Coping with Insecurity: Labour Relations, (Im)mobility and Conflict-sensitive Employment in Afghanistan

Forced migration studies and research related to the "new wars" paradigm have drawn attention to the modes of operation of war economies and the coercive labour relations involved. Field research findings by the author and an Afghan team in 2015-2017 on employment by local construction companies revealed that remnants of the war economy have persisted in Afghanistan's fragile and violence-affected settings and continue to shape labour relations. To avoid acts of sabotage and fulfil construction contracts, relationships with local powerholders - politicians holding offices in government or Taliban leaders - are crucial for mobile Afghan companies operating on construction sites for limited periods. The research findings indicate that these relationships provide a field of interaction and negotiations about conflict-sensitive employment between company managers and local elders representing community interests - and through them, local powerholders. The involvement of elders affects the labour relations between company managers and local workers, both mobile and immobile

Challenges of Regional Peace after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), concluded between the Government of Sudan and the leadership of the Sudan People\u27s Liberation Army (SPLA) in January 2005, ended a 22 years lasting civil war. The core of the CPA document is the agreement on power and wealth sharing, tackling the main causes of the conflict: unfair distribution of power and marginalization of the majority of the population. The conclusion of the CPA is not only the merit of the two warring parties but also an outcome of the commitment of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the special envoy of the Kenyan government, General Lazaro Sumbeiywo, and the IGAD Partners\u27 Forum which includes the governments of the USA, Norway, Netherlands, Canada, Italy and the United Nations (UN). This success has been overshadowed by the war in Darfur in western Sudan which has been raging since 2003. Moreover, two years after signing the CPA, a speech of the South Sudanese President Salva Kiir on the occasion of the anniversary of the CPA brought some fundamental shortcomings in the implementation to public light. Has the peace process in Sudan come to a standstill? Is the war in Darfur related to the peace in South Sudan? How does the mixture of war and peace in Sudan affect the sub-region of the Greater Horn? What are the challenges for the institutions that had been involved in creating the CPA

Towards conflict-sensitive employment in large-scale infrastructure projects in fragile and conflict-affected settings: recommendations for donor agencies

In fragile and conflict-affected settings (FCAS), largescale infrastructure projects often connect areas under various forms of rule. Donor agencies and development banks should demand from contractors conducting feasibility studies to include conflictsensitive employment (CSE) strategies for those parts of the infrastructure project that are affected by violent conflict. In addition to available international procurement guidelines, donor agencies and development banks should require bidders to outline a CSE strategy. They should demand from bidders a convincing calculation of the costs of CSE, especially in comparison to the costs of anticipated security measures for the duration of the project, its maintenance and protection for a specified period (at least five years) after completion. The CSE framework (Grawert et al., 2017) should be attached to the tender as a guideline. As changes in control over areas and settings of armed conflict are common in FCAS, conditions for company operations in large-scale infrastructure building will change, too. While bidders' contingency plans should include such potential changes, donor agencies or development banks should allow for budget adjustments if these changes exceed the anticipated volume of the project. Local companies often are familiar with local power relations and able to assess project risks in local areas realistically. Donor agencies and development banks should require from bidders an initial outline of units that will have to be constructed by local companies, and bidders should detail the envisaged CSE strategies. Donor-funded skills upgrading measures could enable local companies to carry out part of the operations required for the large-scale infrastructure project. Such projects will thus become development corridors that enhance mobility and communication as well as professional qualification of the local inhabitants

Between reconciliation, resignation and revenge: (re-)integration of refugees, internally displaced people and ex-combatants in Sierra Leone in a long-term perspective

