Own Risk and Solvency Assessment Within the Solvency II Framework and its Interplay with the Quantitative Solvency Capital Requirements

Pursuant to art. 45 of the Solvency II Framework Directive, all insurance undertakings will be obliged to conduct an “Own Risk and Solvency Assessment” (ORSA). ORSA’s relevance is not limited only to the second pillar of Solvency II, where mainly qualitative requirements are to be found. ORSA rather exhibits strong interlinks with the first pillar and its quantitative requirements and may also serve as a trigger for transparency duties which form Solvency II’s third pillar. ORSA may thus be described in some respects as the glue that binds together all three pillars of Solvency II. ORSA is one of the most obvious examples of the supervisory shift from a rules-based to a principles-based approach. As such, ORSA has hitherto been only very roughly defined. Since it is for the undertaking to determine its own specific risk profile and to evaluate whether this risk profile deviates significantly from the assumptions underlying the standard formula, it seems only natural that the supervisor must specify in greater detail what these underlying assumptions are. The most practicable way to do so would be for EIOPA to establish a “standard insurer”, which implies a translation of the assumptions concerning the underlying probability distributions into directly observable characteristics. The creation of the standard insurer would be an important step towards relaxing the insurers’ fear of what ORSA might bring about

Beteiligung der Versicherungsnehmer an den Bewertungsreserven in der Lebensversicherung

In den vergangenen Jahrzehnten wurden hohe Garantieverzinsungen in den Lebensversicherungsverträgen vereinbart. Dauert die herrschende Niedrigzinsphase noch einige Jahre an, wird es für einige Lebensversicherungsunternehmen schwierig werden, die gegebenen Langzeitgarantien über ihre Kapitalanlage zu erwirtschaften. Der Gesetzgeber sollte festlegen, dass Versicherungskunden nur an Bewertungsreserven beteiligt werden, die eine Höhe übersteigen, die zur Gewährleistung eines intergenerativen Risikoausgleichs notwendig ist. Weiterhin sollten Versicherungskunden nur an Bewertungsreserven beteiligt werden, die aus Kapitalanlagen entstehen, die nicht festverzinsliche Wertpapiere umfassen

Hidden gems and borrowers with dirty little secrets: investment in soft information, borrower self-selection and competition

This paper empirically examines the role of soft information in the competitive interaction between relationship and transaction banks. Soft information can be interpreted as a private signal about the quality of a firm that is observable to a relationship bank, but not to a transaction bank. We show that borrowers self-select to relationship banks depending on whether their privately observed soft information is positive or negative. Competition affects the investment in learning the private signal from firms by relationship banks and transaction banks asymmetrically. Relationship banks invest more; transaction banks invest less in soft information, exacerbating the selection effect. Finally, we show that firms where soft information was important in the lending decision were no more likely to default compared to firms where only financial information was used

Stochastic Mortality, Macroeconomic Risks, and Life Insurer Solvency

Motivated by a recent demographic study establishing a link between macroeconomic fluctuations and the mortality index kt in the Lee-Carter model, we assess the impact of macroeconomic fluctuations on the solvency of a life insurance company. Liabilities in our stochastic simulation framework are driven by a GDP-linked variant of the Lee-Carter mortality model. Furthermore, interest rates and stock prices are allowed to react to changes in GDP, which itself is modeled as a stochastic process. Our results show that insolvency probabilities are significantly higher when the reaction of mortality rates to changes in GDP is incorporated.Life insurance, asset-liability management, stochastic mortality, Lee-Carter model, business cycle

Transparency through Financial Claims with Fingerprints – A Free Market Mechanism for Preventing Mortgage Securitization Induced Financial Crises

Lack of transparency in securitization transactions significantly contributed to the severe financial crisis of 2007–2009. To increase transparency we propose a new mechanism: financial claims with fingerprints. They would allow market participants at each stage of the securitization process to obtain easily full information about the underlying original risks and the superior claims that need to be satisfied before receiving their own payoffs. The fingerprint mechanism would considerably enhance transparency in securitization transactions at the expense of some transaction costs, while reducing the need for government involvement in securitization markets.Financial Crisis, Securitization, Mortgage-Backed Securities, Transparency, Opaqueness

Stellungnahme zum Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung: Finanzkonglomerate-Aufsichtsgesetz

