Dans l'ombre du dictateur : l’élite politique chinoise à l'ère de Xi Jinping

Le président Xi Jinping est probablement le dirigeant chinois le plus puissant depuis Mao Zedong. La récente révision constitutionnelle et le remaniement de la direction politique intervenus à mi-mandat ont encore alimenté la crainte que Xi, à l'instar de Mao, n'ait aucune intention de transmettre le pouvoir à un futur successeur. L'ascension de Xi est-elle le signe de la fin de la direction collective ? Un président plus puissant entraînera-t-il l'affaiblissement du Parti ? Dans le présent article, nous examinons les méthodes employées par Xi pour consolider son pouvoir ainsi que les conséquences futures qu'un tel changement pourrait entraîner pour l'élite politique chinoise. En comparant plusieurs sources académiques, nous interrogeons le jeu à somme nulle qui régit la relation entre le pouvoir personnel et la force institutionnelle. Bien que Xi ait sans conteste concentré un pouvoir personnel sans précédent, cela ne s'est pas nécessairement fait aux dépens du Parti. Les dangers liés à la position de force de Xi Jinping sont plutôt à chercher du côté de son effet dissuasif sur l'expression des avis divergents et sur la réduction du vivier de futurs dirigeants, deux conséquences susceptibles d'affaiblir la capacité à gouverner sur les moyen et long termes

Dictator’s Shadow

President Xi Jinping is arguably the most powerful Chinese leader since Chairman Mao. Recent constitutional revisions and a midterm leadership reshuffle has only substantiated the fear that Xi, like Mao, has no intention of handing over power to a future successor. Does Xi’s rise signal an end to collective leadership and does a stronger president translate into a weaker party? In this article, I review the methods by which Xi has come to consolidate power as well as the implications for Chinese elite politics in the future. Drawing insights from the comparative literature, I question the zero-sum relationship between executive and institutional strength. Although Xi has certainly amassed unprecedented personal power, it has not necessarily come at the expense of the Party. Instead, the dangers of Xi Jinping’s power grab are more likely to result from a chilling effect on dissenting opinions and thinning out of the leadership pipeline, each of which is likely to undermine governing capacity over the medium to long-term

Retrofitting Communism : : Consultative Autocracy in China

Proponents of deliberative democracy argue that it enhances procedural democracy by bringing policymakers and the public closer together and by generating new alternatives rather than just choices. But what role does deliberation play under autocracy, where basic democratic institutions are absent? In China, citizens cannot elect their governments but are regularly consulted on matters of governance and policymaking. For example, all national and many sub-national policy initiatives in China currently proceed through at least one round of public consultation prior to adoption. Why do non-democratic regimes consult their citizens? One explanation is that consultation is simply "window dressing" for an otherwise authoritarian decision-making process. Indeed, no new political actors are empowered, the outcomes are non- binding, and critical comments can be kept private. But why then is the Chinese regime investing resources into a politically inconsequential activity? Similarly, why are hundreds of thousands of citizens voicing comments and criticisms if they have no effect? I argue that consultative autocracy is more than window dressing. In particular, I argue that public consultation helps inform and legitimate the policymaking process, contributing to more durable and legitimate policy outcomes. Testing these arguments required overcoming several empirical challenges. For example, public consultation is not randomly distributed, and policy outcomes are issue- specific, making them difficult to generalize. To address non-random selection, I created an extensive sub-national policy database that allows me to identify the effects of consultation across unique policy initiatives implemented in different parts of the country. To proxy for policy outcomes, I measured amendment and repeal rates, which should be lower among more effective policies. I find that no policies adopted with consultation have yet been repealed and that their amendment rates are significantly lower as well. To measure the legitimizing effects of consultation, I took advantage of a budget deliberation experiment in Zeguo, China, where participants are randomly selected to participate in annual budget deliberations. In January 2012, after multiple interviews with political leaders and legislative delegates in Zeguo, I organized a survey of the participant cohort along with a representative sample of non-participants. Survey results demonstrate that approval for local government and its policies is significantly higher among participants than non-participants but that consultation has no positive effect on views towards the central leadershi

Retrofitting Communism : : Consultative Autocracy in China

Proponents of deliberative democracy argue that it enhances procedural democracy by bringing policymakers and the public closer together and by generating new alternatives rather than just choices. But what role does deliberation play under autocracy, where basic democratic institutions are absent? In China, citizens cannot elect their governments but are regularly consulted on matters of governance and policymaking. For example, all national and many sub-national policy initiatives in China currently proceed through at least one round of public consultation prior to adoption. Why do non-democratic regimes consult their citizens? One explanation is that consultation is simply "window dressing" for an otherwise authoritarian decision-making process. Indeed, no new political actors are empowered, the outcomes are non- binding, and critical comments can be kept private. But why then is the Chinese regime investing resources into a politically inconsequential activity? Similarly, why are hundreds of thousands of citizens voicing comments and criticisms if they have no effect? I argue that consultative autocracy is more than window dressing. In particular, I argue that public consultation helps inform and legitimate the policymaking process, contributing to more durable and legitimate policy outcomes. Testing these arguments required overcoming several empirical challenges. For example, public consultation is not randomly distributed, and policy outcomes are issue- specific, making them difficult to generalize. To address non-random selection, I created an extensive sub-national policy database that allows me to identify the effects of consultation across unique policy initiatives implemented in different parts of the country. To proxy for policy outcomes, I measured amendment and repeal rates, which should be lower among more effective policies. I find that no policies adopted with consultation have yet been repealed and that their amendment rates are significantly lower as well. To measure the legitimizing effects of consultation, I took advantage of a budget deliberation experiment in Zeguo, China, where participants are randomly selected to participate in annual budget deliberations. In January 2012, after multiple interviews with political leaders and legislative delegates in Zeguo, I organized a survey of the participant cohort along with a representative sample of non-participants. Survey results demonstrate that approval for local government and its policies is significantly higher among participants than non-participants but that consultation has no positive effect on views towards the central leadershi