Motivation at school : differentiation between and within school subjects matters in the prediction of academic achievement

School motivation is a multidimensional concept. It can be qualitatively defined by various sources of regulation as well as by the school subject to which it pertains. Based on self-determination theory, we postulate that motivation types vary in terms of quality (from lower to higher quality these types are: external, introjected, identified, and intrinsic) and that higher motivational quality predicts positive outcomes. In this study, we examined school subject differentiation in motivational quality and prediction patterns of academic achievement. Results from bi-factor ESEM examining differences in motivational quality within a subject (French, math, and English as a second language) showed that high general levels of motivation in math and English predicted achievement, and more so in the corresponding school subject. Intrinsic motivation for a school subject was generally positively associated with achievement, but only in the corresponding school subject, whereas introjected and external regulations for most school subjects negatively predicted achievement in the corresponding school subject, but also in the other ones. Results from bi-factor ESEM examining differences in motivation levels for distinct school subjects for a given motivation type showed that general levels of intrinsic and external regulations across school subjects predicted achievement positively and negatively, respectively, in all school subjects, while intrinsic motivation, but also identified regulation, had positive subject-specific associations with achievement. The specificity of intrinsic and identified motivations and non-specificity of introjected and external motivations point toward various recommendations in school motivation research and practice. While assessment of autonomous motivations should be subject-specific, assessment of controlled motivations could be general with no loss of predictive power

How Much Do Firms Hedge With Derivatives?

For 234 large non-financial corporations using derivatives, we report the magnitude of their risk exposure hedged by financial derivatives. If interest rates, currency exchange rates, and commodity prices change simultaneously by three standard deviations, the median firm\u27s derivatives portfolio, at most, generates $15 million in cash and$31 million in value. These amounts are modest relative to firm size, and operating and investing cash flows, and other benchmarks. Corporate derivatives use appears to be a small piece of non-financial firms’ overall risk profile. This suggests a need to rethink past empirical research documenting the importance of firms’ derivative use

Horizontal transfer of exosomal microRNAs transduce apoptotic signals between pancreatic beta-cells.

BACKGROUND: Diabetes mellitus is a common metabolic disorder characterized by dysfunction of insulin-secreting pancreatic beta-cells. MicroRNAs are important regulators of beta-cell activities. These non-coding RNAs have recently been discovered to exert their effects not only inside the cell producing them but, upon exosome-mediated transfer, also in other recipient cells. This novel communication mode remains unexplored in pancreatic beta-cells. In the present study, the microRNA content of exosomes released by beta-cells in physiological and physiopathological conditions was analyzed and the biological impact of their transfer to recipient cells investigated. RESULTS: Exosomes were isolated from the culture media of MIN6B1 and INS-1 derived 832/13 beta-cell lines and from mice, rat or human islets. Global profiling revealed that the microRNAs released in MIN6B1 exosomes do not simply reflect the content of the cells of origin. Indeed, while a subset of microRNAs was preferentially released in exosomes others were selectively retained in the cells. Moreover, exposure of MIN6B1 cells to inflammatory cytokines changed the release of several microRNAs. The dynamics of microRNA secretion and their potential transfer to recipient cells were next investigated. As a proof-of-concept, we demonstrate that if cel-miR-238, a C. Elegans microRNA not present in mammalian cells, is expressed in MIN6B1 cells a fraction of it is released in exosomes and is transferred to recipient beta-cells. Furthermore, incubation of untreated MIN6B1 or mice islet cells in the presence of microRNA-containing exosomes isolated from the culture media of cytokine-treated MIN6B1 cells triggers apoptosis of recipient cells. In contrast, exosomes originating from cells not exposed to cytokines have no impact on cell survival. Apoptosis induced by exosomes produced by cytokine-treated cells was prevented by down-regulation of the microRNA-mediating silencing protein Ago2 in recipient cells, suggesting that the effect is mediated by the non-coding RNAs. CONCLUSIONS: Taken together, our results suggest that beta-cells secrete microRNAs that can be transferred to neighboring beta-cells. Exposure of donor cells to pathophysiological conditions commonly associated with diabetes modifies the release of microRNAs and affects survival of recipient beta-cells. Our results support the concept that exosomal microRNAs transfer constitutes a novel cell-to-cell communication mechanism regulating the activity of pancreatic beta-cells

