Environmental determinants of centralization of the collective bargaining function in American unions / 1614

Includes bibliographical references (p. 32-35)

A Micro-Level Study of Strikes During Contract Negotiations: Determinants and Effects on Wage Changes

174 p.Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1983.Two distinct tasks are undertaken in this dissertation. First, a model of strike determination during the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement is developed and tested. The theoretical contribution of this model is its explicit analysis in a choice theoretic framework of the factors underlying both the union's and the employer's willingness to risk a strike. Hypotheses generated by the model are tested using pooled time series, cross-sectional data on individual contract negotiations by bargaining units in U.S. manufacturing industries to test the empirical model. The study is the first to use micro-level measures of strike duration and worker-days-idled as well as the occurrence or nonoccurrence of a strike as dependent variables. The model is estimated using tobit analysis for the former two variables and probit analysis for the latter.Second, the strike-nonstrike wage change differential is estimated using the ordinary least squares estimator and bargaining unit level measures of both strike action during the negotiation and the resulting wage change. In addition, the strike-nonstrike wage change differential is decomposed into the portion attributable to endowments and the portion attributable to the behavior of striking.Several important findings emerge from the analyses. First, the likelihood that a strike will occur and its severity are positively related to the percent of union workers in the bargaining unit's industry who are male and to local union density, and inversely related to wage changes over the term of the previous agreement and the industry coefficient of variation in shipments, ceteris paribus. Second, evidence from this study fails to support the contention that the availability of welfare for strikers increases either the probability or severity of strikes.Finally, the results suggest that strikers, at best, enjoy a very slight advantage with respect to negotiated wage changes. The estimated differential in annualized percentage wage increases attributable to striking is under 1%. Moreover, short strikes actually appear to place strikers at a disadvantage. These results indicate that there is little basis for alarm concerning the inflationary impact of strikes.U of I OnlyRestricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETD

Difficult Choices: Crossing the Picket Line during the 1987 National Football League Strike.

This study examines the difficult choice faced by members of a striking bargaining unit between withholding labor or crossing the picket line in violation of the prevailing behavioral norm. Using duration analysis, the authors test a model of crossing behavior using data on individual football players during the 1987 National Football League strike. A notable finding is that nonwhite players are less willing to cross the picket line if their team union representative is also nonwhite. Willingness to cross the line is also influenced by teammate crossing and proxies for expected career length, demand for current income, and expected benefits from union demands. Copyright 1994 by University of Chicago Press.

Learning by Striking: Estimates of the Teetotaler Effect.

The authors hypothesize that past strike experience will have a negative or "teetotaler" effect on a collective bargaining unit's propensity to strike in future negotiations, other things being equal. They test this using a unique micro-level sample comprising four consecutive negotiations by 147 bargaining units in U.S. manufacturing industries, controlling for observable and unobservable differences among bargaining pairs in the propensity to strike. The results are consistent with the view that the experience of striking is, indeed, sobering: lagged strike experience variables have a significantly negative effect on the propensity to strike in the current negotiation. Copyright 1987 by University of Chicago Press.