Why Proximity Matters for the Concept of Supererogation

The concept of supererogation is strictly correlated with duty, since its peculiar value is defined by acts that go beyond our regular obligations. This paper highlights the importance of proximity (relational closeness) in allowing the proper theoretical space to supererogation. As a matter of fact if we broaden our sense of duty, the possibility to perform supererogatory acts correspondingly decreases. Special obligations emphasize how difficult acts of supererogation are to perform if we stand in some morally-relevant special position with the recipient of our acts. Thus, we can conclude that the relationship between the agent and the recipient of the act (proximity) plays an important role both for our sense of duty (generating special obligations) and for the possibility of performing supererogatory acts. Furthermore, this analysis brings attention to the fact that whenever an act is supererogatory, it cannot, at the same time, be a special obligation (and vice versa). As a consequence, if proximity plays such a role, an objection to the possibility of self-regarding supererogation can be made

Supererogation and the Limits of Moral Obligations. Guest Editor’s Preface

Do moral obligations include all the good that can be possibly achieved? Does every instance of the good always entail obligatory performance? Supererogation is a moral concept that tries to address this claim, by pointing out the existence of a category of morally relevant good acts that go beyond the call of duty. Paradigmatic examples of this category of acts are represented by deeds of heroism and sanctity, where the agent is sacrificing herself in order to benefit the others in an exemplary way. However, supererogation is not limited to extreme and utmost cases of generosity, but it has much to do with our everyday life. From a moral point of view, making a small donation to the local children‘s hospital is considered to be morally good, but optional

Only Through Complexity. Morality and the Case of Supererogation

This volume deals with some of the major issues in contemporary moral philosophy. The core metaethical argument illuminates the structure of a moral system and emphasizes the importance of a phenomenological attitude toward the moral subject. From this starting point, further questions (typically addressed in normative ethics) arise: “How does moral deliberation work?” “How is moral justification possible?” “What is moral pluralism?” “How do we give an account of supererogatory acts?” Regarding all these questions, the volume works out the following answer: only through complexity. This view entails the belief that a life lived well is richer if we endorse a moral system that denies theoretical oversimplifications and favors the abundance of the constraints of moral obligations. As such, the overall goal of this volume involves mapping and recognizing different instances of moral complexity. This acknowledgment comes with several assumptions. Only through complexity can we make sense of what lies beyond the call of duty. Only through complexity can we give an account of how morality works from the first-person perspective. Only through complexity can we better promote the pursuit of a flourishing life

Only Through Moral Complexity: The Case of Supererogation

The present research work will focus on two morally relevant issues: the nature of the experience of a moral agents and a possible account of the concept of supererogation. Even if, at a preliminary stage, these two subjects look to be unrelated, it will become clear how they both are expressions of the complexity typical of the moral domain. I will endorse, as a starting point, the approach of moral phenomenology as defined by Maurice Mandelbaum. A phenomenological study is then intended as the analysis of what it is like to perform a given act from the perspective of the first-person. Accordingly, the experience of the moral agent appears to be manifold and heterogeneous. On a normative level, the best moral account that allows the management and the comprehension of such complexity seems to be moral pluralism. In particular, I will distinguish between two sorts of pluralism: methodological pluralism (about the different ways of moral reasoning) and axiological pluralism (about the different values that we take to have ultimate relevance). These denominations represent two ways of understanding morality in virtue of its complexity. As such, the approach of moral complexity relies on the acknowledgment of the manifold structure of morality. In this regard, I will consider the account offered by Charles Larmore in his Patterns of Moral Complexity. His admission of different and equally valid moral principles does not only explain something essential about our moral experience, but it will also become particularly helpful as I will try to apply his theory to the justification of supererogatory acts. Supererogation, as I will highlight, is a moral concept that relies on the existence of the many levels of morality and on the many possible achievements of the good. In this way, a clear distinction between the Right and the Good will provide the theoretical space for this category of acts. I will define this as the need of complexity, that is, the need of a multilevel theoretical structure that resembles the distinction between precepts and concepts that gave birth to the concept in the Christian tradition. I will try to show how the loss of moral complexity is the first responsible of the theoretical struggles that the major monist theories (in particular Utilitarianism and Kantian Ethics) face when confronted with the justification of supererogatory acts. These theoretical approaches usually tend to be anti-supererogationists for a clear reason. When the level of the Right and the level of the Good merge into the same category there is no easy way to give an account of morally good acts that go beyond the call of duty. I believe that the endorsement of a pluralist system will solve the so-called problem of supererogation by reestablishing a clear distinction between the two faces of morality: the deontic and the evaluative. This is why, in the final chapter, I will introduce the Multiple Sources Dynamics as possible explanation, on a normative level, of how supererogatory acts can be performed. A system that provides multiple sources of the good has the tools to explain the establishment of our moral obligations and, at the same time, it can explain how we are able to see and foster some other good that lies beyond the level of requirements. In the present work, moral pluralism will be taken to be a sort of inference to best explanation of different morally relevant issues. This claim will be warranted by highlighting how moral pluralism can explain why our moral experience is so essentially complex (to the point of facing true moral dilemmas) and by showing how it can provide a satisfactory account of the concept supererogation. If these two subjects (which will be considered, at this point, directly related) are proved to hold true, the endorsement of a pluralist system will be considered the preferable option over the other normative systems

