Managerial ownership and corporate performance in Slovenian post-privatisation period

The Slovenian post-privatisation period has been characterised by a decline in the ownership by non-managerial owners (employees) and state-controlled funds. On the other hand, domestic and foreign non-financial firms, Privatisation Investment Funds and managers have been increasing their holdings. The latter, namely the growing managerial ownership, is likely to feature in future ownership dynamics in Slovenia. In fact, in 2002 the desired (optimal) ownership stakes estimated by Slovenian managers were 10.8 percentage points higher than their actual stakes. The aim of our paper is to describe the main trends in the ownership of Slovenian corporations in the post-privatisation period and to provide an answer to the basic economic question: what is the influence of the ongoing consolidation of managerial ownership on the performance of Slovenian firms. The empirical analysis testing this relationship is based on a panel of 182 Slovenian firms in the 1995-99 period and does not provide relevant evidence of any positive effects of the increasing managerial control on Slovenian firms' performance. If any, a positive incentive effect is only observed in those firms whose managers' holdings exceed 10-percent, only with regards to firms' financial performance (but not total factor productivity) and only in firms that are not listed on the capital market. Further, the negative effect of the current gap between the desired and actual managerial ownership seems to exceed any positive incentive effect arising out of managerial ownership.managerial ownership; ownership consolidation; corporate performance; corporate governance; transparency

SME Financing and Multiple Bank Relationships in Transition Economies

This paper investigates bank-borrower relationships in an advanced transition country. The empirical analysis is based on a unique dataset of 121 privatized small and medium-sized Slovenian corporations in the first years following the end of the banking sector’s reorganization (1998–2002). The results reveal the strong dominance of bank funding for small and medium-sized enterprises. Despite this, the firms included in the study are characterized by a small number of bank relationships. The specifics of the transition are moreover reflected in the substantial role of fixed assets that can be put up as collateral. However, the number of bank relationships relates to similar factors that have been proven to influence the number of firm-bank relationships in developed countries. We thus expect that the number of bank relationships in Slovenia will increase with the progress of restructuring and privatization of the enterprise sector and with the integration of financial markets following Slovenia’s entry to the European Union

Promoting Rule Compliance and Good Governance Practice

The paper re-examines the concerns on the rule-based governance in poor institutional environment. By relying on the theories and research vehicles of social psychology, we show that under certain conditions, the ‘law on books’ may still play role in governing market transactions, even though no formal enforcement applies. We furthermore expose the potential of the Corporate Governance Code as the ‘signaling device’ and provide arguments as to why this potential may be even stronger in an environment with relatively weak institutions in comparison to the developed market economies

A comparison of Russia and Slovenia

Ownership is determined by firm specific factors and the environment. Firms change over their life-cycle. The governance cycle – here defined as changes in identity of the dominant owner and own-ership concentration - is marked by key phases including start-up, growth, and possibly a restructur-ing or exit stage. During transition the cycle reflects: privatization often with a high proportion of employee ownership like in Russia and in Slovenia; strong pressures for restructuring and owner-ship changes; limited possibility for external finance because of embryonic development of the fi-nancial system. To provide simple hypothesis tests, we use Russian enterprise data for 1995-2003 and Slovenian data covering 1998-2003. In spite of differences in institutional development, con-cerning privatization and development of corporate governance institutions, we find that govern-ance cycles are broadly similar in the two countries. Employee ownership is rapidly fading, but while change to manager and non-financial domestic outsider ownership is typical for Russia, man-ager ownership is not widespread in Slovenia. Instead change to financial outsiders in the form of Privatization Investment Funds is frequent. Foreign ownership, which is rare especially in Russia, is quite stable. The ownership diversification to employees and diversified external owners during privatization did not fit well to the low development of institutions. As expected we observe in both countries a subsequent concentration of ownership on managers, external domestic and foreign owners. JEL-codes: G3, J5, P2, P3 - Keywords: corporate governance, life-cycle, privatization, ownership change, transition economies, Russia and Slovenia

Managerial ownership and corporate performance in Slovenian post-privatisation period

The Slovenian post-privatisation period has been characterised by a decline in the ownership by non-managerial owners (employees) and state-controlled funds. On the other hand, domestic and foreign non-financial firms, Privatisation Investment Funds and managers have been increasing their holdings. The latter, namely the growing managerial ownership, is likely to feature in future ownership dynamics in Slovenia. In fact, in 2002 the desired (optimal) ownership stakes estimated by Slovenian managers were 10.8 percentage points higher than their actual stakes. The aim of our paper is to describe the main trends in the ownership of Slovenian corporations in the post-privatisation period and to provide an answer to the basic economic question: what is the influence of the ongoing consolidation of managerial ownership on the performance of Slovenian firms. The empirical analysis testing this relationship is based on a panel of 182 Slovenian firms in the 1995-99 period and does not provide relevant evidence of any positive effects of the increasing managerial control on Slovenian firms' performance. If any, a positive incentive effect is only observed in those firms whose managers' holdings exceed 10-percent, only with regards to firms' financial performance (but not total factor productivity) and only in firms that are not listed on the capital market. Further, the negative effect of the current gap between the desired and actual managerial ownership seems to exceed any positive incentive effect arising out of managerial ownership

Pay me right: reference values and executive compensation

status: publishe

Pay me right: reference values and executive compensation

This paper examines the importance of reference values for executive compensation contracts. We rely on a quasi-experimental setting (the adoption of pay guidelines), and a well-defined measure of individual-specific reference values to provide evidence on how a change in CEO reference compensation leads to subsequent changes of actual pay. We find that executive compensation adjusts gradually towards the new reference values, and that the speed of the adjustment depends on the corporate governance characteristics: the firm ownership structure, the role of the State and of the employees in the firm decision making. These results provide empirical support for theoretical models of bargaining that take into account reference values