Electronically Stored Information: Balancing Free Discovery With Limits on Abuse

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the Rules) have long sought to limit abuses that developed under the traditional presumption favoring free discovery. The 2006 amendments to the Rules are specifically aimed at curbing abuses associated with electronically stored information (ESI), which has become the basic medium of business communications and has provided businesses with overall productivity benefits. The 2006 amendments introduce a new category of electronic evidence that is not reasonably accessible and allow a court to shift the related costs of discovery to the party requesting the information. Cost-shifting, however, creates an incentive for businesses to shelter sensitive data by making it not reasonably accessible. This iBrief argues that the current tests created by the courts for cost-shifting should be reassessed and should include a benefit-shifting component that offsets business savings from using ESI as a storage medium. Rather than treating ESI as exceptional, the Rules should adopt a uniform approach that curbs abuses of all discovery

Phase Diagram for Self-assembly of Amphiphilic Molecule C12E6 by Dissipative Particle Dynamics Simulation

In a previous study, dissipative particle dynamics simulation was used to qualitatively clarify the phase diagram of the amphiphilic molecule hexaethylene glycol dodecyl ether (C12E6). In the present study, the hydrophilicity dependence of the phase structure was clarified qualitatively by varying the interaction potential between hydrophilic molecules and water molecules in a dissipative particle dynamics (DPD) simulation using the Jury model. By varying the coefficient of the interaction potential $x$ between hydrophilic beads and water molecules as x=-20, 0, 10, and 20, at a dimensionless temperature of T=0.5 and a concentration of amphiphilic molecules in water of phi=50% the phase structures grew to lamellar (x=-20), hexagonal (x=0), and micellar (x=10) phases. For x=20, phase separation occurs between hydrophilic beads and water molecules

Survey on Rules on Loss of Nationality in International Treaties and Case Law. CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe No. 57, 30 August 2013

This paper offers a picture of the obligations existing under international and European law in respect of the loss of nationality. It describes international instruments including obligations in this field with direct relevancy for the loss of nationality of Member States of the European Union, but also obligations regarding loss of nationality in regional non-European treaties. Attention is given to two important judicial decisions of the European Court of Justice (Janko Rottmann) and the European Court of Human Rights (Genovese v Malta) regarding nationality. Special attention is devoted to Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which forbids the arbitrary deprivation of nationality. A survey is provided of possible sub-principles that can be derived from this rule. Finally, some observations are made on the burden of proof in cases of loss of nationality

Roger Caillois, Games of Chance and the Superstar

Superstars are not by accident a conspicuous phenomenon in our culture, but inherently belong to a meritocratic society with mass media, free enterprise, and competition. To make this contention plausible I will use Caillois’s book, Man, Play and Games, to compare the mechanisms underlying the superstar phenomenon with a special kind of game, as set out by Caillois. As far as I know, Caillois’s book is not quoted in the literature dealing with income distribution theories, although the comparison with play and games is, for limited purposes, interesting. In play and games we find almost all elements which play a role in theories of just income distribution: equality of opportunity, chance, talent, competition and skill, reward, entitlement, winners and losers, etc. These are not chance similarities, for “. . . games are largely dependent upon the cultures in which they are practised. They affect their preferences, prolong their customs, and reflect their beliefs . . . One can posit a truly reciprocal relationship between a society and the games it likes to play”. Moreover, as we will see, superstars combine the four basic characteristics of play that make their activities a special kind of play.Caillois superstars Rawls

Basic income, unemployment and job scarcity

The main claim of this paper is that in a world of equal entitlements to work rights the justification for a basic income is stronger, and that its level should be higher. the higher the level of unemployment or job scarcity. Point of departure is an economy with job scarcity. A fair way to deal with job scarcity is to grant everybody an equal right to work, where these rights can be freely traded. It turns out that such a Labour Rights scheme and a basic income scheme are equivalent. The equivalence is that the price of Labour Rights and the unemployment benefit corresponds to the income tax rate and basic income respectively. The tax rate can thus be considered as what workers have to pay to appropriate scarce job assets. Both schemes allow that some people voluntarily abstain from doing paid work, in return for a financial compensation. Therefore, the advantages in terms of equity and efficiency of a Labour Rights scheme equally apply to the basic income proposal. This analysis provides an argument against cutting unemployment and social assistance benefits during economic downturns and it offers new insights to evaluate the parasitism and exploitation objection raised against basic income.Unemployment, Right to work, Basic income, Social policy, Exploitation

Regional wage differences in the Netherlands: Micro-evidence on agglomeration externalities

Based on micro-data on individual workers for the period 2000–2005, we show that regional wage differentials in the Netherlands are small but present. A large part of these differentials can be attributed to individual characteristics of workers. Remaining effects are partially explained by variations in employment density, with an elasticity of about 3.8 percent and by Marshall-Arrow-Romer externalities, where doubling the share of a (2-digit NACE) industry results in a 2.4 percent higher productivity. We find evidence for a negative effect of competition (associated with Porter externalities) and diversity (associated with Jacobs externalities).