114 research outputs found
Non-CO2 forcing changes will likely decrease the remaining carbon budget for 1.5°C
One key contribution to the wide range of 1.5 degrees C carbon budgets among recent studies is the non-CO2 climate forcing scenario uncertainty. Based on a partitioning of historical non-CO2 forcing, we show that currently there is a net negative non-CO2 forcing from fossil fuel combustion (FFC), and a net positive non-CO2 climate forcing from land-use change (LUC) and agricultural activities. We perform a set of future simulations in which we prescribed a 1.5 degrees C temperature stabilisation trajectory, and diagnosed the resulting 1.5 degrees C carbon budgets. Using the historical partitioning, we then prescribed adjusted non-CO2 forcing scenarios consistent with our model's simulated decrease in FFC CO2 emissions. We compared the diagnosed carbon budgets from these adjusted scenarios to those resulting from the default RCP scenario's non-CO2 forcing, and to a scenario in which proportionality between future CO2 and non-CO2 forcing is assumed. We find a wide range of carbon budget estimates across scenarios, with the largest budget emerging from the scenario with assumed proportionality of CO2 and non-CO2 forcing. Furthermore, our adjusted-RCP scenarios produce carbon budgets that are smaller than the corresponding default RCP scenarios. Our results suggest that ambitious mitigation scenarios will likely be characterised by an increasing contribution of non-CO2 forcing, and that an assumption of continued proportionality between CO2 and non-CO2 forcing would lead to an overestimate of the remaining carbon budget. Maintaining such proportionality under ambitious fossil fuel mitigation would require mitigation of non-CO2 emissions at a rate that is substantially faster than found in the standard RCP scenarios
Allocating a 2 °C cumulative carbon budget to countries
Recent estimates of the global carbon budget, or allowable cumulative CO2 emissions consistent with a given level of climate warming, have the potential to inform climate mitigation policy discussions aimed at maintaining global temperatures below 2 °C. This raises difficult questions, however, about how best to share this carbon budget amongst nations in a way that both respects the need for a finite cap on total allowable emissions, and also addresses the fundamental disparities amongst nations with respect to their historical and potential future emissions. Here we show how the contraction and convergence (C&C) framework can be applied to the division of a global carbon budget among nations, in a manner that both maintains total emissions below a level consistent with 2 °C, and also adheres to the principle of attaining equal per capita CO2 emissions within the coming decades. We show further that historical differences in responsibility for climate warming can be quantified via a cumulative carbon debt (or credit), which represents the amount by which a given country's historical emissions have exceeded (or fallen short of) the emissions that would have been consistent with their share of world population over time. This carbon debt/credit calculation enhances the potential utility of C&C, therefore providing a simple method to frame national climate mitigation targets in a way that both accounts for historical responsibility, and also respects the principle of international equity in determining future emissions allowances
Climate engineering and the risk of rapid climate change
Recent research has highlighted risks associated with the use of climate engineering as a method of stabilizing global temperatures, including the possibility of rapid climate warming in the case of abrupt removal of engineered radiative forcing. In this study, we have used a simple climate model to estimate the likely range of temperature changes associated with implementation and removal of climate engineering. In the absence of climate engineering, maximum annual rates of warming ranged from 0.015 to 0.07 °C/year, depending on the model's climate sensitivity. Climate engineering resulted in much higher rates of warming, with the temperature change in the year following the removal of climate engineering ranging from 0.13 to 0.76 °C. High rates of temperature change were sustained for two decades following the removal of climate engineering; rates of change of 0.5 (0.3,0.1) °C/decade were exceeded over a 20 year period with 15% (75%, 100%) likelihood. Many ecosystems could be negatively affected by these rates of temperature change; our results suggest that climate engineering in the absence of deep emissions cuts could arguably constitute increased risk of dangerous anthropogenic interference in the climate system under the criteria laid out in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
Accounting for carbon cycle feedbacks in a comparison of the global warming effects of greenhouse gases