Sierra Leone is known for the successful reintegration of a high number of returning refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs), many of whom had stayed in protracted displacement situations during the eleven years of a most cruel internal war. The war was intertwined with the civil war in Liberia and ended with a peace agreement in 2002. The extremely high number of returnees in relation to the total population caused particular hardship for the ‘leastdeveloped’ country. Yet, Sierra Leone managed the task of reintegration of returnees from war, returning refugees from the West African region and IDPs without major disruptions and renewed outbreaks of violence. Neither a severe armed conflict nor new waves of forced displacement have re-occurred during the past 17 years. However, the acts of violence in the context of the 2018 national election - and during the three previous post-war elections - justify the question whether the recurrent violence is related to shortcomings in the overall process of reintegration. This Working Paper, therefore, takes a retrospective look into the reintegration process at large. From the perspective of the communities that received returnees, not only returning refugees and IDPs but also former fighters who came back and reintegrated into civilian life. Furthermore, the perspective of people that did not reintegrate in Sierra Leone should not be overlooked in an assessment of the success of reintegration. Therefore, this Working Paper also incorporates the perspective of Sierra Leoneans that have stayed in Liberia and never returned. It hence addresses the following guiding questions: How did the reintegration of displaced people, refugees and former fighters in Sierra Leone take place, and how did the various groups returning after war manage to live together in the long run? What prevented people from reintegrating? The author and her team's research in 2018 benefitted from the fact that returnees, communities and the ‘non-returnees’ in Liberia were able to reflect on reintegration in hindsight. Reparation and reconciliation turned out to be crucial to make reintegration feasible. Therefore, the Working Paper argues that reconciliation among returning people and the communities where they settle is a crucial dimension that has to be closely linked to the concept of reintegration. The study shows that the reintegration process replicated the deep regional divide and the marginalisation of the youth that had caused the armed conflict and shaped the course of the war. The paper concludes that refugees, IDPs and ex-combatants reintegrated into a disintegrated society - an environment producing grievances that fuel election-related violence. The insights from Sierra Leone should inform interventions of the international community in war-torn countries elsewhere and lead to a comprehensive reintegration process that incorporates refugees, IDPs as well as former fighters and is linked to reconciliation, reparations and development programmes

Between aid dependence, neighbourhood solidarity and the EU-Jordan Compact: livelihood analysis of Syrian refugees in Greater Amman

Jordan, with a population of about ten million, hosts 1.3 million Syrians of whom 670,000 are UNHCR-registered refugees, as well as nearly 85,000 registered refugees from other countries and is thus one of the countries with the highest proportion of refugees in the world. Most of them (83 per cent) are staying outside camps and many have rented flats mainly in the Jordanian capital Amman and its surroundings. The particular conditions for refugees from Syria staying in a receiving area among people with a history of protracted displacement are in the focus of this Working Paper. How do refugees from Syria secure their livelihood in the neighbourhoods of Palestinians who share the experience of a volatile legal status and limited economic rights? Does the EU-Jordan Compact improve Syrians' livelihoods? These questions are addressed by an analytical livelihood approach that includes social relationships as a significant conducive or constraining factor for refugees' agency (ability to act) in making use of local livelihood options. The findings generated in field research between November 2016 and July 2017 reveal dynamics within the Palestinian receiving community that have shifted from empathy and solidarity to more ambiguous interaction up to the exploitation and seclusion of refugees. The Paper shows how self-organised assistance groups of Jordanians with Palestinian origin take care of refugees from Syria in dire need for help, no matter what legal status they have. They support some refugees in regaining their agency and thus contribute to securing their livelihood. The central argument of this Paper is that the agenda of international aid and development agencies of enhancing resilience and promoting self-reliance of refugees does not strengthen refugees’ agency. Instead of considering the refugees' own priorities and intentions about their livelihood, it pre-designs basic needs to different refugee groups and attempts to integrate them into a presumed market economy that in fact is distorted for political purposes (mainly shielding Jordanians from foreign competitors). This is most pronounced in the EU-Jordan Compact, established to provide Syrians with preferential access to (low-skilled) employment in return for alleviated access of Jordanian companies to the European market. The study discloses how the Compact contradicts the idea of resilience of the refugees. In the conclusion, the Paper questions the collusion of the international community with the Jordanian government in using the presence of the refugees for external interests - promoting liberal market expansion through the EU - Jordan Compact in return for continuous aid

The EU-Jordan Compact: a model for burden-sharing in refugee crises?

