The Safety Risks of Proposed Fuel Economy Legislation

Based on, e.g., a comprehensive assessment of what is known of factors influencing automobile safety, previous industry responses to requirements for fuel economy and prior success of regulators in reducing injuries, Professor Graham concludes that pending fuel economy bills are apt to add 1650 fatalities and 8500 serious accidents to the annual highway toll. He also presents several short-term and long-term strategies for simultaneously saving fuel and lives

The Failure of Agency-Forcing: The Regulation of Airborne Carcinogens Under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act

Professor Graham analyzes section 112 of the Clean Air Act, a provision intended by Congress to achieve ambitious regulatory ends by constraining agency discretion. The performance of the Environmental Protection Agency in implementing section 112 reveals flaws inherent in this agency-forcing approach to statutory design. In particular, section 112 directs the Agency to list formally those pollutants that it determines-without statutory guidance-to be hazardous. This directive, added to the requirement that the Agency promulgate within short dead-lines very stringent rules regulating listed pollutants, has led to a lack of result that is perceived as bureaucratic footdragging. This lack of result is, however, due to the statutory design itself, and especially to its denial to the Agency of authority to consider costs and benefits in writing regulations governing sources of listed pollutants. A package of reforms is proposed to bring needed flexibility to section 112

The Evolving Role of the U.S. Office of Management and Budget in Regulatory Policy

Since the early Reagan years, critics have argued that benefit-cost analysis is used by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as a one-sided tool of deregulation to advance the interests of business. This article discloses a little-known fact: OMB also plays a powerful pro-regulation role when agency proposals address market failures and are supported by benefit-cost analysis. Drawing on four case studies from the George W. Bush Administration, the author examines how and why OMB encouraged regulatory initiatives while protecting some rulemakings from opposition by forces inside and outside of the executive branch. The case studies address the labeling of foods for trans fat content, control of diesel engine exhaust, improvement of light-truck fuel economy, and control of air pollution from coal-fired power plants. OMB's role in the 2001-2006 period was unusual by historic standards because, rather than await agency drafts, OMB played a pro-active role in both the initiation of rulemakings and the creation of regulatory alternatives for consideration. The benefit-cost framework could be much more powerful if greater investments were made in applied research to expand knowledge on key regulatory issues.

Ranking Risk Inequities

Comparing recent data on age-adjusted death rates for blacks and whites, the authors attempt to clarify how ranking risks based on degree of inequity might differ from ranking them according to frequency of health impairments in the overall population. They also identify problems in choosing a method for ranking causes of death that incorporates both frequency and equity and suggest that agreement will be difficult to reach

A Survey of Residual Cancer Risks Permitted by Health, Safety and Environmental Policy

The authors describe permitted U.S. residual cancer risks, focusing on numerical levels specifically and implicitly authorized by statute or regulation. They also discuss potential changes

Coke Oven Emissions: A Case Study of Technology-Based Regulation

After examining and analyzing the experience with coke ovens, the authors conclude that attempts to force technology beyond its demonstrated competence can be both expensive and ineffective in controlling hazards. They also suggest implications for pending proposals to further control air pollution