Objectual understanding, factivity and belief

Should we regard Jennifer Lackey’s (2007) ‘Creationist Teacher’ as understanding evolution, even though she does not, given her religious convictions, believe its central claims? We think this question raises a range of important and unexplored questions about the relationship between understanding, factivity and belief. Our aim will be to diagnose this case in a principled way, and in doing so, to make some progress toward appreciating what objectual understanding—i.e., understanding a subject matter or body of information—demands of us. Here is the plan. After some ground clearing in §1, §2 outlines and motivates a plausible working model—moderate factivity—for characterising the sense in which objectual understanding should be regarded as factive. §3 shows how the datum that we can understand false theories can, despite initial suggestions to the contrary, be assimilated straightforwardly within the moderate factivity model. §4 highlights how the inverse kind of case to that explored in §3—viz., a variant of Lackey’s creationist teacher case—poses special problems for moderate factivity. With reference to recent work on moral understanding by Hills (2009), §5 proposes a solution to the problem, and §6 attempts to diagnose why it is that we might originally have been led to draw the wrong conclusion

Knowledge, Assertion and Intellectual Humility

This paper has two central aims. First, we motivate a puzzle. The puzzle features four independently plausible but jointly inconsistent claims. One of the four claims is the sufficiency leg of the knowledge norm of assertion (KNA-S), according to which one is properly epistemically positioned to assert that p if one knows that p. Second, we propose that rejecting (KNA-S) is the best way out of the puzzle. Our argument to this end appeals to the epistemic value of intellectual humility in social-epistemic practice

Googled Assertion

Recent work in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science (e.g., Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2010a; Clark 2010b; Palermos 2014) can help to explain why certain kinds of assertions—made on the basis of information stored in our gadgets rather than in biological memory—are properly criticisable in light of misleading implicatures, while others are not

Climate Change in the Classroom: A Survey of Iowa Agricultural Educators

This report presents results for questions related to climate change from a survey of Iowa agricultural educators. The survey was conducted at the annual Iowa Association of Agricultural Educators (IAAE) summer conference in Ankeny, Iowa on Wednesday, June 29, 2011. The questions were included in a larger survey that focused primarily on evaluation of integrated pest management (IPM) curricula and materials. One-hundred twenty-five agricultural educators who attended the event completed the survey. Ninety-six percent of those surveyed taught at the middle or high-school level. The questions about climate change were included in the survey to with three objectives in mind. The first was to develop an understanding of agricultural educators’ beliefs about climate change. The second was to learn whether or not they discuss climate change in the classroom. The third was to assess their perceived need for curricula and other classroom materials that focus specifically on climate change and agriculture

Norms of assertion: the quantity and quality of epistemic support

We show that the contemporary debate surrounding the question “What is the norm of assertion?” presupposes what we call the quantitative view, i.e. the view that this question is best answered by determining how much epistemic support is required to warrant assertion. We consider what Jennifer Lackey (2010) has called cases of isolated second-hand knowledge and show—beyond what Lackey has suggested herself—that these cases are best understood as ones where a certain type of understanding, rather than knowledge, constitutes the required epistemic credential to warrant assertion. If we are right that understanding (and not just knowledge) is the epistemic norm for a restricted class of assertions, then this straightforwardly undercuts not only the widely supposed quantitative view, but also a more general presupposition concerning the universalisability of some norm governing assertion—the presumption (almost entirely unchallenged since Williamson’s 1996 paper) that any epistemic norm that governs some assertions should govern assertions—as a class of speech act—uniformly

Understanding a communicated thought

The goal of this paper is twofold. First, we argue that the understanding one has of a proposition or a propositional content of a representational vehicle is a species of what contemporary epistemologists characterise as objectual understanding. Second, we demonstrate that even though this type of understanding differs from linguistic understanding, in many instances of successful communication, these two types of understanding jointly contribute to understanding a communicated thought