The EU has committed itself to relaxing its trade regime towards Jordan as an incentive to promote the employment of Syrian refugees staying in the country. However, the current limitation to garment, plastic and metal industries in designated special economic zones does not match the skills Syrians have. Therefore, the EU-Jordan Compact should be opened up to further sectors, such as agro-industries. The government of Jordan has waived work permit fees for Syrian refugees since April 2016 and has now stretched the grace period until the end of 2019. To make the planning for employees and job seekers reliable, the ILO and UNHCR should ensure that the waiver remains in place until Syrians can return home. Transparency about the future cost of work permits and early information before fees for work permits for Syrians are re-introduced are also necessary. Work permits for Syrians are an entry point for refugees in formal labour relations. However, social security and labour rights are still not guaranteed for the majority of Syrian work permit holders. Agencies that support the implementation of the EU-Jordan Compact should insist on employers’ compliance with labour rights and ILO standards of decent work for work permit holders and assist in implementing them. Establishing a business can alleviate tensions in the Jordanian labour market. The government of Jordan should relax the administrative barriers for Jordanian-Syrian joint ventures and abrogate restrictions for Syrians in access to finance. Small-scale home-based businesses for refugees should also be permitted. To avoid failures in reaching the targets of the EU-Jordan Compact, Syrian refugees and Jordanian employers need to be included in revising the Compact. UNHCR could support the establishment of a representative refugee council, which should have an advisory role during the negotiations about the contents of the Compact in the mid-term review scheduled for 2020

Post-war reintegration and reconciliation: learning from Sierra Leone

The rule of law in Sierra Leone is still not firmly established after the war (1991-2002). While the Sierra Leone Special Court only treated the war crimes of top leaders, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) strove for an amnesty of a large number of mid-range commanders, who had exposed their deeds in public and asked for forgiveness. As a lesson for peace processes elsewhere, international agencies should assist in transparent cooperation between TRCs and Special Courts and support post-war governments in designing the two institutions as building blocks for the establishment of the rule of law to ensure that impunity does not become entrenched in politics in the long term. Sixteen years after the end of the war, only very few victims received compensation whereas ex-combatants were provided with vocational training and startup capital. As a lesson for future engagement of international agencies after wars, any bias towards perpetrators should be avoided by providing all-encompassing support - for reparations and compensations of war victims equally with DDR programmes, reintegration of displaced people and returning refugees as well as reconstruction of the economy. In rural Sierra Leone, local chiefs organised collective agricultural work, which facilitated interaction and exchange between IDPs and refugees, victims, ex-combatants and perpetrators of war crimes. Combined with ceremonial reconciliation, this led to reintegration and community cohesion. No external intervention was needed. International agencies should learn for such post-war engagement to let local reconciliation and reconstruction happen where it works well and avoid interference. However, indiscriminate projects that bring the different groups of youth together are crucial and need support to foster reintegration. The general attitude and behaviour of large population groups in Sierra Leone are still shaped by aid dependence, often resulting in their refusal to take responsibility for community projects or start their own initiatives for the benefit of communities. As a lesson, humanitarian and development agencies should define a clear exit strategy, communicate it to the receiving groups from the outset and stick to the strategy without making exceptions. This also requires a clear strategy of transferring responsibility to domestic authorities and societal agencies

Exodus from Afghanistan: how Germany can support the agency of Afghans in protracted displacement; recommendations for the German government