Properties of Implied Cost of Capital Using Analysts’ Forecasts

We evaluate the influence of measurement error in analysts’ forecasts on the accuracy of implied cost of capital estimates from various implementations of the ‘implied cost of capital’ approach, and develop corrections for the measurement error. The implied cost of capital approach relies on analysts’ short- and long-term earnings forecasts as proxies for the market’s expectation of future earnings, and solves for the implied discount rate that equates the present value of the expected future payoffs to the current stock price. We document predictable error in the implied cost of capital estimates resulting from analysts’ forecasts that are sluggish with respect to information in past stock returns. We propose two methods to mitigate the influence of sluggish forecasts on the implied cost of capital estimates. These methods substantially improve the ability of the implied cost of capital estimates to explain cross-sectional variation in future stock returns, which is consistent with the corrections being effective in mitigating the error in the estimates due to analysts’ sluggishness

Is Accruals Quality a Priced Risk Factor?

In a recent and influential empirical paper, Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper (FLOS) [2005. The market pricing of accruals quality. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39, 295–327] conclude that accruals quality (AQ) is a priced risk factor. We explain that FLOS’ regressions examining a contemporaneous relation between excess returns and factor returns do not test the hypothesis that AQ is a priced risk factor. We conduct appropriate asset-pricing tests for determining whether a potential risk factor explains expected returns, and find no evidence that AQ is a priced risk factor

Agency Problems of Excess Endowment Holdings in Not-for-Profit Firms

We examine three alternative explanations for excess endowments in not-for-profit firms: (1) growth opportunities, (2) monitoring, or (3) agency problems. Inconsistent with growth opportunities, we find that most excess endowments are persistent over time, and that firms with persistent excess endowments do not exhibit higher growth in program expenses or investments. Inconsistent with better monitoring, program expenditures toward the charitable good are lower for firms with excess endowments, and CEO pay and total officer and director pay are greater for firms with excess endowments. Overall, we find that excess endowments are associated with greater agency problems

Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?

In Pay Without Performance, Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried develop and summarize the leading critiques of current executive compensation practices in the United States. This book, and their highly influential earlier article, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, with David Walker offer a negative, if mainstream, assessment of the state of U.S. executive compensation: U.S. executive compensation practices are failing in a widespread manner, and much systemic reform is needed. The purpose of our Review is to summarize the book and to offer some counterarguments to try to balance what is becoming an increasingly one-sided debate. The book\u27s thesis is that executive compensation practices in the U.S. benefit corporate executives at the expense of shareholders through implicit and explicit corruption of the pay-setting process. It argues that CEO employment contracts are bad for shareholders (not optimal ) because they are the product of managerial power. Managerial power arises, the authors claim, because boards of directors at public companies are beholden to the firm\u27s top executives, largely due to management\u27s control over the director nomination process. Weak compensation committees thus do little to protect the firm in its pay negotiations with the CEO, leading to levels of executive pay that are both inappropriately high and have inappropriately low levels of incentives. The only constraint on this process is outrage, either among the firm\u27s shareholders or the general public. This outrage constraint, however, only polices extreme cases of executive overcompensation

Do Independent Directors Cause Improvements in Firm Transparency?

Although recent research documents a positive relation between corporate transparency and the proportion of independent directors, the direction of causality is unclear. We examine a regulatory shock that substantially increased board independence for some firms, and find that information asymmetry, and to some extent management disclosure and financial intermediation, changed at firms affected by this shock. We also examine whether these effects vary as a function of management entrenchment, information processing costs, and required changes to audit committee independence. Our results suggest that firms can alter their corporate transparency to suit the informational demands of a particular board structure