Contributions of the French Strategic Environmental Assessment to Brazilian planning in water source areas: the Billings Reservoir sub-basin case

Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) is a tool that aims to integrate environmental issues into decision-making processes, usually to support the development of sectoral or territorial plans and programs. SEA is mandatory in the European Union and is applied to water management in France. Water management in Brazil is inspired by the French model, but does not have SEA; in the state of São Paulo watersheds of interest for public supply have specific norms and can count on a Development and Environmental Protection Plan (PDPA). In this research we explore three potential contributions of SEA as adopted in French water management for the case of the PDPA of the Billings Reservoir sub-basin. We conducted an evaluative case study for this PDPA, a literature review on French practices, and comparative analysis. We conclude by indicating potential contributions of SEA for the definition of objectives, scoping, and study of alternatives of the PDPA-Billings.Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) is a tool that aims to integrate environmental issues into decision-making processes, usually to support the development of sectoral or territorial plans and programs. SEA is mandatory in the European Union and is applied to water management in France. Water management in Brazil is inspired by the French model, but does not have SEA; in the state of São Paulo watersheds of interest for public supply have specific norms and can count on a Development and Environmental Protection Plan (PDPA). In this research we explore three potential contributions of SEA as adopted in French water management for the case of the PDPA of the Billings Reservoir sub-basin. We conducted an evaluative case study for this PDPA, a literature review on French practices, and comparative analysis. We conclude by indicating potential contributions of SEA for the definition of objectives, scoping, and study of alternatives of the PDPA-Billings.Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) is a tool that aims to integrate environmental issues into decision-making processes, usually to support the development of sectoral or territorial plans and programs. SEA is mandatory in the European Union and is applied to water management in France. Water management in Brazil is inspired by the French model, but does not have SEA; in the state of São Paulo watersheds of interest for public supply have specific norms and can count on a Development and Environmental Protection Plan (PDPA). In this research we explore three potential contributions of SEA as adopted in French water management for the case of the PDPA of the Billings Reservoir sub-basin. We conducted an evaluative case study for this PDPA, a literature review on French practices, and comparative analysis. We conclude by indicating potential contributions of SEA for the definition of objectives, scoping, and study of alternatives of the PDPA-Billings.Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) is a tool that aims to integrate environmental issues into decision-making processes, usually to support the development of sectoral or territorial plans and programs. SEA is mandatory in the European Union and is applied to water management in France. Water management in Brazil is inspired by the French model, but does not have SEA; in the state of São Paulo watersheds of interest for public supply have specific norms and can count on a Development and Environmental Protection Plan (PDPA). In this research we explore three potential contributions of SEA as adopted in French water management for the case of the PDPA of the Billings Reservoir sub-basin. We conducted an evaluative case study for this PDPA, a literature review on French practices, and comparative analysis. We conclude by indicating potential contributions of SEA for the definition of objectives, scoping, and study of alternatives of the PDPA-Billings