Since February this year, the intergovernmental negotiation process on developing the Global Compact for Migration has been taking place in New York. The German government should (1) advocate for the National Labour Migration Strategy and the National Labour Policy of the Government of Afghanistan to be taken into account. It should (2) support a reduction in transfer fees for remittances sent by Afghan migrants, as suggested by the KfW. The government should work towards ensuring that internally displaced people in Afghanistan and refugees in the regional host countries, Iran and Pakistan, receive the right to education, land and housing, medical care and effective legal protection as a matter of principle. Administrative authorities in the German states should only carry out deportations of Afghans if they can guarantee the safety of the deportees in the long term and enable sustainably humane living conditions. An immigration law would regulate legal access to the German jobs and educational/training markets for qualified people and skilled workers from abroad, including from Afghanistan, and rule out the immigration of ineligible people. Training and employment schemes should be implemented in areas that are under the control of the government as well as outside of these areas through collaboration with locally elected community development councils, guilds and professional associations

Conflict-sensitive employment in Afghan construction and transport companies

Empirical research on private sector companies and their business strategies in fragile and conflict-affected settings (FCASs) has been rare so far. With the aim of identifying the challenges of and motives for conflict-sensitive employment, this Working Paper presents a qualitative study on construction and transport companies in Afghanistan, based on interviews with company owners and employees in 2015 and 2016. The research reveals that companies do in fact apply a range of employment strategies with conflict-reducing effects out of self-interest. Builders need such strategies for the smooth completion of construction and infrastructure projects, while hauliers seek safe passage on routes through insecure areas of Afghanistan. These companies hire local people and negotiate with elders in communities located around construction sites or, respectively, along transport routes in order inter alia to identify local needs and, where feasible, satisfy them. The Paper argues that a general policy framework for conflict-sensitive employment is futile under conditions of an FCAS, which are characterized by a high level of state corruption and a variety of local powerholders with different interests and the inclination to extract money from companies operating in areas under their control. These insights point to a dilemma for development agencies in their pursuit of an agenda to create stability by engaging with the private sector. Whereas companies pursuing conflict-sensitive employment strategies may help to stabilize local communities, they also stabilize local power relations. In Afghanistan, this implies co-existence of, and competition between, various powerholders controlling different districts or fighting over their control. Underpinned by micro- level data, the study thus contributes meaningfully to the ongoing debate on the potential role of the private sector in peacebuilding. It places the scope of action and limitations of private sector companies into a realistic perspective. The Paper concludes that new Afghan and foreign construction and transport companies can learn lessons from experienced companies and apply systematic, locally adjusted conflict-sensitive employment frameworks to upcoming infrastructure projects

Why Afghanistan is not a safe country of origin

Reconstruction and the establishment of peace in Afghanistan have failed. Germany, as party to the intervention, has to accept its share of responsibility for this failure. The German government can do this in their policies towards the Afghan refugees by offering them with prospects both in Germany and in Afghanistan, rather than deporting them. With a well-managed immigration system, the German government, governments of the European Union, the OECD and of BRICS countries as well as governments of Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries can make an important contribution to the population’s security and to overcoming future challenges. Within a relatively short period of time, refugees ought to be able not only to obtain a status that allows them access to education, training and further qualification measures but also to work, which will give them the chance of integrating into host societies. This would also strengthen the potential of Afghans who already live abroad to help and to provide help for their fellow countrymen and –women staying in Afghanistan. In addition, opportunities for immigrants to qualify for legal migration opportunities (through immigration law, for instance) ought to remain open. A long-term, possibly decade-long investment strategy is necessary to support sustainable economic development driven by the internal market and Afghan purchasing power. Development projects must be integrated into this strategy and complement corresponding public measures by the Afghan government while taking into account the need of the private sector for reliable rules and regulations. It is of critical importance to expand and diversify vocational training centres where the Afghan youth can obtain qualifications needed on the internal job market and develop prospects for the future in their country. The German government must make greater use of its diplomatic influence in working towards a consensus for a viable roadmap for peace with the participation of the governments of Pakistan, Iran, the United States, China, Russia, Saudi Arabia and India. It should also press for legal access to land and housing for all those who have returned and who were displaced within the last 15 years