Spatial management of a fishery under parameter uncertainty

Spatial management of a fishery under parameter uncertainty is analyzed. The habitat is divided into two areas, and the effort level in the two areas may be different. The migration of biomass between the areas follows a diffusion process; two different specifications are considered. The model features logistic growth and Schaefer production functions. The intrinsic growth rate is treated as uncertain; the uncertainty is symmetric and spatially homogeneous. It is found that the optimal, spatial distribution of effort with respect to expected harvest is neither homogeneous or heterogeneous everywhere, but homogenous for a given subset of the parameter space and heterogeneous elsewhere

The Existence of Efficient and Incentive Compatible Equilibria with Public Goods

In our previous paper, "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods...," (1977) we presented a mechanism for determining efficient public goods allocations when preferences are unknown and consumers are free to misrepresent their demands for public goods. We proved the basic welfare theorem for this model: If consumers are competitive in markets for private goods and follow Nash behavior in their choice of demands to report to the mechanism, then equilibria will be Pareto optimal. In this paper we show this result is not vacuous by proving that an equilibria will be Pareto optimal. In this paper we show this result is not vacuous by proving that an equilibrium will exist for a wide class of economies. Our conditions are slightly stronger than those required to prove the existence of a Lindahl equilibrium. In order to rule out the possibility of bankruptcy, we assume additionally that at all Pareto optimal allocations, private goods consumption is bounded away from zero

The existence of efficient and incentive compatible equilibria with public goods

In our previous paper, "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods...," (1977) we presented a mechanism for determining efficient public goods allocations when preferences are unknown and consumers are free to misrepresent their demands for public goods. We proved the basic welfare theorem for this model: If consumers are competitive in markets for private goods and follow Nash behavior in their choice of demands to report to the mechanism, then equilibria will be Pareto optimal. In this paper we show this result is not vacuous by proving that an equilibria will be Pareto optimal. In this paper we show this result is not vacuous by proving that an equilibrium will exist for a wide class of economies. Our conditions are slightly stronger than those required to prove the existence of a Lindahl equilibrium. In order to rule out the possibility of bankruptcy, we assume additionally that at all Pareto optimal allocations, private goods consumption is bounded away from zero

Maintaining The Integrity Of Turnover Measurements When There Are Layoffs

Bonuses for improvements in employee retention rates should be calculated on the actual savings due to fewer terminations and reduced replacement costs. Permanent layoffs and hiring freezes distort the turnover rate and make the normal bonus calculations invalid. A new method for calculating a manager’s bonus for reducing the turnover rate is illustrated. It isolates the number of terminations due to changes in the size of the workforce from the terminations due to the improved retention rate. The size of the savings in terminations due to the improved retention rate can be accurately measured in situations where hiring freezes negate normal calculations

The existence of efficient and incentive compatible equilibria with public goods

In our previous paper, "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods...," (1977) we presented a mechanism for determining efficient public goods allocations when preferences are unknown and consumers are free to misrepresent their demands for public goods. We proved the basic welfare theorem for this model: If consumers are competitive in markets for private goods and follow Nash behavior in their choice of demands to report to the mechanism, then equilibria will be Pareto optimal. In this paper we show this result is not vacuous by proving that an equilibria will be Pareto optimal. In this paper we show this result is not vacuous by proving that an equilibrium will exist for a wide class of economies. Our conditions are slightly stronger than those required to prove the existence of a Lindahl equilibrium. In order to rule out the possibility of bankruptcy, we assume additionally that at all Pareto optimal allocations, private goods consumption is bounded away from zero

The Existence of Efficient and Incentive Compatible Equilibria with Public Goods

In our previous paper, "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods...," (1977) we presented a mechanism for determining efficient public goods allocations when preferences are unknown and consumers are free to misrepresent their demands for public goods. We proved the basic welfare theorem for this model: If consumers are competitive in markets for private goods and follow Nash behavior in their choice of demands to report to the mechanism, then equilibria will be Pareto optimal. In this paper we show this result is not vacuous by proving that an equilibria will be Pareto optimal. In this paper we show this result is not vacuous by proving that an equilibrium will exist for a wide class of economies. Our conditions are slightly stronger than those required to prove the existence of a Lindahl equilibrium. In order to rule out the possibility of bankruptcy, we assume additionally that at all Pareto optimal allocations, private goods consumption is bounded away from zero

Quota: From Experimental Computer Game to Fishery Management Education Tool

Quota, a computer-based simulation game, originated as an experimental game for testing alternative multi-resource management regimes or systems. Highly flexible, it allows specification for a standard common-property, open-access fishery with user-specified bio-economic fishery growth model and multiple sized producers with individual harvest and cost functions. In addition to demonstrating overfishing under open-access, various forms of Property Rights Systems can be implemented, including the setting of an overall Total Allowable Catch (TAC) and further allocation of the TAC to individual producers -- Individual Quota Rights (IQR) -- that may be based on historical catch during initial periods of Open Access fishing or equal shares or shares determined by bargaining amongst the players (producers). Subsequent trading of IQRs is also implemented using a highly developed computerized trading game. Recent use of the game have been as an educational tool in university classes on resource economics and in the field at meetings of Regional Fishing Management Organizations that govern the major tuna fisheries around the world