62 research outputs found
Institutions and Functions
What is an institution? And what distinguishes one type of institution from another? We answer these questions using a functionalist approach: types of institutions are identified by their function, or the coordination problems they solve; token institutions are specific solutions to these problems, or equilibria of strategic games. The functionalist approach provides some insights into the limits of reform, or the extent to which institutions \u2013 like marriage, property, or democracy \u2013 can be modified without turning them into entities of a different kind
A FRAMEWORK FOR COMMUNITY-BASED SALIENCE: COMMON KNOWLEDGE, COMMON UNDERSTANDING AND COMMUNITY MEMBERSHIP
International audienceThis article presents a community-based account of salience as an alternative and a complement to the ânatural salienceâ approach which is endorsed by almost all game theorists who use this concept. While in the naturalistic approach, salience is understood as an objective and natural property of some entities (events, strategies, outcomes), the community-based account claims that salience is a function of community membership. Building on David Lewisâs theory of common knowledge and on some of its recent refined accounts, I suggest that salience acts as a correlating device in a correlated equilibrium. What is constitutive of salience is common understanding, the fact that agents have common knowledge that they share the same modes of reasoning with respect to a well-identified set of events. I argue that the basis for common understanding is community membership. The relevance of this account stems from the fact that it answers the objection that salience is either unnecessary or unable to account for coordination between rational agents
Models in Economics Are Not (Always) Nomological Machines: A Pragmatic Approach to Economistsâ Modeling Practices
International audienceThis paper evaluates Nancy Cartwrightâs critique of economic models. Cartwright argues that economics fails to build relevant ânomological machinesâ able to isolate capacities. In this paper, I contend that many economic models are not used as nomological machines. I give some evidence for this claim and build on an inferential and pragmatic approach to economic modeling. Modeling in economics responds to peculiar inferential norms where a âgoodâ model is essentially a model that enhances our knowledge about possible worlds. As a consequence, models and experiments are very different knowledge-producing devices, at least in economics
Vers un changement de paradigme en économie ? Une réponse à James K. Galbraith
Published Books&Ideas, 06/17/2010DâoĂč viendra le renouveau de la thĂ©orie Ă©conomique ? De ses marges ou de son centre ? En rĂ©ponse Ă lâessai de James K. Galbraith, Cyril HĂ©doin soutient que la science Ă©conomique comporte dĂ©jĂ en son sein des approches novatrices qui permettent de comprendre des phĂ©nomĂšnes tels que la crise financiĂšre
How to Interpret Belief Hierarchies in Bayesian Game Theory: A Dilemma for the Epistemic Program
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Did Veblen Generalize Darwinism (And Why Does It Matter)?
International audienceThis paper examines the claim that Veblen's theory of cultural evolution has generalized Darwinian principles to socioeconomic phenomena. Our argument takes place in the debate around "generalized Darwinism" in evolutionary and institutional economics. We claim that Veblen frequently relied on the concept of selection and considered institutions both as units and as factors of selection. We also argue that some of Veblen's insights can be clarified by expressing them in evolutionary-game theoretic terms. Thus, we suggest a close connection between the ontological framework of generalized Darwinism and the technical study of evolutionary phenomena through evolutionary game theory
Accounting for constitutive rules in game theory
International audienceGame theory and rules are deeply intertwined for at least two reasons: first, in many cases rules are necessary to break the indeterminacy that surrounds most of the games; second, in the past 30 years game theory has been increasingly used as a major tool to build a theory of social rules. Interestingly, though the concept of rules is now part of most game theorists' tool box, none of them has explicitly entertained the important distinction between regulative rules and constitutive rules. This distinction, which finds its roots in Ludwig Wittgenstein's profound discussion of âlanguage gamesâ, is at the core of modern philosophy of social sciences. This article asks whether game theory can account for constitutive rules. I distinguish between three game-theoretic accounts of rules: the rules-as-behavioral-regularities account, the rules-as-normative-expectations account, and the rules-as-correlated-devices account. I show that only the latter two are able to make sense of constitutive rules by giving up any pure individualistic understanding of game theory
Neo-Samuelsonian Welfare Economics: From Economic to Normative Agency
International audienceThis paper explores possible foundations and directions for âNeo-Samuelsonian Welfare Economicsâ (NSWE). I argue that neo-Samuelsonian economics entails a reconciliation problem between positive and normative economics due to the fact that it cuts the relationship between economic agency (i.e. what and who the economic agent is) and normative agency (i.e. what should the locus of welfare analysis be). I explore two possibilities and argue that both are attractive but have radically different implications for the status of normative economics. The first possibility consists in fully endorsing a normative approach in terms of âformal welfarismâ which is completely neutral regarding both the locus and the unit measure of welfare analysis. The main implication is then to make welfare economics a branch of positive economics. The second possibility is to consider that human persons should be regarded as axiologically relevant because while they are not prototypical economic agents, they have the ability to represent them both to themselves and to others as reasonable and reliable beings through narrative construction processes. This gives a justification for viewing well-being as being constituted by the personsâ preferences, but only because these preferences are grounded on reasons and values defining the identity of the persons.Cet article envisage deux types de fondements possibles pour une « Ă©conomie du bien-ĂȘtre nĂ©o-samuelsonnienne ». On dĂ©fend lâidĂ©e que lâapproche nĂ©o-samuelsonnienne en Ă©conomie mĂšne Ă un problĂšme de rĂ©conciliation entre lâĂ©conomie positive et lâĂ©conomie normative, en raison du fait que lâagent Ă©conomique nâest plus nĂ©cessairement lâunitĂ© normativement pertinente. Deux formes de rĂ©conciliation ayant des implications radicalement diffĂ©rentes pour le statut de lâĂ©conomie normative sont envisagĂ©es. La premiĂšre consiste Ă adopter une approche normative en termes de « welfarisme formel » prĂ©tendant Ă une complĂšte neutralitĂ© quant Ă lâidentitĂ© du sujet et lâunitĂ© de mesure de lâanalyse normative. Lâimplication principale est de faire de lâĂ©conomie du bien-ĂȘtre une branche de lâĂ©conomie positive. Une seconde approche consiste Ă une donner une importance axiologique particuliĂšre aux personnes, non parce quâelles sont des prototypes dâagents Ă©conomiques, mais parce quâelles sont dotĂ©es de la capacitĂ© de se reprĂ©senter, auprĂšs des autres et dâelles-mĂȘmes, comme des entitĂ©s raisonnables au travers de processus de construction narrative. Cette capacitĂ© donne une justification Ă la vision selon laquelle le bien-ĂȘtre est constituĂ©e des prĂ©fĂ©rences dâune personne, dans le sens oĂč ces prĂ©fĂ©rences sont fondĂ©es sur des raisons et valeurs dĂ©finissant lâidentitĂ© personnelle
Quand nos comportements déroutent les économistes
Review of G. Saint-Paulâs The Tyranny of Utility, Reprinted in ProblĂšmes Ă©conomiques, n° 3044, May 2012En sâappuyant sur des travaux de psychologie expĂ©rimentale, lâĂ©conomie comportementale remet aujourdâhui en cause les fameuses hypothĂšses de rationalitĂ© de lâhomo oeconomicus. Cependant, Gilles Saint-Paul met en garde contre le risque de paternalisme qui pourrait dĂ©river de ces avancĂ©es thĂ©oriques
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