Greenhouse gases other than CO2 make a significant contribution to human-induced climate change, and multi-gas mitigation strategies are cheaper to implement than those which limit CO2 emissions alone. Most practical multi-gas mitigation strategies require metrics to relate the climate warming effects of CO2 and other greenhouse gases. Global warming potential (GWP), defined as the ratio of time-integrated radiative forcing of a particular gas to that of CO2 following a unit mass emission, is the metric used in the Kyoto Protocol, and we define mean global temperature change potential (MGTP) as an equivalent metric of the temperature response. Here we show that carbon–climate feedbacks inflate the GWPs and MGTPs of methane and nitrous oxide by ~ 20% in coupled carbon–climate model simulations of the response to a pulse of 50 × 1990 emissions, due to a warming-induced release of CO2 from the land biosphere and ocean. The magnitude of this effect is expected to be dependent on the model, but it is not captured at all by the analytical models usually used to calculate metrics such as GWP. We argue that the omission of carbon cycle dynamics has led to a low bias of uncertain but potentially substantial magnitude in metrics of the global warming effect of other greenhouse gases, and we suggest that the carbon–climate feedback should be considered when greenhouse gas metrics are calculated and applied
Non-deforestation fire vs. fossil fuel combustion: the source of CO2 emissions affects the global carbon cycle and climate responses
Non-deforestation fire – i.e., fire that is typically followed by the recovery of natural vegetation – is arguably the most influential disturbance in terrestrial ecosystems, thereby playing a major role in carbon exchanges and affecting many climatic processes. The radiative effect from a given atmospheric CO2 perturbation is the same for fire and fossil fuel combustion. However, major differences exist per unit of CO2 emitted between the effects of non-deforestation fire vs. fossil fuel combustion on the global carbon cycle and climate, because (1) fossil fuel combustion implies a net transfer of carbon from geological reservoirs to the atmospheric, oceanic, and terrestrial pools, whereas fire occurring in terrestrial ecosystems does not; (2) the average lifetime of the atmospheric CO2 increase is longer when originating from fossil fuel combustion compared to fire, due to the strong vegetation regrowth following fire disturbances in terrestrial ecosystems; and (3) other impacts, for example on land surface albedo, also differ between fire and fossil fuel combustion. The main purpose of this study is to illustrate the consequences from these fundamental differences between fossil fuel combustion and non-deforestation fires using 1000-year simulations of a coupled climate–carbon model with interactive vegetation. We assessed emissions from both pulse and stable fire regime changes, considering both the gross (carbon released from combustion) and net (fire-caused change in land carbon, also accounting for vegetation decomposition and regrowth, as well as climate–carbon feedbacks) fire CO2 emissions. In all cases, we found substantial differences from equivalent amounts of emissions produced by fossil fuel combustion. These findings suggest that side-by-side comparisons of non-deforestation fire and fossil fuel CO2 emissions – implicitly implying that they have similar effects per unit of CO2 emitted – should therefore be avoided, particularly when these comparisons involve gross fire emissions, because the reservoirs from which these emissions are drawn have very different residence times (millions of years for fossil fuel; years to centuries for vegetation and soil–litter). Our results also support the notion that most net emissions occur relatively soon after fire regime shifts and then progressively approach zero. Overall, our study calls for the explicit representation of fire activity as a valuable step to foster a more accurate understanding of its impacts on global carbon cycling and temperature, as opposed to conceiving fire effects as congruent with the consequences from fossil fuel combustion
Non-deforestation fire vs. fossil fuel combustion: the source of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions affects the global carbon cycle and climate responses
Non-deforestation fire – i.e., fire that is typically followed by the
recovery of natural vegetation – is arguably the most influential
disturbance in terrestrial ecosystems, thereby playing a major role in
carbon exchanges and affecting many climatic processes. The radiative
effect from a given atmospheric CO2 perturbation is the same
for fire and fossil fuel combustion. However, major differences exist
per unit of CO2 emitted between the effects of
non-deforestation fire vs. fossil fuel combustion on the global
carbon cycle and climate, because (1) fossil fuel combustion implies
a net transfer of carbon from geological reservoirs to the atmospheric,
oceanic, and terrestrial pools, whereas fire occurring in terrestrial
ecosystems does not; (2) the average lifetime of the atmospheric
CO2 increase is longer when originating from fossil fuel
combustion compared to fire, due to the strong vegetation regrowth
following fire disturbances in terrestrial ecosystems; and (3)
other impacts, for example on land surface albedo, also differ
between fire and fossil fuel combustion. The main purpose of this
study is to illustrate the consequences from these fundamental
differences between fossil fuel combustion and non-deforestation
fires using 1000-year simulations
of a coupled climate–carbon model with interactive vegetation. We
assessed emissions from both pulse and stable fire regime changes,
considering both the gross (carbon released from combustion) and net
(fire-caused change in land carbon, also accounting for vegetation
decomposition and regrowth, as well as climate–carbon feedbacks) fire
CO2 emissions. In all cases, we found substantial differences
from equivalent amounts of emissions produced by fossil fuel