Only Through Moral Complexity: The Case of Supererogation

The present research work will focus on two morally relevant issues: the nature of the experience of a moral agents and a possible account of the concept of supererogation. Even if, at a preliminary stage, these two subjects look to be unrelated, it will become clear how they both are expressions of the complexity typical of the moral domain. I will endorse, as a starting point, the approach of moral phenomenology as defined by Maurice Mandelbaum. A phenomenological study is then intended as the analysis of what it is like to perform a given act from the perspective of the first-person. Accordingly, the experience of the moral agent appears to be manifold and heterogeneous. On a normative level, the best moral account that allows the management and the comprehension of such complexity seems to be moral pluralism. In particular, I will distinguish between two sorts of pluralism: methodological pluralism (about the different ways of moral reasoning) and axiological pluralism (about the different values that we take to have ultimate relevance). These denominations represent two ways of understanding morality in virtue of its complexity. As such, the approach of moral complexity relies on the acknowledgment of the manifold structure of morality. In this regard, I will consider the account offered by Charles Larmore in his Patterns of Moral Complexity. His admission of different and equally valid moral principles does not only explain something essential about our moral experience, but it will also become particularly helpful as I will try to apply his theory to the justification of supererogatory acts. Supererogation, as I will highlight, is a moral concept that relies on the existence of the many levels of morality and on the many possible achievements of the good. In this way, a clear distinction between the Right and the Good will provide the theoretical space for this category of acts. I will define this as the need of complexity, that is, the need of a multilevel theoretical structure that resembles the distinction between precepts and concepts that gave birth to the concept in the Christian tradition. I will try to show how the loss of moral complexity is the first responsible of the theoretical struggles that the major monist theories (in particular Utilitarianism and Kantian Ethics) face when confronted with the justification of supererogatory acts. These theoretical approaches usually tend to be anti-supererogationists for a clear reason. When the level of the Right and the level of the Good merge into the same category there is no easy way to give an account of morally good acts that go beyond the call of duty. I believe that the endorsement of a pluralist system will solve the so-called problem of supererogation by reestablishing a clear distinction between the two faces of morality: the deontic and the evaluative. This is why, in the final chapter, I will introduce the Multiple Sources Dynamics as possible explanation, on a normative level, of how supererogatory acts can be performed. A system that provides multiple sources of the good has the tools to explain the establishment of our moral obligations and, at the same time, it can explain how we are able to see and foster some other good that lies beyond the level of requirements. In the present work, moral pluralism will be taken to be a sort of inference to best explanation of different morally relevant issues. This claim will be warranted by highlighting how moral pluralism can explain why our moral experience is so essentially complex (to the point of facing true moral dilemmas) and by showing how it can provide a satisfactory account of the concept supererogation. If these two subjects (which will be considered, at this point, directly related) are proved to hold true, the endorsement of a pluralist system will be considered the preferable option over the other normative systems.Il presente progetto di ricerca si concentrerà su due questioni di rilevanza morale: la natura dell’esperienza morale degli morali ed un possibile giustificazione del concetto di supererogatorio. Anche se, ad uno stadio preliminare, queste due questioni non sembrano essere in relazione, diventerà chiaro in secondo momento come esse siano entrambe espressioni di quella complessità tipica dell’ambito morale. Come punto di partenza, seguirò l’approccio della fenomenologia morale come viene definita da Maurice Mandelbaum. Tale studio fenomenologico è quindi inteso come l’analisi, dalla prospettiva della prima persona, di cosa voglia dire fare una data azione. A questo proposito, l’esperienza morale dell’agente appare multiforme ed eterogenea. Ad un livello normativo, la miglior teoria che permette di affrontare e comprendere tale complessità sembra essere il pluralismo morale. In particolare, distinguerò due tipologie di pluralismo: un pluralismo metodologico (che riguarda i diversi modi di ragionare moralmente) ed un pluralismo assiologico (che riguarda i diversi valori a cui diamo una rilevanza assoluta). Queste due interpretazioni rappresentano due modi di comprendere la moralità in virtù della sua essenziale complessità. Come tale, l’approccio della complessità morale si fonda sul riconoscimento della struttura variegata della morale. A questo proposito, analizzerò la posizione di Charles Larmore come espressa nel suo Strutture di complessità morale. La sua identificazione di diversi principi morali egualmente validi, non solo spiegherà qualcosa di essenziale riguardo all’esperienza morale, ma diventerà particolarmente funzionale quando, nell’ultimo capitolo, farò riferimento alla sua teoria per la giustificazione degli atti supererogatori. Il supererogatorio, come evidenzierò, è un concetto morale che si fonda sull’esistenza dei diversi livelli della morale e sulle molteplici modalità di conseguire il bene. In questo modo, una chiara distinzione tra il Giusto ed il Bene fornirà lo spazio teorico per questa categoria di atti. Definirò tale operazione la necessità della complessità, ovvero, il bisogno di una struttura teorica a più livelli che ricordi la distinzione tra precetti e consigli che ha dato vita al concetto nella tradizione cristiana. Cercherò di dimostrare come la perdita di complessità morale è la prima causa delle difficoltà teoriche che le principali teorie moniste (in particolare utilitarismo ed etica kantiana) si trovano a fronteggiare nella giustificazione degli atti supererogatori. Questi approcci teorici, infatti, tendono ad essere anti-supererogazionisti per un motivo ben chiaro. Quando il livello del Giusto ed il livello del Bene si fondono nella stessa categoria, non resta alcun modo diretto di rendere conto degli atti moralmente buoni che vanno oltre il senso del dovere. Credo che l’adozione di un sistema pluralista risolverà il così detto problema del supererogatorio, ristabilendo una chiara distinzione tra le due facce della morale: il deontico e l’assiologico. Da qui il motivo per cui, nel capitolo finale, introdurrò la Multiple Sources Dynamics come una possibile spiegazione, ad un livello normativo, di come si diano le azioni supererogatorie. Un sistema che garantisca molteplici fonti del bene ha gli strumenti per fondare le nostre obbligazioni morali e, allo stesso tempo, per vedere e perseguire beni di altro genere che stanno oltre il livello degli obblighi. In questo lavoro il pluralismo morale viene inteso come una sorta di inferenza alla miglior spiegazione di diverse questioni moralmente rilevanti. Questa affermazione verrà giustificata evidenziando come il pluralismo morale possa spiegare perché la nostra esperienza morale è essenzialmente complessa (fino al punto di fronteggiare reali dilemmi morali) e dimostrando come si possa fornire una giustificazione soddisfacente del concetto di supererogatorio. Se queste due questioni (che a questo punto si danno come direttamente relazionate) sono verificate come valide, l’adozione di un sistema pluralista sarà considerata come l’opzione preferibile tra i vari sistemi normativi