23 research outputs found

    The Effects of Uncertainty on Macroeconomic Performance: The Importance of the Conditional Covariance Model.

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    We study the effects of growth volatility and inflation volatility on average rates of output growth and inflation for postwar U.S. data in a multivariate asymmetric GARCH-M model. Our statistical model differs from other work in that we allow the conditional covariance of inflation and growth to be both nondiagonal and asymmetric. We show that the data reject diagonality and symmetry restrictions frequently imposed in the literature. Our results on the macroeconomic effects of uncertainty also differ from those in other recent studies using a more restrictive covariance model. Specifically, we find that increased growth uncertainty is associated with significantly higher average growth, and that higher inflation uncertainty is significantly negatively correlated with lower output growth and lower average inflation.Asymmetry; Multivariate GARCH-M; Inflation; Uncertainty; Growth

    An Empirical Note on Economic Freedom and Income Inequality

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    I report estimates for a fixed-effects model of country-level Gini coefficients as a function of economic freedom along with relevant control variables. Gini coefficients are drawn from the UNU/WIDER World Income Inequality Database Version 2.0a, while economic freedom is measured by the Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom of the World index. Controls are included for per capita income, political structure, education, demographics, and industrial composition. Over a broad range of freedom, the estimated relation between economic freedom and income inequality is positive, statistically significant, but relatively inelastic. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2007Economic freedom, Income inequality, Gini coefficient, Equality, Tradeoff, Country panel,

    Market Conduct and Endogenous Lobbying: Evidence from the U.S. Mobile Telecommunications Industry

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    This paper empirically explores the relationship between firms' market behavior and their lobbying activities in a regulated market. In particular, we investigate whether the amount of contributions offered by cellular service providers to fund the campaigns of political parties affected market conduct in the early US mobile telecommunications industry. We structurally estimate market interactions while taking the potential endogeneity of lobbying decisions into account. Our results show that competition was more intense in those states where campaign contributions by the cellular industry have been higher. Furthermore, we reject the hypothesis that lobbying activities can be regarded as exogenous in the study of market conduct. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2007lobbying, campaign contributions, conjectural variations, mobile telecommunications, U.S., D72, L13, L51, L96, C31,

    Party Polarization and the Business Cycle in the United States

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    A large literature has studied the trend of greaterpolarization between Democrats and Republicans in Congress.This paper empirically examines the extent to which inflationand unemployment explain cyclical movements ofpolarization over time. An informal application of thestandard Downsian spatial competition model of partiesgenerates the following relationships, ceteris paribus: (1)inflation should be associated with policy convergence, (2)unemployment should be associated with polarization, (3) theeffect of unemployment on polarization should be larger inmagnitude than the effect of inflation on convergence, and (4)the effect of unemployment on polarization should be strongerin the House than in the Senate. We estimate the relationshipbetween vote records and business cycle conditions over the1947–1999 period using a GLS model with varying lags. Ourresults are broadly consistent with these business cyclehypotheses of polarization, though greater support is found inHouse data than in Senate data. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004
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