combustion. These findings suggest that side-by-side comparisons of
non-deforestation fire and fossil fuel CO2 emissions –
implicitly implying that they have similar effects per unit of
CO2 emitted – should therefore be avoided, particularly when
these comparisons involve gross fire emissions, because the reservoirs
from which these emissions are drawn have very different residence
times (millions of years for fossil fuel; years to centuries for
vegetation and soil–litter). Our results also support the notion that
most net emissions occur relatively soon after fire regime shifts and
then progressively approach zero. Overall, our study calls for the
explicit representation of fire activity as a valuable step to foster
a more accurate understanding of its impacts on global carbon cycling
and temperature, as opposed to conceiving fire effects as congruent with
the consequences from fossil fuel combustion
Cumulative carbon as a policy framework for achieving climate stabilization
The primary objective of The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations at level that will avoid dangerous climate impacts. However, greenhouse gas concentration stabilization is an awkward framework within which to assess dangerous climate change on account of the significant lag between a given concentration level, and the eventual equilibrium temperature change. By contrast, recent research has shown that global temperature change can be well described by a given cumulative carbon emissions budget. Here, we propose that cumulative carbon emissions represent an alternate framework that is applicable both as a tool for climate mitigation as well as for the assessment of potential climate impacts. We show first that both atmospheric CO2 concentration at a given year and the associated temperature change are generally associated with a unique cumulative carbon emissions budget that is largely independent of the emissions scenario. The rate of global temperature change can therefore be related to first order to the rate of increase of cumulative carbon emissions. However, transient warming over the next century will also be strongly affected by emissions of shorter lived forcing agents such as aerosols and methane. Non-CO2 emissions therefore contribute to uncertainty in the cumulative carbon budget associated with near-term temperature targets, and may suggest the need for a mitigation approach that considers separately short- and long-lived gas emissions. By contrast, long-term temperature change remains primarily associated with total cumulative carbon emissions due to the much longer atmospheric residence time of CO2 relative to other major climate forcing agents
The long-term effect of increasing the albedo of urban areas
Solar reflective urban surfaces (white rooftops and light-colored pavements) can increase the albedo of an urban area by about 0.1. Increasing the albedo of urban and human settlement areas can in turn decrease atmospheric temperature and could potentially offset some of the anticipated temperature increase caused by global warming. We have simulated the long-term (decadal to centennial) effect of increasing urban surface albedos using a spatially explicit global climate model of intermediate complexity. We first carried out two sets of simulations in which we increased the albedo of all land areas between ±20° and ±45° latitude respectively. The results of these simulations indicate a long-term global cooling effect of 3 × 10−15 K for each 1 m2 of a surface with an albedo increase of 0.01. This temperature reduction corresponds to an equivalent CO2 emission reduction of about 7 kg, based on recent estimates of the amount of global warming per unit CO2 emission. In a series of additional simulations, we increased the albedo of urban locations only, on the basis of two independent estimates of the spatial extent of urban areas. In these simulations, global cooling ranged from 0.01 to 0.07 K, which corresponds to a CO2 equivalent emission reduction of 25–150 billion tonnes of CO2
Observed decreases in the Canadian outdoor skating season due to recent winter warming
Global warming has the potential to negatively affect one of Canada's primary sources of winter recreation: hockey and ice skating on outdoor rinks. Observed changes in winter temperatures in Canada suggest changes in the meteorological conditions required to support the creation and maintenance of outdoor skating rinks; while there have been observed increases in the ice-free period of several natural water bodies, there has been no study of potential trends in the duration of the season supporting the construction of outdoor skating rinks. Here we show that the outdoor skating season (OSS) in Canada has significantly shortened in many regions of the country as a result of changing climate conditions. We first established a meteorological criterion for the beginning, and a proxy for the length of the OSS. We extracted this information from daily maximum temperature observations from 1951 to 2005, and tested it for significant changes over time due to global warming as well as due to changes in patterns of large-scale natural climate variability. We found that many locations have seen a statistically significant decrease in the OSS length, particularly in Southwest and Central Canada. This suggests that future global warming has the potential to significantly compromise the viability of outdoor skating in Canada
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