Is the political business cycle for real?

This paper's macroeconomic model combines features from both real and political business cycle models. It augments a standard real business cycle tax model by allowing for varying levels of government partisanship and competence in order to replicate two important empirical regularities: First, that on average the economy expands early under Democratic presidents and contracts early under Republican presidents. Second, that presidents whose parties successfully retain the presidency have stronger-than-average growth in the second half of their terms. The model generates both of these features in conformity with U.S. post-World War II data.Business cycles

Is the Political Business Cycle for Real?

This paper constructs and examines a macroeconomic model which combines features from both real and political business cycle models. We augment a standard real business cycle tax model by allowing for varying levels of government partisanship and competence in order to replicate two important empirical regularities: First, that on average the economy expands early under Democratic Presidents and contracts early under Republican Presidents. Second, that Presidents whose parties successfully retain the presidency have stronger than average growth in the second half of their terms. The model generates both of these features that conform to U.S. Post World War II data.Political business cycle

Breaking Even In Transition Russia: Problems And Prospects For Small Business In The World\u27s Largest Country

Opening a business in any market can be a difficult but rewarding experience. In Russia, the experience can be even more rewarding as the market potential is vast, and a new business often may be the first of its kind and offer previously unavailable products. However, the pitfalls and barriers to opening new businesses are severe and require a sustained effort with good local partners. This paper discusses several important areas of opening a business for the practitioner in Russia in the year 2000 and beyond

The Surprising Wealth of Pre-industrial England

Occupations listed in wills reveal that as early as 1560 effectively only 60% of the English engaged in farming. Even by 1817, well into the Industrial Revolution, the equivalent primary share, once we count in food and raw material imports, was still 52%. By implication, incomes in pre-industrial England were close to those of 1800. Urbanization rates are not a good guide to pre-industrial income levels. Many rural workers were engaged in manufacturing, services and trade. The occupation shares also imply pre-industrial England was rich enough in 1560 to rank above the bottom fifth of countries in 2007.Long Run Growth England

Breaking Even in Transition Russia: Problems and Prospects for Small Business in the World\u27s Largest Country

Gregory Brock is Assistant professor of economics, College of Business Administration, Georgia Southern University, Statesboro, GA 30460

The Surprising Wealth of Pre-industrial England

Occupations listed in wills reveal that as early as 1560 effectively only 60% of the English engaged in farming. Even by 1817, well into the Industrial Revolution, the equivalent primary share, once we count in food and raw material imports, was still 52%. By implication, incomes in pre-industrial England were close to those of 1800. Urbanization rates are not a good guide to pre-industrial income levels. Many rural workers were engaged in manufacturing, services and trade. The occupation shares also imply pre-industrial England was rich enough in 1560 to rank above the bottom fifth of countries in 2007.Growth, England, Pre-industrial