procedural epistemic value of deliberation hinges on the relationships of mutual accountability that characterize appropriately conducted deliberation. I will argue that it only comes into view from the second-person standpoint. I shall explain what the second-person standpoint in the epistemic context entails and how it compares to Stephen Darwall’s interpretation of the second-person standpoint in ethics

    Geography and ethics: placing life in the space of reasons

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    Discussions of ethics in recent human geography have been strongly inflected by readings of so-called ‘Continental Philosophy’. The ascendancy of this style of theorising is marked by a tendency to stake ethical claims on ontological assertions, which effectively close down serious consideration of the problem of normativity in social science. Recent work on practical reason emerging from so-called ‘Analytical’ philosophy presents a series of challenges to how geographers approach the relationships between space, ethics, and power. This work revolves around attempts to displace long-standing dualisms between naturalism and normativity, by blurring boundaries between forms of action and knowledge which belong to a ‘space of causality’ and those that are placed in a ‘space of reasons’. The relevance of this blurring to geography is illustrated by reference to recent debates about the relationships between rationality and habit in unreflective action lies. Ongoing developments in this tradition of philosophy provide resources for strengthening a nascent strand of work on the geographies of practical reason that is evident in work on ethnomethodology, behaviour change, and geographies of action

    Love in the private: Axel Honneth, feminism and the politics of recognition

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    Axel Honneth distinguishes between recognitive practices according to the social domain in which they occur and this allows him to theorise the relationship between power and recognition. 'Love-based recognition', which suggests the centrality of recognition to the relationships that nurture us in the first instance, is located in the family. Honneth argues that relationships encompassed by this category are pre-political, thereby repeating the distinction between the public and the private common to much political theory. This article explores the structure of this delineation in his thinking. I argue that Honneth's analysis marginalises feminist concerns with how power functions through recognition in the private sphere. Honneth also robs himself of a rejoinder to recognition sceptics, who suggest that the desire for recognition is a condition of subordination. The article argues for an alternative approach to the analysis of 'love' within recognitive theory. © 2010 Macmillan Publishers Ltd
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