Mittels des Gesetzes zur zusätzlichen Aufsicht über beaufsichtigte Unternehmen eines Finanzkonglomerats (Konglomerate, die aus mehreren Unternehmen aus verschiedenen Finanzmarktsektoren bestehen, beispielsweise aus dem Bankensektor und dem Versicherungssektor) sollen Regelungslücken geschlossen werden, die insbesondere die Gefahr betreffen, die sich aus der „Ansteckung“ einzelner Finanzkonglomerats-Unternehmen ergeben. Die vorliegende Stellungnahme weist auf eine Inkonsistenz in der beabsichtigten Ansiedlung der Aufsichtskompetenz hin und bietet einen Vorschlag zur Präzisierung der Eigenmittelvorschriften.Mittels des Gesetzes zur zusätzlichen Aufsicht über beaufsichtigte Unternehmen eines Finanzkonglomerats (Konglomerate, die aus mehreren Unternehmen aus verschiedenen Finanzmarktsektoren bestehen, beispielsweise aus dem Bankensektor und dem Versicherungssektor) sollen Regelungslücken geschlossen werden, die insbesondere die Gefahr betreffen, die sich aus der „Ansteckung“ einzelner Finanzkonglomerats-Unternehmen ergeben. Die vorliegende Stellungnahme weist auf eine Inkonsistenz in der beabsichtigten Ansiedlung der Aufsichtskompetenz hin und bietet einen Vorschlag zur Präzisierung der Eigenmittelvorschriften

The Impact of Individual Investment Behavior for Retirement Welfare: Evidence from the United States and Germany

Much of the industrialized world is undergoing a significant demographic shift, placing strain on public pension systems. Policymakers are responding with pension system reforms that put more weight on privately managed retirement funds. One concern with these changes is the effect on individual welfare if individuals invest suboptimally. Using micro-level data from the United States and Germany, we compare the optimal expected lifetime utility computed using a realistically calibrated model with the actual utility as reflected in empirical asset allocation choices. Through this analysis, we are able to identify the population subgroups with relatively large welfare losses. Our results should be helpful to public policymakers in designing programs to improve the performance of privately organized retirement systems.Asset Allocation, Retirement Welfare, Pension Reform

Portfolio management and retirement: what is the best arrangement for a family?

In comparing an immediate life annuity with a payout-equivalent investment fund payout plan (self-annuitization), research to date has focused mainly on shortfall probabilities of self-annuitization. As an exception, Schmeiser and Post (2005) propose a family strategy where the chances of self-annuitization (i.e., bequests) are taken into consideration as well. In such a family strategy, potential heirs must bear shortfall risks, but in return have a chance of receiving a bequest. This paper analyzes under which conditions heirs will be willing to agree to a family strategy. The idea of a family strategy is integrated into a realistically calibrated intertemporal expected utility framework, taking into account risks arising from stochastic life span, asset returns, and nontradable labor income. A family strategy is shown to be accepted for many parameter combinations, especially in families with low marginal tax rates, if the heirs are wealthy, or in a case where the retiree has an average population life expectancy. We also work out how family self-annuitization decisions interact with asset allocation, saving decisions, and labor income risk. Under realistic conditions our results support two explanations for the empirically observable low demand for annuities (the so-called annuity puzzle), namely intra-family risk sharing and high cost of market-annuitizatio

Risikoübernahme - sollte der Staat bestimmte Versicherungsgarantien übernehmen?

Nach den Terrorattacken vom 11. September sehen sich die privaten Erst- und Rückversicherer mit einer völlig veränderten Risikolage konfrontiert, die sie bisher bei ihren Kalkulationen außer Acht ließen. Dr. Michael Wolgast, Gesamtverband der Deutschen Versicherungswirtschaft, schlägt deshalb vor, dass der Staat eine »Art Resthaftung« übernehmen sollte. Diese sollte aber nach Meinung von Prof. Dr. Helmut Gründl und Dr. Hato Schmeiser, Humboldt-Universität Berlin, »nur von befristeter Natur sein« und dürfe, laut Prof. Dr. Martin Nell, Universität Hamburg, »keinesfalls zur Subventionierung von Wirtschaftszweigen eingesetzt werden«. Auch Prof. Ray Rees, Universität München, sieht die Gefahr, dass »staatliche Garantien für Versicherungsschutz Marktversagen eher noch verschlimmern als korrigieren« könnten.Versicherung, Rückversicherung, Risiko, Staat