Upper Midwest Climate Variations: Farmer Responses to Excess Water Risks

Persistent above average precipitation and runoff and associated increased sediment transfers from cultivated ecosystems to rivers and oceans are due to changes in climate and human action. The US Upper Midwest has experienced a 37% increase in precipitation (1958–2012), leading to increased crop damage from excess water and off-farm loss of soil and nutrients. Farmer adaptive management responses to changing weather patterns have potential to reduce crop losses and address degrading soil and water resources. This research used farmer survey (n = 4778) and climate data (1971–2011) to model influences of geophysical context, past weather, on-farm flood and saturated soils experiences, and risk and vulnerability perceptions on management practices. Seasonal precipitation varied across six Upper Midwest subregions and was significantly associated with variations in management. Increased warm-season precipitation (2007–2011) relative to the past 40 yr was positively associated with no-till, drainage, and increased planting on highly erodible land (HEL). Experience with saturated soils was significantly associated with increased use of drainage and less use of no-till, cover crops, and planting on HEL. Farmers in counties with a higher percentage of soils considered marginal for row crops were more likely to use no-till, cover crops, and plant on HEL. Respondents who sell corn through multiple markets were more likely to have planted cover crops and planted on HEL in 2011.This suggests that regional climate conditions may not well represent individual farmers’ actual and perceived experiences with changing climate conditions. Accurate climate information downscaled to localized conditions has potential to influence specific adaptation strategies

Agricultural Stakeholder Views on Climate Change: Implications for Conducting Research and Outreach

Understanding U.S. agricultural stakeholder views about the existence of climate change and its causes is central to developing interventions in support of adaptation and mitigation. Results from surveys conducted with six Midwestern stakeholder groups [corn producers, agricultural advisors, climatologists, extension educators, and two different cross-disciplinary teams of scientists funded by the U.S. Department of Agriculture–National Institute of Food and Agriculture (USDA–NIFA)] reveal striking differences. Individuals representing these groups were asked in 2011/12 to “select the statement that best reflects your beliefs about climate change.” Three of five answer options included the notion that climate change is occurring but for different reasons (mostly human activities; mostly natural; more or less equally by natural and human activities). The last two options were “there is not sufficient evidence to know with certainty whether climate change is occurring or not” and “climate change is not occurring.” Results reveal that agricultural and climate scientists are more likely to believe that climate change is mostly due to human activities (50%–67%) than farmers and advisors (8%–12%). Almost a quarter of farmers and agricultural advisors believe the source of climate change is mostly natural causes, and 22%–31% state that there is not sufficient evidence to know with certainty whether it is occurring or not. This discrepancy in beliefs creates challenges for communicating climate science to agricultural stakeholders in ways that encourage adaptation and mitigation. Results suggest that engagement strategies that reduce threats to worldviews and increase public dialogue could make climate information more relevant to stakeholder groups with different belief structures

On Pritchard, Objectual Understanding and the Value Problem

Duncan Pritchard (2008, 2009, 2010, forthcoming) has argued for an elegant solution to what have been called the value problems for knowledge at the forefront of recent literature on epistemic value. As Pritchard sees it, these problems dissolve once it is recognized that that it is understanding-why, not knowledge, that bears the distinctive epistemic value often (mistakenly) attributed to knowledge. A key element of Pritchard’s revisionist argument is the claim that understanding-why always involves what he calls strong cognitive achievement—viz., cognitive achievement that consists always in either (i) the overcoming of a significant obstacle or (ii) the exercise of a significant level of cognitive ability. After outlining Pritchard’s argument, we show (contra Pritchard) that understanding-why does not essentially involve strong cognitive achievement. Interestingly, in the cases in which understanding-why is distinctively valuable, it is (we argue) only because there is sufficiently rich objectual understanding in the background. If that’s right, then a plausible revisionist solution to the value problems must be sensitive to different kinds of understanding and what makes them valuable, respectively