42 research outputs found

    The Triple Contract: A Case Study of a Source Blending Analogical Argument

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    One form of analogical argument proceeds by comparing a disputed case (the target) with an agreed upon case (the source) to try to resolve the dispute. There is a variation on preceding form of argument not yet identified in the theoretical literature. This variation involves multiple sources, and it requires that the sources be combined or blended for the argument to work. Arguments supporting the Triple Contract are shown to possess this structure

    Tensor Products and Split-Level Architecture: Foundational Issues in the Classicism-Connectionism Debate

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    This paper responds to criticisms levelled by Fodor, Pylyshyn and McLaughlin against connectionism. Specifically, I will rebut the charge that connectionists cannot account for representational systematicity without implementing a classical architecture. This will be accomplished by drawing on Paul Smolensky\u27s Tensor Product model of representation and on his insights about split-level architectures

    Case Classification, Similarities, Spaces of Reasons, and Coherences

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    A simple recurrent artificial neural network (ANN) is used to classify situations as permissible or impermissible. The trained ANN can be understood as having set up a similarity space of cases at the level of its internal or hidden units. An analysis of the network’s internal representations is undertaken using a new visualization technique for state space approaches to understanding similarity. Insights from the literature on moral philosophy pertaining to contributory standards will be used to interpret the state space set up by the ANN as being structured by implicit reasons. The ANN, on its own, is not capable of explicitly representing or offering reasons to itself or others. That said, the low level similarity space set up by the network could be made available to higher order processes that exploit it for case-based reasoning. It is argued that for normative purposes, similarity could be seen as a contributor to procedural coherence in case-based reasoning and local forms of substantive coherence, but not to global forms of coherence given the computational complexity of managing those more ambitious forms of coherence

    Commentary on Rehg

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    On the Limits of the Woods-Hudak Reconstruction of Analogical Argument

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    Connectionist Coherence and Moral Reasoning

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    Commentary on Wein

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    A Defence of Non-Deductive Reconstructions of Analogical Arguments

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    Bruce Waller has defended a deductive reconstruction of the kinds of analogical arguments found in ethics, law, and metaphysics. This paper demonstrates the limits of such a reconstruction and argues for an alternative, nondeductive reconstruction. It will be shown that some analogical arguments do not fit Waller\u27s deductive schema, and that such a schema does not allow for an adequate account of the strengths and weaknesses of an analogical argument. The similarities and differences between the account defended herein and the Trudy Govier\u27s account are discussed as well

    Two-wise and Three-wise Similarity, and Non-deductive Analogical Arguments

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    This paper will add to the discourse on analogical arguments by showing that they need not be deductively reconstructed in common contexts of persuasion. Analogical arguments have varying degrees of similarity, which helps us to understand their varying degrees of strength. Pace Shecaira (2013) it will be argued that this is a common and useful way of examining analogical arguments. It will be shown that deductive reconstruction does not adequately capture the needed degrees of strength. Let us start with two-wise similarity claims. Subject S1 says that the disputed case C1 is (relevantly) similar to C2 and should be treated as x, just as C2 is. S2 says that C1 is (relevantly) similar to C3 and should be treated as y, just as C3 is. S1 may counter with a three-wise similarity claim: C1 is more similar to C2 than it is to C3, because…, so C1 should be treated as x. Think of lawyers in court. It will be shown that the evaluation of analogical arguments in these contexts turns in a central way on similarity, and that deductive reconstructions get in the way of a proper understanding of the preceding
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